



CROSS-BORDER OIL AND GAS PIPELINES: THE INTERSECTION OF 







A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the 









© 2015 Miyeon Oh 
All Rights Reserved 
 ii 
ABSTRACT 
The emerging trend of cross-border oil and gas pipelines in Eurasia has immense 
geopolitical and energy market implications. With the changing landscape of global 
energy markets, both key consuming and producing states have strategic reasons to forge 
new transit routes and diversify supply lines with new overland (or undersea) pipelines. 
This dissertation examines what brings countries into binding cross-border oil and gas 
pipeline deals and why some proposed pipeline projects materialize quickly while others 
do not. It aims to provide a more systematic explanation of how politics and energy 
markets are interconnected in the choice of supply routes and of how political and 
economic factors play out interactively in decisions regarding cross-border pipeline 
projects. The dissertation employs statistical analysis and case studies to advance the 
hypothesis that, in addition to market considerations, the successful launch of a cross-
border pipeline project and the speed of the deal depend on geopolitical factors, political 
alignment between host country governments, and pipeline ownership structure. The 
statistical analysis tests this argument through the dataset I constructed of all existing and 
proposed cross-border oil and gas pipelines in the world. The dissertation then examines 
four case studies: (1) the completed Eastern-Siberia Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline 
from Russia to China; (2) the planned Altai and Power of Siberia pipelines, designed to 
bring gas from Russia to China; (3) the completed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline 
carrying Caspian oil to West from Azerbaijan via Georgia and Turkey; and (4) the 
planned Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) pipelines, designed to bring Caspian gas to 
Europe from Azerbaijan via Georgia, Turkey, Greece, Albania, and Italy. The dissertation 
finds that geopolitical factors profoundly shape energy relations and affect the likelihood 
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of successful pipeline deals and their speed regardless of the degree of economic 
incentives involved in the project. Second, the degree of political alignment between host 
countries and the ownership structure of pipelines likely determine the success of cross-
border pipeline deals. Third, the political-economic arrangements among host countries 
affect the likelihood of successful pipeline deals and their speed more significantly in the 
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WHY STUDY CROSS-BORDER OIL AND GAS PIPELINES IN EURASIA? 
The landscape of global energy markets and geopolitics is changing. The locus of global 
energy demand has shifted from Western industrial countries to developing countries in 
Asia, mainly due to economic growth in China and India1, and stagnation in European 
economies. Along with the accelerated declines in existing low-cost reserves, the rise in 
oil and gas production from non-OPEC countries will likely change the rules of the game 
in global energy supply markets in coming decades. The breakup of the former Soviet 
Union has not only released enormous new potential reserves of oil and gas in landlocked 
Central Asia, but has also opened the potential for scaled-up oil and gas production in the 
Russian Far East. In addition, the U.S. shale gas revolution and the development of East 
African natural gas will likely change the global energy supply equation significantly in 
the long term. The plunge in crude prices since the summer of 2014, on the other hand, 
has prompted major energy firms’ to defer new oil and gas projects around the globe in 
order to protect investors’ dividends, which is affecting the global energy supply markets 
in the short-term.2     
With all of these combined factors, the transformation of the global energy supply-
demand structure is powerfully influencing regional energy market dynamics and 
geopolitical relationships. At the nexus of these changing dynamics is a growing 
                                                        
1 The International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts that in the two decades leading up to 2030, China and 
India combined are likely to account for more than 50 percent of total world energy demand growth, 60 
percent of world oil demand growth, 20 percent of world natural gas demand growth, and 85 percent of 
world coal growth. World Energy Outlook 2013.  
2 The world’s big energy groups have shelved $200bn of spending on new projects due to low oil prices. 
Christopher Adams, “Oil groups have shelved $200bn in new projects as low prices bite,” Financial Times, 




competition to develop a number of major Asian and Eurasian3 pipelines to transport oil 
and gas across the region.4 With the boom in Asia’s demand for oil and natural gas, 
access to and control over future oil and gas supplies, as well as control of oil and gas 
transportation links and transit infrastructure, has become a major priority for both 
consuming and producing countries in Eurasia. Both Eurasian key producers and 
consumers have strategic reasons to forge new transit routes and diversify supply lines 
with new overland and undersea pipelines.  
Three main factors are driving the emerging trend of cross-border pipeline networks in 
Eurasia. First, in order to meet Asia’s rising energy demand in coming decades, an 
increasing share of Asia’s oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies must transit the 
Indian Ocean, Malacca Strait, and the South China Sea, to bring energy resources from 
the Middle East and Africa. This has raised new concerns for regional power over the 
growing risk of major maritime supply disruptions. China has been especially eager to 
diversify its oil imports away from these sea lanes, where more than 85 percent of its 
crude oil imports flow, because of their vulnerability to disruption by various modern 
navies.5  China has relied on one particular sea lane, the Persian Gulf, for almost half of 
its crude imports. Pipelines, therefore, are becoming more attractive as a means to 
circumvent major maritime chokepoints and congested waterways. These circumstances 
                                                        
3 “Eurasia” is used here to denote all the nations of the Asian continent, plus the territory of the former 
Soviet Union in its entirety, including all of the Russian Federation. “Asia” denotes the Asian continent, 
minus all the constituent parts of the former USSR. Kent E. Calder, The New Continentalism : Energy and 
Twenty-First-Century Eurasian Geopolitics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012). See page 305 for 
the definition of Eurasia and Asia. 
4 Mikkal Herberg et al, "Pipeline Politics in Asia: The Intersection of Demand, Energy Markets, and 
Supply Routes," in NBR Special Report (National Bureau of Asian Research, 2010). 
5 Erica Downs, “Sino-Russian Energy Relations: An Uncertain Courtship,” in James Bellacqua, ed. The 




are driving regional powers to diversify supply routes with new overland (and sometimes 
undersea) pipeline routes.  
Second, the collapse of the former Soviet Union freed up enormous potential reserves of 
oil and gas in Central Asia, and the volume of production and export from these 
landlocked, non-OPEC countries is rising. Sustained high oil prices (with exceptions 
during the 1990s, the Global Financial Crisis and the current decline in global oil prices 
since the late 2014), technological advancement, as well as increased world demand for 
oil and gas has rendered production from such landlocked states commercially viable. 
Third, transcontinental political-economic interdependence is rising across Eurasia, due 
to the breakup of the former Soviet Union and the economic reforms and rapid growth in 
China and India. These trends have led to intensify transcontinental trade between energy 
producer and consumer countries and the emergence of trans-regional oil and gas pipeline 
networks.  These transnational pipelines are becoming a more attractive means of energy 
transport in Eurasia, and an increasing number of cross-border pipelines and transit routes 
are under consideration across the continent.  
This emerging trend of developing transnational pipelines across Eurasia has drawn 
increased attention from academic and policy communities. However, existing studies 
have not sufficiently examined their important geopolitical and energy market 
implications. Transnational oil and gas pipelines are considered as an emerging type of 
strategic energy partnership that enhance the security of energy supply in Eurasia, a 
region where the institutional basis for multilateral cooperation is not yet solidified and 
where heterogeneous cultures, economies, and political regimes co-exist. Transnational 




investment and huge upfront capital costs; they also introduce a host of jurisdictional 
challenges for construction, operation, and maintenance. In this respect, the nature of 
emerging energy relations in Eurasia as well as the region’s changing supply-demand 
structure must be systematically explored in order to fully understand geopolitical and 
energy market implications of transnational pipeline development. 
EMPIRICAL PUZZLE 
The choice of one pipeline route among various options reflects energy security priorities 
and the state of political relations of countries participating in the project. In choosing 
routes to export their commodities and import their energy supplies, states consider and 
promote the political ramifications of various route options.6 From industry perspectives, 
meanwhile, cross-border pipelines are commercially driven, and political support is 
merely a way to help guarantee economic profits. Yet while the market can provide 
energy supplies, it does not create energy security. Nor does the market inherently seek 
diversification of energy supply sources and transportation routes, which can enhance 
energy security. Beyond market reasons, there are strategic reasons to develop cross-
border pipelines between key producing and consuming states. In this respect, it is 
frequently observed that not all cross-border pipelines driven by economic and 
commercial motivations necessarily align with strong political motivations. Some cross-
border pipeline projects that are seemingly less economically justifiable become 
implemented because of strong political motivations among host country governments. 
Conversely, some commercially viable pipeline projects are delayed for more than a 
couple of decades or never materialize due to lack of political motivations. My 
                                                        




dissertation focuses on the cross-border pipeline projects where market incentives are 
inversely related to political considerations. Neither economic nor political incentives can 
be the dominant factor in every pipeline case. Emerging types of strategic energy 
cooperation for cross-border pipeline development in Eurasia are much more complex 
than energy partnerships in other regions, because these are cases where states with 
different cultures, economies, and political regimes are developing energy ties.  
My dissertation aims to answer the three following research questions: 1) What brings 
countries into binding cross-border oil and gas pipeline deals and at what speed?; 2) How 
do political and economic factors play out interactively in the decision-making of cross-
border pipeline projects?; and 3) To what extent is the strategic framework of 
calculations regarding oil pipeline development different from natural gas pipeline 
development?  
This project seeks to shed light on these puzzles by examining variations among cross-
border oil and gas pipeline projects in Eurasia in terms of deal success and speed, by 
providing a systematic understanding of how politics and energy markets are 
interconnected. I explore political and economic factors at both the international and 
domestic levels in order to explain the international political economy as well as 
comparative political economy of cross-border pipeline development. At the international 
level, I examine political and commercial alignment between pipeline host countries, in 
addition to geopolitical and geo-economic factors. At the domestic level, I investigate 
political and economic considerations in individual host countries that affect decisions 
about particular pipeline projects. I also examine underlying interactive political and 




Political and commercial alignment between host countries of pipeline projects is 
evaluated in the internal project level. Finally, this dissertation examines geopolitical 
changes that occur due to crisis situations, and the subnational political-economic 
dynamics influencing decisions about pipeline development.  
To answer my research questions, I advance the following hypothesis: beyond the market 
considerations that directly relate to the economic cost and benefit incurred from cross-
border pipeline development, the successful launch of a proposed cross-border pipeline 
project and the speed of the deal depend on three underlying factors: (1) geopolitical (and 
external crisis) factors (i.e., whether a pipeline project is supported or opposed by third-
party countries, and/or goes through external shock or crisis situations); (2) political trust 
between host country governments (i.e., political alignment)7; and (3) pipeline ownership 
structure (i.e., commercial alignment between host countries). I focus on these three 
explanatory variables, which are explained in detail in the next chapter, in order to 
examine how the successful development of transnational pipeline projects depends on 
the interaction between underlying economic and political factors. This dissertation posits 
that political factors significantly affect the commercial viability of large-scale cross-
border infrastructure projects of pipeline networks in Eurasia, and that economic factors 
are conditioned on the nature of political arrangements of participating states regarding 
these pipeline projects. Moreover, I hypothesize that the effect of these three identified 
factors is more pronounced in natural gas than in oil pipeline projects. The dependent 
                                                        
7 My political trust variable represents how host country governments involved in cross-border pipeline 
projects align politically and trust one another.  I use “political trust” and “political alignment” 
interchangeably throughout my dissertation. Although the concept of political alignment provides a better 
explanation of this issue of cross-border oil and pipeline development (in the sense that political alignment 
means states are moving in the same direction), I assume that a certain degree of political trust is necessary 
to have political alignment. See Chapter 2’s Theoretical Framework section for a more detailed explanation 




variable (successful launch of a proposed pipeline project and its deal speed) and key 
independent variables are explained in greater detail in Chapter 2.  
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Overview of Research Design 
This dissertation seeks to understand what brings countries into binding cross-border oil 
and gas pipeline deals and why some proposed pipeline projects move quickly through 
the negotiation and decision-making process while others do not. In order to achieve this 
goal, I employ combined methods of statistical analysis and case studies. The statistical 
analysis explains the international political economy of cross-border pipelines by 
identifying the key political and economic factors affecting the deal speed for successful 
pipeline projects. It quantitatively demonstrates how political trust between host country 
governments, geopolitical factors, and pipeline ownership structure affect the deal speed 
of successful cross-border oil and gas pipeline projects. The purpose of this statistical 
analysis is to enable a structural understanding of the commonality of international 
political economy of cross-border oil and gas pipelines, which has been neglected in the 
existing studies.  
After this quantitative analysis provides a brief overview of proposed and existing cross-
border pipelines around the world, I conduct four case studies that focus on two regions, 
China-Russia and the Caspian Sea: (1) the completed Eastern-Siberia Pacific Ocean 
(ESPO) oil pipeline from Russia to China; (2) the planned Altai Pipeline and the Power 
of Siberia Pipeline, designed to bring gas from Russia to China; (3) the completed Baku-




via Georgia and Turkey, since 2006; and (4) the planned  Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) 
pipelines,8 designed to bring Caspian gas to Europe from Azerbaijan, via Georgia, 
Turkey, Greece, Albania, and Italy. Through these four case studies, I examine the 
comparative political economies of host countries in planned or existing cross-border 
pipelines. By focusing on detailed subnational analysis, these case studies explain both 
internal and external political-economic dynamics that lead countries to reach cooperative 
trans-border pipeline development agreements.  
Statistical Analysis 
Through independent research, I have constructed a dataset on all existing and 
prospective cross-border oil and gas pipelines in the world, which includes approximately 
200 pipeline projects. Because this dataset has many missing values in dependent and 
independent variables due to the limited accessibility to industry data sources, I have 
constrained the final sample to realized pipelines that are operational or the pipelines 
whose cross-border agreements are signed/finalized. A total of 77 cross-border pipeline 
projects are selected for statistical regressions.9 Despite these limitations in sample size, 
                                                        
8 The Southern Gas Corridor includes the expansion of the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline to Turkey from 
Azerbaijan, the construction of the Trans Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) across Turkey, and the Trans 
Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) across Greece, Albania, and into Italy. The Southern Gas Corridor will bring 
Caspian gas from the Shah Deniz field to a major European gas market for the first time in 2018. 
9 The reason why I only have cases of successful pipelines as a final sample (a subset of 77 out of 200) is 
because (1) I have limited access to the industry data, thus difficult to have a larger size of final sample, 
and (2) only successful pipelines have a full range of observations containing a brief description of four 
explanatory variables (geopolitical factors, the level of political trust, pipeline ownership structure, and fuel 
type), control variables (a number of participating countries, pipeline length), a dependent variable (the 
year that a pipeline is proposed, signed, and operated) and other indictors (throughput, total capital cost, 
etc.). I tested if I have same statistical results for my explanatory variables (that do not include the ‘pipeline 
ownership structure’ variable as final investment decision (FID) is made at the last stage for deal 
finalization) with the dataset that has pipelines that are successful, failed, and under considerations. I 
confirmed they lend the same statistical results with those of my final sample. Therefore, I can test success 





this quantitative exercise forms the basis for the more in-depth qualitative case 
discussions that follow.   
As I am studying cross-border oil and gas pipeline projects over time, the unit of analysis 
is a cross-border pipeline project in a given year (project-year). To avoid selecting on the 
dependent variable, I have included all cross-border pipeline projects, regardless of 
whether they are in Eurasia or not. This part of the research design reflects the 
heterogeneity that exists among cross-border pipeline projects and how quickly their 
deals are finalized (i.e., deal speed). While my case studies investigate key determining 
factors both for deal success and the deal speed, the statistical analysis focuses on the 
deal speed due to the limitations of my current dataset. In order to operationalize my 
dependent variable of deal speed, I aggregated the number of years of a successful 
pipeline project from its initial proposal to its deal finalization. For the explanatory 
variables of geopolitical factors, pipeline ownership structure and fuel type, I created 
categorical or binary variables depending on my definitions, which will be explained in 
Chapter 3. For the independent variable of political trust between host countries, I relied 
on the Affinity of Nations index to construct a continuous variable, whose unit of analysis 
is the country dyad in a given year; I take the average values of all pairs of participating 
states in a certain pipeline project in the year that the deal is finalized. I use the maximum 
likelihood estimation method since the classical linear model is not suited to explaining 
how my discrete explanatory variables depend on (or are associated) with other 




small number of values with strictly positive probabilities given postulated categorization, 
the shape of observation set does not correspond to a linear model.10  
Case Studies 
I chose my four cases for the following reasons. First, they show variations in terms of 
pipeline type and the number of host countries, allowing me to differentiate between 
multi-state export pipelines and direct link pipelines. Intuitively, international pipelines 
that cross borders of multiple states and therefore involve transit state(s), incur more risks 
than pipelines that link exporting and importing states directly. Multi-state export 
pipelines are not only longer, more expensive, and technologically more complicated than 
direct-link pipelines, but they also involve multiple parties including transit states without 
overarching jurisdictions. The more parties involved in a cross-border pipeline project, 
the harder it is to negotiate, reach investment decisions, and finalize intergovernmental 
agreements. Developing cross-border pipeline projects creates an environment in which 
no overarching legal jurisdiction exists to manage conflicts that may result due to cross-
border trade, the use of transit infrastructure, and the use of pipeline itself. Different 
parties have different interests, and the project generates profit and rent to be shared 
between various parties. Given that the interests of transit state(s) are fundamentally 
different from those of an exporting or importing state, the difficulties of dealing with 
cross-border pipelines magnifies with each new party engaged in a pipeline project.11 
However, I find that this assumption does not adequately explain why some bilateral 
                                                        
10 Scott Long, Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables (Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications, 1997). Christian Gourieroux, Alain Monfort, and Alain Trognon, "Pseudo Maximum 
Likelihood Methods: Theory," Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society (1984): 681-700. 
11 Paul Stevens, "Cross-Border Oil and Gas Pipelines: Problems and Prospects," (Joint UNDP/World Bank 




direct-link pipelines face or have faced many more obstacles than multi-state export 
pipelines in Eurasia. I challenge the conventional understanding that bilateral energy ties 
tend to be easier to establish than multilateral energy ties.12 By examining four case 
studies that do not support the prevailing assumption, I aim to better explain what drives 
successful cross-border pipeline projects in Eurasia as well as how the nature of energy 
relations in Eurasia is different from that in other parts of the world.  
Second, I chose my four case studies because they show variations in terms of the 
relationship between economic incentives and political alignments between host country 
governments (see Figure 1). This approach reflects the methodological considerations of 
my project, since the research objective is to explain variations rather than similarities in 
the dependent variable (the likelihood of successful launch of a proposed cross-border 
pipeline project and its deal speed), and therefore the postulated independent variable 
should take on values as different from each other as possible. The two cases of China-
Russian oil and natural gas pipelines have high economic incentives to proceed, but low 
political trust between the two states. The BTC oil pipeline is a case where high political 
trust exists between host countries but where there are few economic incentives, while 
the SGC pipeline project to bring Caspian gas to Western Europe demonstrates how the 
deal proceeds when there are high-medium levels of political trust and high-medium 
economic incentives. I did not include the case where a pipeline project had both low 
levels of political trust and low economic incentives because it is self-evident that such a 
project is unlikely to materialize. My analysis focuses on the different arrangements 
                                                        
12 Some existing studies emphasize that energy relations in Asia have been mainly bilateral because the 
basis of multilateral cooperation has not been solidified and the institutional framework has not been set in 
the region. See: Jae-Seung Lee, "Energy Security and Cooperation in Northeast Asia," Korean Journal of 




between interconnected political and economic factors in these four cases, which enable 
me to explain why some proposed cross-border pipeline projects succeed while others fail, 
as well as why some proposed ones materialize quickly while others do so slowly.  
Figure 1. Case Selection: Political-Economic Matrix 
 
Third, I selected these cases because they are representative of other cross-border 
pipeline projects in Eurasia that fall within my own postulated categories of ownership 
structure and fuel type. China-Russian pipelines represent the type of pipeline ownership 
and financing that is driven solely by national oil and gas companies, whereas the 
pipelines from the Caspian Sea represent the combined pipeline ownership structure 
between national and international oil companies, which creates a joint venture (JV) 
consortium for the financing, construction, and operation of pipelines. The ESPO pipeline 
from Russia to China and the BTC pipeline from the Caspian to the West represent cross-
border oil pipelines, while the POS and Altai pipelines from Russia to China and the SGC 




Because this research examines cross-border pipeline projects that involve decision-
making at both international and domestic levels, small-N case studies are crucial in 
accounting for contextual idiosyncrasies that each pipeline project has depending on 
domestic political and economic considerations, which a large-N statistical analysis does 
not capture. Targeted small-N studies allow research to access complex casual 
mechanisms in detailed cases, thus helping elucidate specific concepts that can lead to 
better theory building.13 Each pipeline has a different and complex story depending on 
domestic political and economic arrangements, including a host country’s energy 
bureaucracy and industry structure, its national and foreign policies of energy security, 
and the geopolitical environments and international political-economic factors a country 
faces. The commercial viability of the pipeline project, the security of energy supply, and 
the choice of one supply routes among several options are embedded in such domestic 
arrangements. Through the case studies, my dissertation aims to explain these domestic 
factors that are not assessed in the statistical analysis, as well as the international factors 
that influence domestic political economies of host countries. In terms of methodology, I 
employ process-tracing research techniques to uncover the decision-making process by 
which the outcome – deal success and speed for successful cross-border pipeline projects 
– is produced.14   
This study marshals evidence from archival documents, speeches, interviews, and 
surveys, as well as from attendance at energy-related conferences that were open to 
public or off-the-record. My research excluded fieldwork, given the fact that my cases 
                                                        
13 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). 
14 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in 




cover more than ten countries; traveling to those countries was not feasible for a 
dissertation research project due to limitations of time and resources, as well as language 
barriers. To overcome such limitations, I mostly relied on secondary sources written in 
English for archival research to observe and track the process and history of decision-
making and negotiations of selected pipeline projects. I relied on the LexusNexis 
database of the Brookings Institution’s library, which keeps track of selected pipeline 
projects on a daily basis with both industry sources and major newspapers.15 The industry 
sources I consulted include The Oil & Gas Journal, The Platts Energy Economist, The 
Platts Oilgram News, The International Oil Daily, UPI Energy, The Russia & CIS 
Energy Newswire, The Trend Oil & Gas, The Interfax Natural Gas Daily, The Interfax 
Russia & CIS Oil and Gas Weekly, The Russia & CIS Oil and Gas Weekly, and The 
Kazakhstan Oil & Gas Weekly. Major newspapers include not only The New York Times, 
The Financial Times, Reuters, the BBC, and Bloomberg Business, but also the local 
newspapers on particular countries or regions that have an English-language version, 
such as China Daily, Xinhua News, The Central Asia & Caucasus Business Weekly, The 
Russia & CIS Business and Financial Newswire, and The Moscow Times. I also utilized 
resources that are energy-specific and open to the public, which include research 
institutions such as the Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, Institut Français des Relations 
Internationales (IFRI, French Institute of International Relations), the Jamestown 
Foundation, and Natural Gas Europe. Publications or reports from government-affiliated 
agencies such as the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS), as well as intergovernmental organizations such 
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as the World Bank, the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Energy Charter Treaty 
(ECT)’s secretariat were also consulted.  Websites of the energy-related ministries in the 
host countries of selected pipeline projects, of international oil companies (IOCs) such as 
Shell and British Petroleum (BP), and of national oil companies (NOCs) such as 
Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) were also included in the 
analysis.    
I also conducted in-depth interviews in English with government officials, scholars from 
academia and think tanks, experts from the oil and gas industry, and analysts from energy 
consulting companies or international organizations. Interviewees include both 
Americans and citizens of host countries of selected pipeline projects. Despite the 
limitations that I have due to language barriers and the exclusion of fieldwork, my 
location in Washington D.C. enabled me to overcome these obstacles. A large number of 
scholars and experts from host countries of the selected pipeline projects visited 
Washington to participate in and speak at energy-related conferences, which enabled me 
to interview them. Given that the selected pipelines were actively discussed within the 
DC policy community during my period of study, a large number of conferences were 
held on the specific pipeline projects I studied.  
Interviews with government officials—including at the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE), the Energy Bureau in the U.S. State Department, and the energy-related 
ministries of foreign states— provided me with broader foreign policy perspectives in 
understanding cross-border energy trade and infrastructure development. Interviews with 
foreign government officials or scholars in the foreign government-affiliated research 




dynamics and geopolitics involved in cross-border pipeline projects. Interviewing 
individuals in various academic, corporate, and non-academic positions also enabled me 
to crosscheck the information that I obtained in my interviews and archival research.      
FINDINGS 
By focusing on cross-border oil and gas pipeline projects, my dissertation examines the 
underlying mechanism of interactive political and economic factors (at both the 
international and domestic levels) as a determinant for energy cooperation in Eurasia. 
Through an investigation of intergovernmental and financial decision-making processes 
regarding cross-border pipelines, the dissertation sought to explain what brings countries 
into binding cross-border oil and gas pipeline deals and why some proposed pipeline 
projects materialize quickly while others move slowly through the process of negotiation 
and decision-making. In explaining the variations in deal success and speed of 
negotiations, the dissertation employs combined methods of statistical analysis and case 
studies, whose empirical results demonstrate four key findings.  
First, geopolitical changes due to crisis situations profoundly shape energy relations and 
affect the likelihood and speed of successful pipeline deals, regardless of the degree of 
economic incentives involved in the project. For example, Sino-Russian agreements for 
cross-border oil and gas pipelines were signed 1) when Russian-Western relations were at 
odds – during Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 
2014 – and/or 2) when unexpected external factors, such as the Global Financial Crisis 
and the collapse of oil prices (in 2008–2009 and since the summer 2014), compelled 
Russia to rely on Chinese capital. Russia decided to make concessions with China only as 




has strong market and strategic incentives to diversify its energy import portfolio with 
Russian oil and gas.  
The BTC pipeline provides another example of how geopolitical changes can affect a 
pipeline project. After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the geopolitical goal of 
enhancing Western involvement in the energy and security sectors of the Caspian region 
was a key factor driving commercial decisions in the BTC pipeline development – the 
first oil pipeline transporting Caspian oil to international markets without crossing 
through Russia. In another case involving geopolitical considerations, competition over 
the SGC pipeline project to transport Caspian gas to Europe illustrates the rivalry 
between the EU and Russia, as well as changing dynamics of regional power politics. 
Russia tries hard to maintain its control over the European market against the EU’s quest 
for supply diversification of natural gas, both in terms of sources and transit routes. The 
EU wants to reduce its dependence on Russia due to Russia’s gas disputes with key 
transit countries, which lead to unpredictable and consequential supply disruptions in 
Europe. With Russia’s stronger role in the region today than when the BTC was built in 
the 2000s, the SGC proceeded much differently than the earlier pipeline. Azerbaijan and 
Turkey, U.S. allies that worked with Washington on the BTC pipeline, now desired to 
avoid direct competition with Russia and maintain pragmatic, strategic relations with 
Moscow. These new geopolitical dynamics are considered to be one of the key elements 
in choosing Trans Adriatic Pipeline and the Trans Anatolian Pipeline over other pipeline 
routes in the SGC competition.   
Second, the level of political trust between host countries affects the deal success and 




project, including oil and gas prices and equity stakes in the upstream, an examination of 
political alignment offers more nuanced and sophisticated explanations as to why Sino-
Russian pipeline development took many years to materialize despite clear economic 
incentives of supply-demand complementarity.16, This stands in contrast to the Caspian 
case, where pipelines transporting oil and gas to Europe were realized much faster despite 
their less substantial economic incentives (Figure 2). In explaining such differences, I 
argue that the low level of political trust (i.e., political alignment) between Russia and 
China is one of the key elements that delayed the finalization of the oil and gas deals, 
whereas relatively high levels of political trust among host countries helped expedite the 
Caspian pipelines. Both case studies and statistical results support my argument that the 
level of political trust between host countries is one of the key determinants explaining 
why some bilateral direct-link pipelines face more obstacles than multi-state export 
pipelines in Eurasia, which challenges the conventional understanding that bilateral 
energy ties are easier to establish than multilateral ones.  
Third, I contend that pipeline ownership structure also affects the success and speed of 
cross-border pipeline projects. Sino-Russian pipelines represent the type of ownership 
structure where pipelines are owned only by national oil companies (NOCs) and where 
there is no joint venture (JV) consortium for construction and operation. In contrast, 
Caspian pipelines represent the combined ownership structure where both NOCs and 
international oil companies (IOCs) are shareholders in the pipeline JVs. In the BTC 
pipeline case, British Petroleum (BP), as principal shareholder and project operator, took 
                                                        
16 China is the world’s second-largest oil consumer (behind the United States) and became the largest 
global energy consumer in 2010. Russia is a major producer and exporter of oil and natural gas; Russia was 
the world’s third-largest producer of oil (after Saudi Arabia and the United States) in 2013 and the second-




the lead in establishing a JV consortium that consists of seven countries and eleven 
companies17, including Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR. The Trans Adriatic 
Pipeline (TAP) and Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), which are main components of 
the SGC, have also established JVs, composed of both IOC and NOC shareholder 
members.18 I argue that the IOC-NOC combined ownership helps facilitate the successful 
materialization of cross-border pipeline deals, even though such an ownership structure 
engages a larger number of actors, including companies from non-host countries, than 
pipelines owned exclusively by NOCs or host-country firms.    
Fourth, political-economic arrangements in host countries have a greater impact on the 
speed and success of cross-border pipeline projects for natural gas than for oil. In 
particular, when a pipeline’s fuel type is natural gas, the effect of geopolitical factors on 
the deal speed is more pronounced, as my statistical results demonstrate. In other words, 
gas pipelines are more vulnerable in geopolitical and external crises than oil pipelines. 
My case studies also confirmed that gas pipeline projects tend to take longer to 
materialize than oil pipelines. In explaining the distinction between oil and gas, the case 
studies provided more in-depth analysis by examining subnational political-economic 
dynamics, in addition to geopolitical and other international factors. For instance, case 
studies revealed the full impact of power dynamics in the Russian oil industry and the 
                                                        
17 The principal stakeholder of the JV is British Petroleum (BP) of having 30.1 percent of shares (the 
project operator), followed by Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR (25 percent). Other consortium 
members include American UNOCAL (8.9 percent), Norwegian Statoil (8.71 percent), Turkish TPAO 6.53 
percent), Italian ENI (5 percent), French Total (5 percent), Japanese Itochu (3.4 percent), Japanese Inpex 
(2.5 percent), American ConocoPhillips (2.5 percent) and American Hess (2.36 percent).  
18 Shareholders of the TAP JV include Azerbaijan’s state-owned SOCAR (58 percent), Turkey’s state-
owned BOTAŞ (30 percent), and British multinational BP (12 percent). Shareholders of the TANAP JV are 
BP (20 percent), SOCAR (20 percent), Norway’s multinational Statoil (20 percent), Belgium’s public 
utility Fluxys (16 percent), French multinational Total (10 percent), Germany’s electricity utility E.ON (9 




rise of state-owned oil company Rosneft, as well as of China’s sharp decline in oil 
production and “loans for oil” import diversification strategy, on Sino-Russian oil 
cooperation. Case studies also allowed for a deeper examination of the impact of Russia’s 
invasion of Georgia and the Global Financial Crisis on the oil deal with China. Likewise, 
case studies provided analyses to illuminate how Sino-Russian gas cooperation was 
shaped by factors as diverse as the competition between Rosneft and Gazprom in line 
with the Russian government’s “eastward strategy,” China’s increasing concerns about 
air pollution and anti-corruption investigations into NOCs, the impact of the 2014 
Ukraine crisis and resulting Western sanctions against Russia, and the impact of falling 
global oil prices.    
In closing, both case studies and statistical results support my argument that, when 
looking beyond market incentives, the successful launch and deal speed of a cross-border 
pipeline project depend on three underlying factors: geopolitical change, political trust 
between host country governments, and pipeline ownership structure, and that the effect 
of these three factors is more pronounced in natural gas than in oil pipeline projects. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of the quantitative analysis in my dissertation, it forms 
the basis for the more in-depth qualitative analysis of case studies. This qualitative 
analysis demonstrates that geopolitical factors are likely to delay cross-border pipeline 
developments, whereas a higher level of political trust and a pipeline ownership structure 
that includes NOCs and IOCs are likely to expedite projects. Case studies offer the 
detailed subnational analysis of changing internal political-economic dynamics that lead 




well as analysis of relevant external political-economic factors. A summary of these case 
study findings is provided in Figure 2 and Table 1 below.  
Figure 2. Deal Speed: History of Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Pipelines and Caspian 
Oil and Gas Pipelines to Europe 
 
 
Table 1. Case Selection and Summary 
 Caspian to Europe  
(multi-state export pipelines) 
China-Russia 
(direct-link pipelines) 
Pipelines  BTC Oil SGC  
(TAP & 
TANAP) 
ESPO Oil  POS Gas 
Deal Speed Fast  Fast Slow  Slow  
Number of 
Actors 
Many  Many  Few  Few  
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(Notes: *Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (ACG) oil field; ** Shah-Deniz (SD) consortium; *** 
Greek Natural Gas System Operator (DESFA)) 
ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
Chapter 2 outlines my conceptual framework as well as theoretical context. I provide a 
detailed formulation of my dependent variable (likelihood of successful launch of a 
proposed pipeline project and how quickly its deal is concluded), three explanatory 
variables (geopolitical (and external crisis) factors; political trust between host country 
governments; and pipeline ownership structure), and explain why examining the 
variations on the dependent variable through analysis of explanatory variables matters. I 
also evaluate the effect of the three explanatory variables on the different fuel types (oil 




emerging trend of cross-border pipeline networks in Eurasia within the scholarly 
literature on energy security, strategic partnership, international joint ventures (JVs), state 
owned enterprises (SOEs), and international oil companies. I revisit the existing 
international relations (IR) literature of neorealist and liberal paradigms in order to derive 
my hypotheses, since the paradigms help to situate my project in the IR literature and, 
incidentally, the current debate on the emerging trend of pipeline networks across 
Eurasian continent in policy circles.  
Chapter 3 comprises the dissertation’s statistical analysis. It illustrates the statistical 
design with a detailed explanation of data, as well as a measurement and 
operationalization of dependent, independent, and control variables. It then describes how 
my statistical findings reinforce the hypotheses.  
Chapters 4 through 7 analyze my four in-depth case studies of cross-border pipeline 
projects. Chapter 4 and 5 focus on the pipeline development between China and Russia, 
whereas Chapter 6 and 7 examine the developing energy transportation networks from 
the Caspian Sea to Europe.  
Chapter 4 introduces the case of the completed Eastern-Siberia Pacific Ocean (ESPO) 
pipeline carrying oil from Russia to China, while Chapter 5 traces the planned Altai 
Pipeline and the proposed Power of Siberia Pipeline designed to bring gas from Russia to 
China.  
Chapter 6 introduces the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline that has brought Caspian 
oil to West from Azerbaijan, via Georgia and Turkey, since 2006, and Chapter 7 
examines the planned Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) development designed to bring 




Lastly, Chapter 8 revisits my findings in light of underlying interactive political and 
economic factors determining the deal success and speed for cross-border pipeline 
projects. Given that both Sino-Russian gas pipeline development and the Caspian gas 
transportation network of the SGC are ongoing planned projects, the chapter updates 
changes in geopolitics that occurred after the deal was finalized. The updates include the 
impact of Western sanctions and low oil prices on the Russian political economy, the 
suspension of the Altai gas pipeline between China and Russia, Russia’s cancellation of 
the South Stream pipeline, and the proposal of the Turkish Stream pipeline. The chapter 
then discusses how U.S. energy policy will be affected by Russia’s strengthening energy 
ties with China and Turkey. And finally, by inviting discussion on the nature of strategic 















In explaining rising political-economic interdependence across Eurasia, deepening inter- 
and intra-regional energy ties are certainly a key driver. Transcontinental trade between 
energy producer and consumer states has intensified, and trans-regional oil and natural 
gas pipeline networks have emerged. One of the distinct features of the new 
transcontinental configuration is that countries with different cultural, social, political, 
and/or economic backgrounds are developing relationships in the sectors where they 
share complementarity such as energy. Since existing energy ties are systematic yet less 
formal, and transcontinental integration still remains at an early stage19, it is analytically 
compelling to examine the nature of emerging energy relations in Eurasia, which is 
underexplored in the existing political science literature. This dissertation focuses on the 
emerging trend of cross-border oil and gas pipeline development in order to explain 
systematically the nature of energy relations, as well as the changing geopolitics and 
supply-demand structure of energy markets in Eurasia.  
The topic of cross-border oil and gas pipelines across the Eurasia continent is drawing 
increased attention from the academic and policy communities, as they are considered as 
signs of emerging strategic energy partnerships that enhance energy security. However, 
most of the existing studies on pipelines are in the areas of economics, environmental 
studies, engineering, and the sciences, as the topic has not received much attention in the 
international relations (IR) and political science literature. While some contemporary IR 
studies of pipelines target audiences in either policy circles or energy industries, they 
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have not yet sufficiently examined pipelines’ important geopolitical and energy market 
implications from either a theoretical or empirical perspective.  
This dissertation examines the emerging trend of cross-border oil and gas pipeline 
networks across the Eurasian continent as a way to provide a more systematic 
understanding of how politics and energy markets are interconnected in reaching binding 
cross-border agreements and how political factors significantly affect the commercial 
viability of large-scale cross-border energy infrastructure projects. This chapter is divided 
into two sections: literature review and theoretical framework. The literature review 
section begins by probing existing studies of cross-border oil and gas pipelines. It 
explores the studies that directly discuss selected cases of cross-border pipelines from a 
policy-oriented perspective. It also examines the literature that briefly discusses cross-
border pipelines as part of a comprehensive explanation of energy security and the 
political economy of energy. The chapter then explores the literature that is highly 
relevant to explaining the planning, decision-making processes, construction, and security 
of cross-border pipelines. The literature reviewed includes scholarship regarding 
international energy security, the political economy of energy, strategic partnership, and 
the traditional IR theories of neorealism and liberalism. By incorporating the existing 
studies on cross-border pipelines with the relevant literature in political science, the 
dissertation offers a more integrative approach.   
The second section outlines my conceptual framework. I detail my dependent variable 
(likelihood of successful launch of a proposed pipeline project and its deal speed), three 
explanatory variables (geopolitical (and external crisis) factor(s); political trust between 




working hypotheses through which I examine the variations in the dependent variable 
through explanatory variables. I also evaluate the effect of my three explanatory variables 
on the difference between oil and natural gas cross-border pipeline projects. First, I 
examine existing studies that focus on international pipelines and then other studies of 
international energy security and geopolitics that are relevant to cross-border pipeline 
development.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Existing Studies on Pipelines 
Intergovernmental organizations, think tanks, research institutions, and energy consulting 
firms have published many special reports on cross-border pipelines.20 The World Bank 
published a report on “Cross-Border Oil and Gas Pipelines: Problems and Prospects” in 
2003.21 This report explains cross-border pipelines’ inherent risks involving high 
financing costs and vulnerability to supply disruption, as well as the differences between 
oil and natural gas pipelines. It introduces twelve pipeline projects that differ in terms of 
roles of the private and public sectors (i.e., the degree of private sector involvement) in 
stages ranging from pipeline planning, financing, construction, and operation. The report 
concludes there are fewer problems when governments are primarily concerned with 
                                                        
20 Special reports on cross-border pipelines include: Stevens, Paul. “Cross-Border Oil and Gas Pipelines: 
Problems and Prospects.” Joint UNDP/World Bank Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme 
(ESMAP), 2003; Herberg, Mikkal et al. "Pipeline Politics in Asia: The Intersection of Demand, Energy 
Markets, and Supply Routes." In NBR Special Report: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2010. Research 
institutions such as the Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, the Jamestown Foundation, and the French 
Institute of International Relations (IFRI) have publications, reports, or brief analyses on cross-border oil 
and gas pipelines. Private consulting firms such as IHS Inc. which acquired Cambridge Energy Research 
Associates (CERA) and PFC Energy also have analysis on pipelines, which is only provided to its clients in 
business and government.   
21 Paul Stevens, “Cross-Border Oil and Gas Pipelines: Problems and Prospects.” Joint UNDP/World Bank 




commercial rather than political or strategic factors.  
Another exemplary work on cross-border pipelines is the National Bureau of Asian 
Research (NBR)’s special report, “Pipeline Politics in Asia: The Intersection of Demand, 
Energy Markets, and Supply Routes.”22 The report has five essays that focus on the broad 
geopolitics of cross-border pipeline development, the progress in development of new oil 
and gas pipelines from Russia’s East Siberia to China and Northeast Asia, prospects for 
Central Asian oil and gas pipelines to East Asia, India’s pipeline dilemmas and 
challenges, and the implications of new oil and gas pipelines being built by China across 
Myanmar into Southeastern China. Based on these essays, the report draws conclusions 
regarding U.S. energy security and strategic interests in East Asia and Eurasia.  
Research institutions such as the Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, the Jamestown 
Foundation, and the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) have publications, 
reports, or brief analyses on cross-border oil and gas pipelines. While they tend to offer 
analytical frameworks for micro-level understandings of individual oil and gas 
pipelines,23 the emerging trend of cross-border pipeline networks in Eurasia is still 
underexplored and must be examined through a more integrative approach in order to 
fully understand these developments’ important geopolitical and energy market 
implications.    
Another group of studies include a discussion of cross-border oil and gas pipelines as a 
                                                        
22 Herberg, Mikkal et al. "Pipeline Politics in Asia: The Intersection of Demand, Energy Markets, and 
Supply Routes." In NBR Special Report: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2010. 
23 Jonathan Stern among others who specialize in the Russian oil and gas industry and the European gas 
market has published books and reports that include brief analyses of oil and gas pipelines. See James and 
Pirani Henderson, Simon, ed. The Russian Gas Matrix: How Markets Are Driving Change (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2014); Jonathan Stern et al, Natural Gas in Asia: Challenges of Growth in China, 




part of their analyses of energy security. In Sea Lanes and Pipelines, Bernard D. Cole 
investigates military aspects of energy security in maritime Asia and discusses pipelines 
as a way to ameliorate the threats to the security of the sea lines of communications over 
which tankers travel.24 Through a brief analysis of existing and planned cross-border 
pipelines in Asia, he argues that both overland and undersea pipelines offer relief from 
the costs and dangers of the seaborne delivery of energy resources, since tankers are 
susceptible to considerable risks, including navigational hazards, bad weather, dangers 
posed by maritime terrorism and piracy, and wartime attacks.  
In Energy & Security: Strategies for a World in Transition, several chapters briefly 
discuss specific pipelines in Europe, North America, Russia, and Central Asia.25 For 
instance, Julia Nanay and Jan H. Kalicki summarize competing natural gas pipelines in 
Russia and Eurasia, including the South Stream pipelines, the Southern Gas Corridor, the 
Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP), and the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India 
(TAPI) pipeline. In The East Moves West, Geoffrey Kemp briefly explores intra-Asian oil 
and gas pipelines that are existing, proposed, or under construction in order to explain  
Asia’s growing presence and involvement in the Middle East through energy trade and 
transportation links.26 He argues that infrastructure development in Eurasia has been 
plagued by regional rivalries and could be derailed in the future given the region’s 
geopolitical and economic realities, while the development of new pipelines could relieve 
                                                        
24 Bernard D Cole, Sea Lanes and Pipelines: Energy Security in East Asia (Praeger Security International, 
2008). 
25 Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn, eds. Energy and Security: Strategies for a World in Transition. 
Johns Hopkins Univeristy Press, 2013. 
26 Geoffrey Kemp, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia's Growing Presence in the Middle East 




some of China’s and India’s reliance on seaborne energy shipments.27 Brenda Shaffer 
examines pipeline trends in her broader discussion of energy politics, arguing that 
infrastructure projects link states and reflect the current state of political and economic 
relations, especially when choosing routes to export commodities and import energy 
supplies.28   
Other studies also briefly discuss cross-border oil and/or gas pipelines as a way to 
provide a more integrative understanding of the political economy of energy. Thane 
Gustafson explores the Eastern Siberia Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline between Russia 
and China in order to explain the Russian oil industry in Wheel of Fortune: The Battle for 
Oil and Power in Russia.29 Arguing that the fate of the Russian oil industry parallels the 
collapse and revival of the Russian state, his analysis is divided into explaining the 
weakness of the Russian state vis-à-vis the privatized oil industry in the 1990s and then 
the resurgence of strong state power since 2000 with the growth of two power groups: the 
oil oligarchs and Putin’s circle. Studies of Sino-Russia relations also sometimes examine 
oil and gas pipelines in order to explain the role of energy in bilateral relations. Keun-
Wook Paik’s Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation: The Reality and Implications  is 
one of the exemplary studies that discuss oil and gas pipelines to provide a 
comprehensive explanation of the evolution of Sino-Russia energy relations.30  
                                                        
27 Ibid, p. 170-173. 
28 See “Pipeline Trends and International Politics,” in Brenda Shaffer, Energy Politics (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009); Brenda Shaffer, "Natural gas supply stability and foreign policy," 
Energy Policy 56 (2013): 114-125; Avinoam Idan and Brenda Shaffer, "The Foreign Policies of 
Landlocked States," Post-Soviet Affairs 27.3 (2011): 1-37. 
29 Thane Gustafson, Wheel of Fortune: The Battle for Oil and Power in Russia (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2012. 
30 Keun-Wook Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation: The Reality and Implications (Oxford: 




In addition, the economics literature examines how economic theory captures the 
development and regulation of pipelines. Jeff Makholm, in the Political Economy of 
Pipelines,31 introduces key elements to explain the world’s pipeline industry, including 
high transaction costs,32 institutional evolution,33 public goods, and transit tariff.34 
Focusing on pipelines’ unique characteristics—they are capital-intensive, land-bound and 
immobile, and long-distance inland (sometimes undersea) forms of transportation—
                                                                                                                                                                     
Poussenkova, "Russia's Eastern Energy Policy: A Chinese Puzzle for Rosneft " Russie.NEI.Visions 70 
(2013); Erica Downs, “Sino-Russian Energy Relations: An Uncertain Courtship,” in James Bellacqua, The 
Future of China-Russia Relations (2010); Morena Skalamera, "Booming Synergies in Sino-Russian Natural 
Gas Partnership," Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 
May 2014.  
31 Jeff D. Makholm, The Political Economy of Pipelines: A Century of Comparative Institutional 
Development (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012). 
32 Makholm builds on Oliver Williamson’s transaction cost economics to explain pipelines. The theory 
explains why some economic transactions take place inside firms and others happen by contract in the 
marketplace. He brings in the concept of asset specificity to explain why certain kinds of investment are so 
sunk and dedicated to particular business relationships that they give rise to vertical integration. Makholm 
says pipelines display great asset specificity: immobile assets of great length tied to fuel producers, oil 
refiners, power plants, or local gas distributors. Vertical integration ties the interests of those producers, 
pipeline companies, refineries, power plants, or gas distributors together. The problems with pipelines is 
that while asset specificity pulls pipelines to vertically integrate, their inherent economies of scale limit 
their number, thus concentrating fuel markets around a relatively small number of vertically integrated 
pipeline companies.   
33 Douglass North’s institutional economics explains how economic governance institutions evolve to 
pursue profit. North used the developmental history of canals, railroads, and ocean shipping to illustrate the 
advances in transport systems are central to success of economies and depend on institutional foundations. 
Makholm views pipelines as a specialized form of highly capital-intensive, long-distance inland 
transportation, descending from the older canal and railroad systems developed in Europe and America to 
transport commodities in the first half of the nineteenth century. He argues that the governance institutions 
surrounding pipelines are therefore complex products of relatively ancient social customs, public opinion, 
legislative action, and judicial precedent.  
34 Charges of Pipeline tariffs are imposed by an operating entity of a pipeline onto its users and buyers. 
There are two approaches to regulate tariffs: (1) The tariffs can either be negotiated; or (2) The tariffs are 
regulated. Normally tariffs are regulated by host-country government agreements (HGAs), but some 
intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) contain provisions on tariffs. The Transit Protocol only deals with 
those tariffs imposed for transit services. According to the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), each contracting 
party shall take all necessary measures to ensure that transit tariffs are objective, reasonable, transparent 
and do not discriminate on the basis of origin, destination or ownership. Additionally, transit tariffs shall 
not be affected by market distortions and shall be based on operational and investment costs, including a 
reasonable rate of return. However, some existing pipeline agreements do not deal with tariff issues at all. 
Intergovernmental Agreements and Host Government Agreements on Oil and Gas Pipelines: A 
Comparison, Energy Charter Secretariat (2015). Model Agreements for Cross-Border Pipelines (2nd 




Makholm provides a bridge between institutional economics35 and traditional economic 
theories36 to provide a broader explanation of the pipeline industry by integrating pipeline 
economics, regulatory policy, and historical evidence. In doing so, however, he only 
looks at investor-owned pipelines, such as those in Europe, North America, and South 
America. His analysis does not include state-owned pipelines, such as those in China, 
Russia, and Central Asia, and the discussion of pipeline tariff regimes for state-owned 
pipelines, which are integral parts of my dissertation. 
Existing Studies Relevant to Pipelines 
This dissertation focuses on existing studies in the IR literature that do not discuss cross-
border pipelines directly, but are relevant to explaining the planning and development of 
cross-border oil and gas pipelines. They provide insights into important aspects of energy 
security as well as the political economy of energy, which enables a more systematic 
understanding of how politics and energy markets are interconnected and how political 
factors significantly affect the commercial viability of large-scale cross-border energy 
infrastructure projects. Building on the literature in energy security, the political economy 
of energy, and the traditional IR paradigms of neorealism and liberalism, the dissertation 
places its research puzzles in the IR literature and the current debate regarding the 
geopolitical and energy market implications of ongoing cross-border pipeline 
development across Eurasia.  
Energy Security 
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Transnational or trans-regional pipelines that cross borders of two or more countries not 
only require long-term investment and huge upfront capital costs, but also introduce a 
host of jurisdictional challenges for construction, operation, and maintenance. It is 
frequently observed that some cross-border pipeline projects that are seemingly less 
economically justifiable are implemented because of strong political motivations. At the 
same time, some commercially viable pipeline projects never materialize or are delayed 
for more than a decade due to lack of political willingness. Major energy deals in Eurasia 
involving cross-border transactions often reveal that energy cooperation between states 
cannot be justified by purely economic considerations.  
A systematic understanding of how politics and energy markets are interconnected 
contributes to the literature on energy security. A substantial amount of research has been 
done in various areas pertinent to energy security. Charles Doran discusses various types 
of supply disruptions in the international energy market as a way to analyze the 
motivations and mechanisms that drive oil markets.37 He argues that true threats to 
energy security arise from political matters exogenous to the energy market itself and that 
the threat to supply disruption is not innate to the energy market, but merely uses that 
market for political purposes. In explaining how the world petroleum market operates, he 
maintains that the potential for energy supply disruption lies in the inner workings of the 
international energy market. Exporting countries such as Iran sometimes take advantage 
of fundamental vulnerabilities in major energy-importing countries and manipulate oil 
supply for commercial gain or foreign policy purposes. Supply disruption could range 
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from supply reduction in Iran’s own oil fields and pipelines to attacking pipelines, 
pumping facilities, refineries, and port facilities in neighboring states such as the United 
Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The duration of crisis also influences the price of oil 
and the security of oil production and distribution in the Persian Gulf region.  
By focusing on asymmetry in attitudes and strategies toward the management of oil 
prices and supplies, Doran explains that exporters might attempt to acquire the 
instruments of force that they believe will enhance their security as well as their political 
and military leverage. His discussion of supply disruption is highly relevant to 
understanding pipeline planning and construction in that cross-border pipelines in Eurasia 
are considered as a means to increase political and economic leverage, and states utilize 
different strategies in negotiating and implementing binding cross-border energy deals.  
Another line of inquiry focuses on the multi-dimensional aspect of energy, as energy 
issues have both economic and political aspects that sometimes come into conflict. Jae-
Seung Lee argues that energy issues in the realm of security have both “high politics” and 
“low politics” elements.38 “High politics” elements represent the factors related to the 
function and maintenance of the nation-state, including sovereignty and security, whereas 
“low politics” elements indicate the factors related to low-level and practical issues.39 
Grand-scale energy infrastructure projects such as cross-border pipelines can be regarded 
as having both “high politics” and “low politics” dimensions, depending on the political, 
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economic, and geographical factors involved. However, “high politics” elements tend to 
prevail in the pipeline projects where governments function as active players, while “low 
politics” elements tend to predominate in relatively small-scale pipeline projects that are 
not politically sensitive. 
Energy Competition or Cooperation? 
In studying energy security, scholars have debated whether to view energy as a source of 
competition or as an instrument for cooperation. Those who view energy as a source of 
competition focus on state-to-state competition over access to and control of energy 
supplies and transportation routes, which tend to encourage the zero-sum mentality that 
one country’s energy security comes at another country’s expense.40 These scholars argue 
that the underlying structure of energy markets in which vital resources are concentrated 
in a small number of geographical regions drive states to shape their energy policy 
through a geopolitical lens, which often becomes a key element in political distrust, 
rivalry, and potential military conflict. They find the evidence from history: the Roosevelt 
administration’s oil embargo against Japan followed by a Japanese attack on the oil fields 
of the Dutch East Indies during World War II (Sagan, 1988: 898); OPEC members’ oil 
embargo in response to U.S involvement in the Yom Kippur War in 1973; Germany’s 
drive to the oil fields in Caucasus and Romania during World War II; and contemporary 
energy-related disputes in the South and East China Sea41.  
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In contrast, those who perceive energy as an instrument for cooperation assert that market 
forces and non-state actors can help avert violence in many instances of resource 
scarcity.42 Given the rising interdependence of the global economy and international 
relations,43 markets and non-state actors conceive energy resources as public goods and 
offer joint benefits from cooperation between consumers and producers, including the 
correcting of market failures, the lowering of transaction costs, and the setting of rules 
and standards. These scholars argue that state-centered energy policies disturb the 
efficient allocation of capital and decrease transparency in energy markets.  
 With the international increase in population and economic expansion since the 
Industrial Revolution, the global economy has continuously and heavily relied on 
hydrocarbon resources to fuel industrial growth and urbanization, resulting in an ever-
growing worldwide energy demand and resource shortage. Since the end of the Cold War, 
moreover, the defining parameters of national power and influence have changed from 
military to economic and technological capacity.44 Possession and control of vital 
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economic commodities such as hydrocarbons, which fuel the engine of economic 
development, has been central to states’ security and survival.45 In particular, for major 
economies that are not energy self-sufficient, resource competition plays a major role in 
explaining the dynamics of global security affairs.46  In this respect, those who view 
energy as a source of competition share the neo-realist perspective that security 
considerations consistently prevail in foreign policy-making and that trade in strategic 
resources is strictly determined by national interests. 
The neorealist approach provides insight into how states promote their national interests 
through resource diplomacy, since it assumes that states seek to maximize their security 
and power to offset scarcity in capital, labor, and natural resources, and therefore that 
conflict or competition is pervasive. Energy resources have been a major tool for Russian 
foreign policy and its political maneuvering with its neighboring states of the former 
Soviet Union, as well as with great powers such as the European Union (EU) and 
China.47 Some studies argue that China’s quest for energy resources abroad has provoked 
intense competition over access to supplies, thus locking up international oil and gas 
reserves and militarizing key producing regions of the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea, and 
Africa,48 while others contend that Chinese energy diplomacy is neither new nor unique. 
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These scholars argue almost all major Western industrial nations have historically used 
their leverage either to promote the interests of their national oil companies or to secure 
energy supplies.49  
The neorealist approach relies heavily on the notion that geopolitical rationales often 
outweigh economic profitability, since the position of a state in the international system 
and the state’s influence in a region consistently prevail in foreign policy-making. 
Geopolitics not only reflects the foreign policy implications of countries’ geo-economic 
strategies,50 but also provides a foreign policy framework by which local events and 
regional conflicts can be understood in all their global significance.51 Energy resources 
are often discussed as a “weapon” for geopolitical domination and manipulation, with a 
prominent example coming from Russian “pipeline diplomacy” of withholding oil and 
natural gas supplies in the Caucasus region and Central Asia in order to destabilize transit 
countries and dominate the European oil and gas market.52 
On the other hand, the liberal approach in IR provides insight into how states can 
cooperate even in the area of strategic resources, focusing on the economic fundamentals 
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of trade. Stressing the benefits of cooperation through mutual gain, it assumes that states 
can cooperate and trade with each other for mutual benefit based on multifaceted 
interactions over time. Moreover, it not only emphasizes the rising importance of supra-
national non-state actors in the international system such as the EU and the UN, but also 
focuses on subnational non-state actors in foreign policy-making.53 
A subset of liberalism includes political economy, which examines energy markets and 
trade mechanisms in their political contexts. Political economists explore how free trade 
influences domestic economies and political system; resource-rich countries have a 
greater chance to become wealthy if they commit to free trade.54 These scholars’ analyses 
focus on topics such as energy production, consumption, and distribution, as well as the 
financing of energy projects in a wide range of resources that includes coal, electricity, 
nuclear, oil, and natural gas. They tend to put more weight on economics and the 
mechanism of trade and investment than on politics, by providing historical and 
economic overviews. For instance, some of these scholars explained that Russia offered 
oil and gas to post-Soviet states at Soviet-era discounted prices in order to prevent these 
countries’ economic collapse and social unrest,55 rather than to maintain Moscow’s 
geopolitical power. Scholars in IR liberalism also view China’s “going out strategy” 
(focusing on cultivating relationships with autocratic and oil-rich regimes) as a holistic 
approach including a full package of trade and investment in social infrastructure, rather 
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than a scenario where energy-hungry China is merely trying to lock up international oil 
and gas reserves and challenge the West.56 They contend that economic development in 
the energy industry shapes energy markets that are dominated by energy companies and 
institutions. Their focus on non-state actors as well as trade and economic mechanisms 
clearly puts them in the liberalism domain.  
In sum, the neorealist approach stresses geopolitical rationales, and argues that 
competition for strategic energy resources often outweighs economic incentives, while 
the liberal approach emphasizes the benefits of energy cooperation through mutual gain. 
However, there is an analytical gap between these two competing arguments. Neither line 
of inquiry explains the emerging types of energy relations in Eurasia, which include both 
cooperative and competitive characteristics. Energy relations tend to be competitive when 
the national interests of participating states clash or diverge. Under these conditions, 
energy relations are likely to be highly susceptible to conflicts over political and national 
security issues such as territorial disputes and political distrust between states.57 In 
contrast, energy cooperation is likely when potential mutual benefits are visualized 
through developing a joint project, as well as when a sense of urgency is strong enough to 
develop a strategic partnership. Depending on how states view each other and design the 
direction of their bilateral relationships, strategic partnerships can either evolve into 
comprehensive and enduring relations or remain fragile and short-term in nature.   
Strategic Partnership 
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Cross-border oil and gas pipeline projects are considered to be emerging types of 
strategic energy partnerships in Eurasia. Countries with heterogeneous cultures, societies, 
economies, and political regimes are developing relationships in the energy sector where 
they share complementarity. These energy partnerships in Eurasia are considered 
“emerging” rather than “established”, however, since the institutional basis for 
multilateral cooperation has not been solidified.  
While a small number of studies have explored the topic of strategic partnership, its 
definition, parameters, and purpose still remain vague and unclear. Focusing on 
contemporary postwar agreements between former adversaries, some scholars emphasize 
the institutional arrangements and incentives behind such cooperative strategic 
agreements,58 as well as variations in their outcomes.59 Others seek to provide a 
framework to explain the mechanisms of reconciliation between rivals. For example, 
Thomas Wright examines the difference between competitive and cooperative strategic 
engagement in explaining U.S. foreign policy with major powers that have significantly 
different views about the shape, purpose, and future direction of the international order.60 
Charles Kupchan explains how states generate new narratives of each other to change the 
identity of their adversary from a former rival to a friend.61  
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Strategic partnerships represent unique diplomatic instruments that allow states to pursue 
multidimensional bilateral, regional, and global issue agendas and diverse diplomatic 
goals without compromising freedom of action.62 The end of the Cold War in 1989, 
followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, closed a chapter on an era where 
states’ geopolitical strategies were largely derived from a bipolar ideological conflict. 
While the end of bipolarity left the United States in a position of global preeminence, 
secondary or regional powers such as Russia and China have been striving to expand 
their influence and pursue sustainable economic development in a globalizing world. 
States have not only adopted a pragmatic approach to foreign policy, but have also sought 
mutually reinforcing ties binding them in functionally cooperative arrangements. 
Strategic partnerships have emerged to allow countries to pursue opportunities for 
selective engagement with all major states (even former adversaries and rivals) in order 
to achieve domestic economic and security goals, because it allows for a degree of 
flexibility in interstate relations during a long period of uncertainty. Examples of this 
kind of strategic partnership include the post–World War II relationship between the 
United States and Germany, the Indo-Russian partnership established in 2000, and the 
Sino-Russian strategic partnership of the post-Cold War era.  
Historical examples of strategic partnership show that it embodies both competitive and 
cooperative elements.63 Strategic partnerships, therefore, demonstrate meaningful 
variations in terms of their depth and duration. Realist-oriented scholarly approaches to 
strategic partnership focus on the tenuous nature of a relationship that rests on an unstable 
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and short-term convergence of tactical interests. In contrast, liberal and constructivist 
perspectives place greater emphasis on contingent future outcomes based on mutual 
learning through multifaceted interaction over time and on the course of domestic, 
regional, and global developments. They view the nature of strategic partnerships as 
comprehensive and enduring, whereas realist scholarship pays more attention to these 
relationships’ instrumental and transactional nature. In Strategic Partnerships in Asia, 
Vidya Nadkarni explains how these theories offer different guidance in designing 
strategic partnerships and argues that emerging strategic partnerships exhibit hedging 
strategies between engagement and resistance for countries that are neither allies nor 
adversaries but share a range of both converging and diverging interests. Most of the 
extant literature provides historical overviews of particular strategic partnership cases, 
such as the Sino-Russian partnership64, by investigating bilateral political and economic 
relations, as well as subnational political, economic, and social institutional 
arrangements. These accounts also explore states’ positions in the international system 
and aspirations for global status, and examine political leaders’ perceptions and abilities.    
Political Economy of Energy  
Since energy itself is a politicized and multi-faced concept, the notion of energy security 
is self-directed and hinges on perspectives that each society makes choices in balancing 
economic, political, national security, and environmental concerns, thus justifying actions 
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and policies on particular energy security grounds.65 Due to the multi-dimensional nature 
of the energy agenda, a number of conflicting elements can often exist within the same 
issue. Moreover, the notion of energy security has evolved from the traditional notion of 
oil supply and politics to full consideration of all energy resources including natural gas, 
nuclear power, and renewable energy, and focuses not only on supply but also on demand. 
In addition, the meaning of energy security has extended to other dimensions of 
technology, investment, environment, and trade.  
Robert Gilpin argues that “in a highly integrated global economy, states continue to use 
their power and to implement policies to channel economic forces in ways favorable to 
their national interest and the interests of their citizenry.” Assuming that free-market 
mechanisms are not sufficient to ensure the smooth operation of the world economic 
system, he stresses the role of nation-states. His definition of political economy—a 
“sociopolitical system composed of powerful economic actors or institutions such as 
giant firms, powerful labor unions, and large agribusiness that are competing with one 
another to formulate government politics”—is relevant to explaining the energy sector.66 
In particular, it is more relevant in accounting for major energy deals including upstream 
development of oil and natural gas and large-scale energy infrastructure projects. 
Governments play active roles in setting the rules of the game regarding energy deals 
involving large-scale cross-border transactions, given that such deals are likely to have a 
                                                        
65 Carlos Pascual and Jonathan Elkind, eds. Energy Security: Economics, Politics, Strategies, and 
Implications, Brookings Institution Press, 2010. Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn, Energy and 
Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005. Alhajii, A. F., 
“Dimensions of Energy Security: Competition, Interaction and Maximization” in Energy Security in the 
Gulf: Challenges and Perspectives The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research: 191-218 (2010). 
66 Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order (Princeton: 




substantial impact on the function and maintenance of nation-states. My discussion of the 
political economy of energy not only shares the assumption that nation-states are the 
main actors that set the rules and norms, but also seeks to go beyond the neorealist focus 
on nation-states and foreign policy, by integrating liberal scholarship’s emphasis on 
domestic politics (e.g., energy bureaucrats, interest groups) and non-state actors (e.g., 
national and multinational oil and gas companies).  
Some existing studies provide valuable insights on understanding the political economy 
of energy in a more integrated perspective.67 However, most of them focus on oil and 
have not updated their analyses with the current changing landscape of energy markets 
and geopolitics. I aim to not only broaden the analysis by adding the political economy of 
natural gas, but also by including the market and geopolitical implications of the 
changing structure of both energy relations and supply and demand.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
My dissertation provides a systematic understanding of how politics and energy markets 
are interconnected by examining variations among cross-border oil and gas pipeline 
projects in Eurasia in terms of a deal’s success and speed. By focusing on successful 
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pipeline projects in which market reasons are inversely related to political considerations, 
I investigate how political and economic factors play out interactively in the decision-
making regarding cross-border pipeline projects, as well as what brings countries into 
binding cross-border pipeline deals and at what speed. To answer these research 
questions, I advance three hypotheses about underlying interactive political and economic 
factors: (1) geopolitical (and external crisis) factor(s) (i.e., whether a pipeline project 
involves support or opposition from third-party countries and/or goes through an external 
shock or crisis situation); (2) political trust between host country governments (i.e., 
political alignment); and (3) pipeline ownership structure (i.e., commercial alignment 
between host countries). Then I advance additional hypothesis which tests the effect of 
the three underlying political-economic factors on the difference between oil pipeline 
development and natural gas development. I begin by explaining how I conceptualize my 
dependent and independent variables. Operationalization of these variables for large-n 
statistical analysis is explained separately in the next chapter.   
Dependent Variable – Deal Success and Speed 
The dependent variable (DV) of my dissertation is the successful launch of a proposed 
cross-border pipeline project and its deal speed (i.e., deal success and speed). The scope 
of study is all the proposed international oil and gas pipelines that cross borders of two or 
more sovereign states and that are successful, have failed, or are still under consideration. 
The dissertation assumes that a certain cross-border pipeline project has successfully 
materialized when it obtains both intergovernmental/host-country government 
agreements (IGA/HGA) and a final investment decision (FID). Pipelines either under 




projects are those that are no longer under consideration. Deal speed is measured as the 
number of years that pass between a successful pipeline project’s proposal to its deal 
finalization. 
My dissertation examines how the joint development of pipeline projects between (two or 
more) countries can vary in decisions about intergovernmental and financial 
arrangements. It notes that, when a pipeline project is proposed, it goes through a 
governmental decision-making process as well as a financial/investment decision-making 
process in order to reach cooperative trans-border arrangements – both intergovernmental 
and investment – and international treaties (Figure 1). Through an overview of all 
existing or proposed transnational pipelines, I confirmed that each pipeline project has a 
different story, which can be very complex depending on the political orientation and 
institutional arrangements of host countries, the market and political environment for 
investment in producer and transit states, issues regarding supply routes and geographical 
conditions, technological conditions related to fuel type (oil or gas) and transportation 
type (overland or undersea), and security and environmental issues. Therefore, it is not 
easy to tell which step in a process comes first (e.g., governmental or investment 
decisions) or to understand detailed decision-making processes in chronological order.  
However, it can be assumed that the final investment decision (FID) for a pipeline is 
made after an intergovernmental agreement (IGA) and a host government agreement 
(HGA) are signed. Both IGA and HGA have important implications for the successful 
launch of a proposed pipeline project, since the nature of transnational pipelines present a 
host of international jurisdictional challenges in their construction, operation, and 




and maintenance of transnational pipelines, it is important to understand how and when 
the legal framework for a pipeline project is determined since the construction of a cross-
border pipeline is made possible after IGA, HGA, and FID are made in chronological 
order. An IGA is signed by individual governments of participating states of a pipeline 
project and should be signed and ratified by the parliaments of all participating states. An 
HGA is signed between sponsor companies of a joint venture (JV) consortium that 
constructs a pipeline and the governments of participating countries. In other words, an 
HGA is an agreement between governments and investors, which accordingly comes 
after an IGA. The legal framework of pipeline projects—including pricing, tariff, and 
production sharing agreement (PSA)—is determined by the IGA and HGA, and the final 
investment decision is made afterwards. Therefore, once all the three decisions – IGA, 
HGA, and FID – are made, it can be regarded as representing a successful launch of a 
proposed pipeline project.     
In explaining cross-border pipeline projects, my dissertation measures deal success 
through intergovernmental and investment decision-making processes, as well as deal 
speed measured by the total number of years from proposal to deal finalization. My case 
studies examine why a deal succeeds, why the deal’s speed varies, and which internal and 
external political-economic dynamics lead countries to reach cooperative trans-border 
arrangements for pipeline development. Meanwhile, my statistical analysis examines the 
speed of pipeline deals68 to illustrate the commonality of political and economic 
challenges of proposed transnational oil and gas pipelines in the world. 
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Figure 3. Pipeline Decision-Making Process: from Proposal to Success69 
 
Independent Variables 
This dissertation seeks to understand what brings countries into binding cross-border oil 
and gas pipeline deals and why some proposed pipeline projects materialize quickly in 
the process of decision-making and negotiations while others do not. My dissertation 
hypothesizes that, beyond market considerations that directly relate to economic costs 
and benefits incurred from cross-border pipeline development, the successful launch of a 
proposed cross-border pipeline project and its deal speed depend on three underlying 
factors: (1) geopolitical (and external crisis) factor(s) (i.e., whether a pipeline project 
involves support or opposition from third-party countries and/or goes through external 
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shock or crisis situations); (2) political trust between host country governments (i.e., 
political alignment); and (3) the pipeline’s ownership structure (i.e., commercial 
alignment between host countries). Four hypotheses are derived from these explanatory 
variables in order to examine how successful development of transnational pipeline 
projects depends on underlying interactive economic and political factors. 
Geopolitical and External Crisis Factor 
I define that a cross-border oil and gas pipeline project has geopolitical (and external 
crisis) factor(s) when it (directly or indirectly) involves support or opposition from third-
party countries (that are not host countries participating in the pipeline projects) and/or 
when the project goes through external shocks or crisis situations. I assume that changes 
in the geopolitical environment due to external crisis situations can alter the dynamics of 
energy relations between host countries. External shocks or crisis situations can be 
defined as any sudden and unexpected political and economic events that dramatically 
change the existing frameworks or prior assumptions regarding national policies and 
strategies. Examples include the Global Financial Crisis, oil shocks, and political crises 
such as the Ukraine Crisis with Russia’s annexation in Crimea.   
First, cross-border pipeline projects involving support or opposition from third-party 
countries are often observed in the cases where producer and transit states want to 
diversity supply routes by building new pipelines and where powerful third-party 
countries (e.g., the United States, Russia, or China) that have important political, strategic, 
and commercial interests express their political support or opposition to the cooperative 
development of regional pipelines. For instance, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline 




Mediterranean without crossing Russia. Before commercial investors agreed to 
participate in the BTC, there was an unprecedented amount of political backing from the 
U.S. government. Despite pessimistic assessments by energy specialists and many non-
U.S. policy-makers over the commercial viability of this project, the United States 
considered the new energy route as a tool to foster security and political ties with the 
landlocked and newly independent Caspian states that still remained vulnerable to 
Russia’s hegemonic impulses. The United States and other Western countries supported 
the BTC project in order to counterbalance Russian and Iranian dominance in the region, 
and to increase U.S. influence in cementing a new geopolitical order in the Caspian 
region. Washington, in particular, believed that if Azerbaijan’s energy resources were 
transported to market through Russia or Iran, Azerbaijan would not be able to adopt a 
pro-Western security and political orientation and NATO ally Turkey would not be able 
to increase its political influence in the region. 
Second, it is often observed that any sudden, unexpected crisis situations and/or external 
political-economic shocks change the geopolitical environment of states involved in 
cross-border pipeline projects, thus altering the dynamics of their energy relations. I 
borrow the concept of crisis in order to explain the key drivers of cross-border pipeline 
deals outside of market reasons. Some scholars present the concept of crisis to account 
for national policies and leaders’ choices at critical decision points.  
I draw on insights from Charles Doran’s model of crisis in international relations.70 In 
System in Crisis, he explores how structural change leads to decision-making uncertainty 
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in shaping foreign policy, and argues that “the sudden, massive increase in an uncertainty 
that holds high foreign policy stakes for the state affects foreign policy behavior through 
increased stress and anxiety.” Everything changes in security terms for the state and the 
international system at critical turning points, which leads to system transformation as a 
result of structural upheaval to state power cycles. Massive structural change causes 
decision-makers to miscalculate the strength of established expectations. Doran 
articulates that the probability of miscalculation in communications between states is 
greater during a crisis, given that “learned patterns from prior behavior” or “the 
government’s former expectations about foreign policy role, status, and security” are 
“suddenly proven wrong.”71 His emphasis on “conditional non-rationality” in crisis 
situations and system transformation is highly relevant to understanding the emerging 
trend of cross-border pipeline networks in Eurasia. A crisis with a major capacity to 
affect pipeline planning and construction is associated with system transformation. For 
instance, I argue that China and Russia signed binding agreements to build a cross-border 
gas pipeline when geopolitical changes due to the Ukraine crisis in 2014 shaped their 
energy relations; a declining Russia decided to make concessions to a rising China only 
as part of efforts to preserve its geopolitical leverage at critical points.72  
The emerging trend of cross-border pipeline networks in Eurasia between major 
importers and exporters is another representation of Doran’s system transformation. From 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Rise,” the SAIS Europe Journal, April 1, 2012; Charles F. Doran, “Power Cycle Theory and the 
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71 Doran, Systems in Crisis, pp. 27-29, 95-110.  
72 Sino-Russian energy relations and oil and gas pipeline deals are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 




Doran’s “power cycle” perspective, power is what government officials and diplomats 
perceive it to be, and perceptions of power are highly correlated with the national 
capability that facilitates a state’s ability to carry out a foreign policy role. In addition to 
traditional measures of national capability—such as GDP, per capita wealth, size of 
armed forces, military spending, population size—transportation infrastructure to secure 
reliable supply and demand of hydrocarbons has become an important parameter to 
measure national capability. In this respect, Doran’s model of crisis and theory of system 
transformation is very relevant to understanding how decision-makers design and 
implement energy policies concerning cross-border transactions and investment during 
external shocks, as well as the extent to which such external political-economic factors 
have an impact on different strategies and policies.  
I also draw on insights from other scholars who discuss the notion of crisis. Building on 
the discussion of the relationship between crisis and the state, Peter Gourevitch argues 
that it is not easy to find coherence in decision-making when states choose a policy or a 
sequence of policies in crisis situations.73 By applying the notion of crisis in explaining 
public policy profiles, Kent E. Calder specifies the critical juncture framework, and notes 
that a crisis changes the pre-existing bargaining context and creates opportunities for 
change, thus generating demands for new institutions.74 His critical juncture framework 
explains how external shocks and crises can act as a catalyst that individual decision-
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makers can use to create institutions, and what specific impact the decision-making 
process can have on outcomes. Assuming that intense time pressure is a crucial element 
in a critical juncture, Calder argues that decision-making takes place under severely 
bounded rationality during crises75 and that decision-makers are forced into sudden, high-
stakes decisions with inadequate information.76 While his framework highlights the 
individual-level dynamics in negotiations and interactions at major turning points and the 
relative autonomy of individual decision-making, it maintains that domestic political-
economic interests are an important background factor.   
Given my own conceptualization of geopolitical (and external crisis) factors, which draw 
from existing studies on the notion of crisis and critical historical points, I derive the 
following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1A: Geopolitical factors are likely to have an effect on the likelihood of 
successful pipeline deals and the deal speed.  
Hypothesis 1B: Geopolitical factors are likely to delay the deal’s speed (i.e., geopolitical 
factors are likely to have negative effect on the deal’s speed).  
 
Political Trust (i.e., Political Alignment) 
My political trust variable represents how host country governments of cross-border 
pipeline projects align politically and trust one another. My dissertation posits that energy 
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cooperation arising from cross-border oil and gas pipeline networks is associated with 
variations in the level of political trust between host countries. I thereby estimate the 
relationship between the level of political trust and the deal success/speed of cross-border 
pipeline projects. Political trust between states (i.e., political alignment) can be defined 
and measured by how pairs of states (dyads) trust each other and share similar political 
interests, preferences, and motivations. I refer to archival data for case studies, as well as 
the Affinity of Nations index data that will be explained in detail in Chapter 3.77  
Shared interests and reciprocity are what rationalists conceptualize as trust and 
cooperation. My dissertation borrows the rationalist conception of trust and cooperation 
to measure political alignment between states. A number of academic studies have 
focused on the security and economic dimensions of cross-border pipelines, but few have 
systematically addressed the issue of political alignment and trust. Charles E. Ziegler, 
who has pioneered this line of inquiry, argues that energy interdependence arising from 
oil and gas pipeline networks is associated with variable levels of trust within the EU and 
that variations in trust impact the EU’s ability to make effective energy policy, which can 
erode foreign policy coherence and generate strains within the European community.78 
Although most mainstream approaches in international relations have little to say about 
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trust among states, trust facilitates cooperation,79 and higher levels of trust tend to reduce 
international tensions, lower transaction costs, help ensure compliance with contractual 
agreements, and overcome collective action problems.80 
My dissertation draws on the rationalist approach in explaining trust in international 
relations in order to define the notion of political alignment. Rationalists conceptualize 
trust as based on interests and reciprocity. If states acknowledge shared interests and act 
cooperatively rather than competitively, then a trusting relationship can develop. For 
them, cooperative interaction over time may lead to greater levels of rational trust, as 
actions become predictable. Rational trust involves an estimation of the degree of risk in 
interactions among actors as well as predictions about the behavior of other actors, which 
reduces transaction costs. 
The successful launch of a cross-border pipeline project must constitute cooperative 
trans-border arrangements. The concept of shared interest and reciprocity is closely 
linked with the concept of cooperation, and energy cooperation such as cross-border 
infrastructure development requires a substantial level of political trust between host 
countries that can support and approve the joint development. Therefore, I derive the 
following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2: When the level of political trust between host countries on a cross-border 
pipeline project is higher, it is more likely to increase the likelihood of a deal’s success 
as well as its deal speed. 
 
Pipeline Ownership Structure 
I include the variable of a pipeline’s ownership structure, which captures commercial 
alignment between countries involved in cross-border pipeline deals. In many cases, 
investors create a pipeline consortium or joint venture (JV) to construct and operate the 
cross-border pipeline. While a cross-border pipeline JV includes corporate financing as 
well as funds from public (both national and intergovernmental) and commercial banks, 
my dissertation focuses exclusively on corporate financing when examining the 
ownership structure. Such an emphasis is designed to measure whether the pipeline 
ownership is shared by firms from host- and non-host countries (in many cases, whether 
the pipeline ownership is shared by state-owned enterprises and international oil 
companies). Loans from intergovernmental and commercial banks are excluded as I 
desire to examine commercial alignment at the country level. International oil companies 
(IOCs) and national oil companies (NOCs) are included, because their national origins 
are an important parameter for the country-level analysis. My dissertation research shows 
that pipeline ownership falls into three categories based on commercial alignment 
structure: (1) host-country firms only (either state-owned enterprises or multi-national 
corporations whose national origins belong to one of the host countries); or (2) non-host 
(foreign) country firms only (either state-owned enterprises or multi-national 




combination of host-country firms and non-host (foreign) country firms. While 
constructing my dataset of all proposed and existing cross-border pipelines in the world 
for my statistical analysis, I learned that there are only a few pipelines owned exclusively 
by non-host (foreign) country firms. Therefore, I excluded this type of pipeline ownership 
from both my case studies and statistical analysis.  
Whether ownership structure is diffused or concentrated has been the subject of much 
investigation in the fields of finance, management, and political economy. In addition, the 
role of ownership structure on the stability patterns of international JVs has been a 
classical issue in the field of international business; some scholars have suggested 
majority control (concentrated ownership) as the best option for maintaining stability and 
survival,81 while others have advocated equally shared ownership (diffused ownership).82 
Those who put more weight on majority (concentrated) ownership argue that firms can 
exercise control to alleviate risks through the adoption of more hierarchical governance 
structures83 and the holding of majority ownership control in joint ventures.84 Majority 
ownership can help overcome friction that stems from disagreements between partners 
(shareholders of a JV consortium) about the best ways to allocate resources or 
responsibilities within an alliance. 
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My dissertation attempts to borrow the concept of ownership structure (of firms or JVs) 
that is much discussed in the literature of other disciplines but has been overlooked in the 
literature of international relations and political science, in order to identify the effect of 
pipeline ownership structure on the successful completion of a pipeline and the speed at 
which it is built.  
Hypothesis 3: When pipeline ownership is shared between host-country firms (either 
state-owned enterprises or multi-national corporations whose national origins belong to 
one of the host countries) and non-host country firms (either state-owned enterprises or 
multi-national corporations whose national origins do not belong to any of host 
countries), it increases the likelihood of a deal’s success and its speed. 
 
Fuel Type (Oil vs. Natural Gas) 
My dissertation examines how political and economic factors play out differently in oil 
versus gas pipeline deals. The discussion of the difference between oil and natural gas is 
a relatively new topic and has less been explored in the fields of international relations 
and political science. A few studies introduce the discussion of the difference between oil 
and natural gas, arguing that gas trade is more vulnerable to political influence than the 
oil trade. Brenda Shaffer states that there is more opportunity for politics to affect energy 
supply relations in the current international system, due to the  rise in the global use of 
natural gas and surging cross-border natural gas trade.85 While pipelines are considered 
as the most economical way to transport large quantities of oil over land, natural gas 
                                                        




pipelines are less attractive than liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers for shipping when 
the distance is greater than 3,000 miles (4,800 kilometers).86 Building natural gas 
pipelines is also more technologically difficult, and more expensive, than developing oil 
pipelines.87 In addition to the differences between oil and gas pipelines, natural gas itself 
displays a number of unique traits apart from oil. While oil is a global commodity, 
natural gas is produced, transported, and traded through fragmented regional markets. As 
its pricing mechanism reflects this regional differentiation, regional buyers and sellers 
exert more influence under both long-term and oil-indexed contracts.88  
Since natural gas involves a higher level of risk, investment, and sunk costs, gas transport 
via pipelines confronts barriers. However, with the North American shale gas boom, 
mounting concerns over energy security, and global climate change, natural gas is 
playing a more prominent role in the global energy mix.89 Pipelines are even more 
compelling for natural gas, given that gas reserves close to market are declining, thus 
requiring the transport of gas further overland. For instance, some of the new natural gas 
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basins, notably those of the Caspian region, are landlocked. The successful exploitation 
of many of these sources requires pipeline delivery.  
I derive the following hypothesis in order to examine to what extent a strategic 
framework of calculations regarding oil pipeline development is different from natural 
gas pipeline development. 
Hypothesis 4: The effects of political trust, geopolitical factors, and pipeline ownership 
structure on the pipeline deal’s success and speed are more pronounced in natural gas 
pipelines than oil pipelines.  
My dissertation empirically tests the four hypotheses illustrated above in order to 
examine whether and how underlying interactive political and economic factors 
determine a deal’s success and speed on proposed cross-border pipeline projects. The 
dissertation employs both statistical analysis and in-depth case studies to test my working 
hypotheses. It seeks to explain whether and to what extent political factors significantly 
affect the commercial viability of large-scale cross-border infrastructure projects of 
pipeline networks in Eurasia, whether and how economic factors are conditioned on the 
nature of political alignments of participating states regarding these pipeline projects, and 
whether the trend of the joint development differs by fuel type. In particular, I focus on 
examining the geopolitical and external crisis factors that may outweigh either economic 
incentives or political alignment between host countries. While my statistical analysis 
focuses on examining the interactive political and economic factors at the international 
and project levels, case studies add the in-depth analysis at the subnational/domestic level 
in order to explain both internal and external political-economic dynamics that lead 




Domestic political economies concerning cross-border oil and gas pipelines, including 
the political institutional configuration of governments, energy bureaucracy and industry 


















This dissertation seeks to understand what brings countries into binding cross-border oil 
and gas pipeline deals and why some proposed pipeline projects materialize quickly 
while others move slowly through the process of decision-making and negotiations. In 
order to achieve this goal, the dissertation employs two approaches by using combined 
methods of quantitative and qualitative analysis. The first is to understand the 
international political economy of transnational pipelines by identifying the key factors in 
the likelihood of successful pipeline projects quantitatively. The second part of my 
dissertation conducts four case studies that focus on two regions: China-Russia and the 
Caspian Sea. Through case studies, my dissertation examines the comparative political 
economies of participating countries in planned or existing cross-border pipelines. By 
focusing on detailed subnational analysis, the case studies attempt to understand both 
internal and external political dynamics that lead countries to reach cooperative trans-
border arrangements of pipeline development.  
This chapter quantitatively tests the working hypotheses that are described and explained 
in Chapter 2. It statistically tests how political trust between host country governments, 
geopolitical factors, and ownership structure of pipelines affect the deal speed of cross-
border oil and gas pipeline projects. While existing studies tend to pay more attention to 
providing an in-depth understanding of individual cases of trans-border pipelines, this 
chapter intends to provide an overview of existing or planned cross-border oil and gas 
pipelines in the world through quantitative analysis. It focuses on the international level 
in examining the key political and economic factors for successful pipeline deals in order 




proceeds differently in making decisions regarding intergovernmental and financial 
arrangements. By quantitatively showing the casual effects of the key explanatory 
variables on the successful launch of proposed pipeline projects, the chapter aims to 
enable a structural understanding of the commonality of the international political 
economy of cross-border pipelines.  
DATA AND SAMPLE 
I collected data on all existing and prospective cross-border oil and gas pipelines in the 
world. I have constructed my own dataset that includes approximately 200 transnational 
pipeline projects featuring the following information: throughput (both initial capacity 
and maximum capacity), total capital cost (USD in millions), pipeline length, pipeline 
diameter, the year that a pipeline project is proposed, signed, and/or operationalized, fuel 
type (oil or gas), who initiated the project (government or companies), type of pipelines 
(direct link between consumer and producer, or multi-state export pipeline), number of 
countries that a pipeline passes through, whether a pipeline has transit state(s) or not, 
whether a pipeline project has geopolitical factor(s), the level of political trust (i.e., 
political alignment) between host countries, and the ownership structure of pipeline joint 
ventures. Due to the limitations in terms of accessibility to industry data, I relied on 
resources that are open to the public or available on a subscription-basis, which include 
The Oil & Gas Journal, Major Pipelines of the World Map of the Petroleum Economist, 
The Platts Energy Economist, The Platts Oilgram News, major international newspapers 
such as The Financial Times, Natural Gas Europe, the Oxford Institute of Energy Studies 
website, the U.S. Energy Information Agency, the Economist Intelligence Unit, the 




and transit countries), international oil companies’ websites (e.g., BP, Shell, and 
Chevron), and major international and local press releases. I also relied on the LexisNexis 
database of the Brookings Institution’s library, which keeps the track of both industry 
sources and major newspapers within a limited range depending on the institution’s 
subscriptions.  
As I have limited access to the industry data and mostly relied on publicly available data, 
my current data set has many missing values in my dependent and independent variables. 
Most of all, I found it difficult to collect the data on who proposed a pipeline project and 
when it was proposed, particularly in cases where pipelines were built or proposed a long 
time ago or where proposed pipeline projects have not witnessed much progress.  It is not 
clearly defined who proposed a certain pipeline project between government(s) and 
firm(s) and when it was proposed. In order to operationalize my hypotheses statistically, 
therefore, I have constrained the data set to include only pipelines that are operational or 
pipelines whose binding cross-border agreements are all signed and finalized. A total of 
77 cross-pipeline projects were selected for statistical regressions.  
The scope of data covers all proposed cross-border oil and natural gas pipelines in the 
world that are still under consideration or in operation, and all deals that are either 
finalized or have failed (i.e., are no longer under consideration). It excludes pipelines that 
are no longer in operation due to their lifespan expiry. It also excludes domestic pipelines 
that are within one existing sovereign territory and subject to the laws and regulations of 
one territory. I have 200 observations of cross-border oil and gas pipelines whose 
observation contains a brief description of fuel type (oil vs. gas), external geopolitical-




ownership and financing structure, pipeline type (direct link vs. multi-state export 
pipeline), number of participating states, pipeline operator,  pipeline project history (the 
year that a pipeline is proposed, signed, and operated), throughput (initial and maximum 
capacity)90, pipeline length, and total capital cost. I am left with 77 cross-border oil and 
gas pipeline projects that are operational or have finalized the deals for the final sample.   
MEASUREMENT 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is deal speed of a cross-border pipeline project. It is measured as 
the number of years from when a pipeline project is proposed to when it is operational. 
While my case studies in the next four chapters investigate key determining factors for 
both deal success and speed, my statistical analysis focuses on the deal speed due to the 
limitations of my current dataset described above. I have culled from the dataset of 200 
observations of cross-border pipeline projects those agreements (intergovernmental, host-
country governmental, and financing) that are finalized. I am left with 77 cross-border oil 
and natural gas pipelines, which is the final sample for my statistical analysis. Each 
observation contains values for fuel type (oil vs. gas), pipeline type (direct link vs. multi-
state export pipeline), number of participating states, pipeline ownership structure and 
financing, pipeline operator, the history of pipeline project (the year that a pipeline is 
proposed, signed, and operated), throughput (initial and maximum capacity), pipeline 
length91, total capital cost92, the level of political trust between host country governments, 
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geopolitical factor(s). Measurement and operationalization of variables of pipeline 
ownership structure, level of political trust, fuel type, and geopolitical factor(s) are 
explained in the next section on independent variables.  
𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑
= 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
In order to operationalize my dependent variable of deal speed, I construct a count 
variable aggregating the number of years from a successful pipeline project’s proposal to 
its deal finalization. The reason why I do not consider my dependent variable to be 
continuous is that whether it is successful or not is decided each year upon proposal. I 
intentionally do not implement a survival analysis to operationalize my dependent 
variable because the sample size is too small for robust estimation.  Given that successful 
materialization of a pipeline project occurs randomly only once in time, I assume that 
most pipeline projects are likely to be determined to be a success or a failure within thirty 
years after proposal.93 I define a pipeline project as a success in each year if it proceeds 
without failure or suspension, and then aggregate the total number of years until the deal 
finalization.  
Independent Variables 
Geopolitical and External Crisis Factor 
I assume that a cross-border oil and gas pipeline project has geopolitical (and external 
crisis) factor(s) when the project (directly or indirectly) involves support or opposition 
                                                        




from third-party countries and/or when the project goes through external shock or crisis 
situations. I quantitatively estimate the relationship between geopolitical factors and the 
deal speed of cross-border pipeline projects, in order to test Hypothesis 1, which predicts 
that geopolitical factors are likely to delay the deal speed (i.e., geopolitical factors are 
likely to have negative effect on deal speed). I construct a binary variable, which has a 
value of 1 if a pipeline project involves external geopolitical-economic factor(s) and a 
value of 0 if not. In order to measure the external geopolitical-economic factor(s), I 
conducted keyword searches in the LexisNexis and ProQuest Databases. I searched for 
news articles, books, conference papers and proceedings, dissertations and theses, wire 
feeds, and scholarly journals that contained the keywords of the name of a certain 
pipeline project, “geopolitics,” and/or “crisis.” If the search results produce multiple 
items—each of which contains the name of the pipeline project and “geopolitics” in its 
title, abstract, or full text—it is coded as 1. Likewise, the search results including the 
pipeline’s name and “crisis” are coded as 1. A cross-border pipeline project that does not 
come up in a search with the keywords of “geopolitics” and/or “crisis” is coded as 0, as it 
is considered not to involve any external geopolitical-economic factor(s). The database 
search shows that 28 cross-border pipelines out of total 77 are characterized by external 
geopolitical-economic factor(s) as I defined them.   
Political Trust  
My dissertation research posits that energy interdependence arising from cross-border oil 
and gas pipeline networks is associated with variations in the level of political trust 
between states. I intend to quantitatively estimate the relationship between the level of 




Hypothesis 2, which predicts that when the level of political trust between host countries 
of a cross-border pipeline project is higher, it is more likely to increase its deal speed. In 
order to measure the level of political trust, I rely on the Affinity of Nations index data 
that captures the similarity of state preferences and motivations among pairs of states 
(dyads), based on voting positions of the dyads in the United Nations (UN) General 
Assembly votes from 1946 to 2012.94 One of the major advantages of the Affinity index 
is that it shows variations in state preferences on bilateral terms and changes in 
preferences over time, which reflects how states perceive and trust each other, and align 
politically. As a proxy for the political trust variable, I rely on the “agree3un” variable of 
the Affinity index, which is a voting similarity index scaling from 0 to 1, computed using 
3 category vote data.95  Based on the agree3un index, I construct a continuous variable of 
political trust (ranging from 0 to 1) that takes the average of agree3un values of all pairs 
of participating states in a certain pipeline project in the year that the deal is finalized. For 
instance, I averaged the agree3un values of three pairs of states – Azerbaijan-Georgia, 
Azerbaijan-Turkey, and Georgia-Turkey – in 2004, in order to have a value of political 
trust among the three host states of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline that was signed in 
2004.     
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Pipeline Ownership Structure  
I include an ownership structure of pipeline variable that captures commercial alignment 
between countries involved in cross-border pipeline deals. To test Hypothesis 3, which 
predicts that when the ownership of a cross-border pipeline is combined by host-country 
firms (either state-owned enterprises or multinational corporations whose national 
origins belong to one of the host countries) and non-host country firms (either state-
owned enterprises or multi-national corporations whose national origins do not belong 
to any of host countries), it is more likely to increase its deal speed, I created a binary 
variable of ownership structure, which has a value of 1 if a pipeline has a combined 
ownership between host and non-host country firms, and a value of 0 if a pipeline is 
owned by host-country firms only. No single observation of the ownership type of non-
host country firms only is included in the sample of my dataset.   
Fuel Type (oil vs. natural gas) 
To test Hypothesis 4, which predicts that the effect of political trust, geopolitical factors, 
and pipeline ownership structure on pipeline deal speed is more pronounced in natural 
gas pipelines than oil pipelines, I created a binary classification of oil and natural gas 
pipelines included in the sample. The fuel type variable has a value of 0 for an oil 
pipeline and 1 for natural gas.  
Control Variables 
I implement the following set of controls to address potential omitted variable bias. First, 
I include a control for pipeline length (in kilometers), because longer cross-border 




pipelines. Longer pipelines tend to have lower economic incentives, which could be 
associated with the dependent variable (deal speed). As cross-border pipelines require 
long-term investment involving huge upfront capital costs, a negative association is 
expected between pipeline length and deal speed. A total capital expenditure for each 
pipeline construction may seem to be a desirable estimator, as an alternative to pipeline 
length, because capital expenditure can reflect the economic aspects of each pipeline 
more directly than pipeline length. However, I chose pipeline length as a control variable 
given that my dataset has many missing values for capital expenditure, whereas it has 
only one missing value for pipeline length. I also do not control for pipeline throughput, 
because the dataset includes both oil and natural gas pipelines and the unit measures 
between the two fuels are not inter-convertible.      
I also control for the number of countries that a pipeline passes through. Cross-border 
pipeline projects bring a host of jurisdictional challenges for construction, operation, and 
maintenance, because no overarching legal jurisdiction exists to manage any conflicts 
that may result. The international pipelines that cross borders of multiple states, thereby 
involving transit state(s), are likely to incur more risks than pipelines that directly link an 
exporting and an importing state. The more parties that are involved in a cross-border 
pipeline project, the harder it is to negotiate and to reach investment decisions as well as 
intergovernmental agreements, which could be associated with the dependent variable of 







Linear regression may not properly estimate parameters for my hypotheses, because the 
dependent variable (deal speed, or the number of years to a successful pipeline deal) is 
bounded by zero, takes on only integer values, and has a highly skewed frequency 
distribution. Linear regression, which cannot account for these constraints, can yield 
inefficient, inconsistent, and biased coefficient estimates.96 Count models offer a better 
means of analyzing these data. Researchers often use Poisson models to analyze count 
data, but these models constrain the variance to equal the mean. However, most count 
data exhibit over-dispersion (i.e., the variance exceeds the mean). To accommodate this 
over-dispersion, researchers can use a negative binomial regression.97 The negative 
binomial model introduces latent heterogeneity to the standard Poisson model, allowing 
the conditional variance and the conditional mean to differ.  
The baseline regression model for my hypotheses is as follows:  
 
𝑃𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑖𝑝𝑒𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑖
+ 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
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where 𝑃𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑖 is a number of years of a successful cross-border pipeline 
project i from proposal to completion; 
𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 is an indicator variable that takes a value of one when a cross-border 
pipeline project i has external geopolitical-economic factors (i.e., when a cross-border 
pipeline project directly or indirectly involves support or opposition from third-party 
countries, or when a pipeline project goes through external shock or crisis situations); 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖 measures the level of political trust between host country governments, 
it ranges from 0 to 1; 
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖 is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if pipeline i has a combined 
ownership between host-country firms and non-host country firms;  
𝑃𝑖𝑝𝑒𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑖  is the length of pipeline i (in kilometers); 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 is the number of countries where pipeline i crosses borders of 
sovereign states; and epsilon i is an error term.  
β is a vector of coefficients for the independent variables and control variables. The 
dependent variable Pipeline Deal Speedi is the count of total years that pipeline project i 
takes from proposal to completion (i.e., finalization of deal). I expect the coefficient to be 
positive for geopolitics, pipeline length, and number of host countries, meaning that the 
effect of each of them is likely to increase the number of years of a pipeline project from 
proposal to materialization. I expect the coefficient to be negative for political trust and 
ownership structure, meaning that a higher level of political trust between host countries 
is likely to decrease the number of years to a successful pipeline deal, and that a 




to decrease the number of years to a successful pipeline deal. In the equation above, I do 
not assume the heterogeneity across fuel type (oil vs. natural gas). Instead, I run the same 
equation above for each type of fuel separately.  
The summary statistics and the correlation matrix can also be found in the data 
description section of the supplementary appendix.  
FINDINGS 
Statistical findings generally support the hypotheses of my dissertation. The main results 
are presented in Table 1 (see below). Models 1-3 choose to implement the standard 
Poisson model, and Models 4-6 employ a negative binomial model. As mentioned earlier, 
the negative binomial model introduces latent heterogeneity to the standard Poisson 
model, allowing the conditional variance and the conditional mean to differ. Given that I 
was only able to construct the data set with a small-sized sample due to limited access to 
industry data, it is hard to tell if the population of my data is over-dispersed or not (i.e., if 
the variance exceeds the mean or not). In this respect, I implemented both Poisson and 
negative binomial models to test my hypotheses.  
Statistical findings using the standard Poisson model support my hypotheses more 
strongly than the ones using the negative binomial model. Model 1 shows that empirical 
findings strongly support hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. The coefficients for pipeline ownership 
and political trust are negative and statistically significant, meaning that both combined 
ownership (between host-country and non–host country firms) and a higher level of 
political trust between host countries are likely to increase the deal speed (i.e., decrease 




factor(s) is positive and statistically significant, meaning that geopolitical and external 
crisis factor(s) are likely to decrease the deal speed (i.e., increase the number of years to a 
successful pipeline deal). Models 2 and 3, also implementing the standard Poisson, 
introduce the effect of each fuel type and partially support hypothesis 4.  The results 
show that the effects of geopolitical factor(s) and pipeline ownership are more 
pronounced in natural gas pipelines than oil pipelines. Although statistically significant, 
the effect of political trust between host countries is not easy to interpret, as the 
coefficient for oil pipelines contradicts that of all pipelines (both oil and gas) in terms of 
direction.  
When employing the negative binomial method, the statistical results strongly support 
hypothesis 1. The coefficient for geopolitical factor(s) is positive and statistically 
significant, meaning that geopolitical factor(s) are likely to decrease the deal speed (i.e., 
increase the number of years to a successful pipeline deal). While the coefficients for 
pipeline ownership and political trust are in the direction expected by hypothesis 2 and 3, 
they are statistically insignificant. In addition, the effect of geopolitical factor(s) is more 
pronounced in natural gas pipelines than oil pipelines.  
For the control variables, the coefficients for pipeline length and number of host countries 
are positive and statistically significant across both Poisson and negative binomial 
models. When a cross-border pipeline is longer and involves a larger number of host 
countries, it is more likely to decrease the deal speed (i.e., increase the number of years to 
a successful pipeline deal).    
Overall, the statistical results reinforce my hypotheses in the following respects. First, the 




likely to delay the deal speed of cross-border pipeline development regardless of political 
and commercial alignment between host countries. Second, a higher level of political 
trust and a combined pipeline ownership structure consisting of both host-country and 
non–host country firms are likely to expedite the deal speed of successful cross-border 
pipeline projects. Third, the effect of external geopolitical factors on the deal speed is 
more pronounced in natural gas pipelines than oil pipelines. In other words, cross-border 
natural gas pipelines are more susceptible to external geopolitical factors and crisis 
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SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY RELATIONS AND 







Sino-Russian cooperation in the oil and gas sector comes from different motivations and 
interests in each country. China and Russia appear to be ideal, complementary partners: 
one is the holder of enormous hydrocarbon reserves and a leading exporter, and the other 
is a fast-developing economy and the world’s largest consumer and importer of 
hydrocarbons. In spite of this supply-demand complementarity, however, these countries’ 
bilateral energy relations have gone through many ups and downs during the last two 
decades. The trajectory of the ups and downs tends to track periods when one or the other 
country was in a more advantageous bargaining position.98 Moreover, the trajectory of 
their energy relations reflects a convoluted set of factors shaping each country’s energy-
related policies, including divergent internal dynamics between the government, national 
oil and gas companies, and private-interest groups.  
While energy has become a central plank of the bilateral relationship and the two 
countries’ foreign policies more generally, progress in bilateral energy cooperation has 
been slow.99 In examining the slow pace as well as the ups and downs of the Sino-
Russian energy relationship, some scholars focus on the sources of vulnerability that 
inhibit the development of a genuinely close partnership100, whereas others emphasize 
that bilateral energy cooperation is moving toward an enduring and comprehensive 
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partnership through interaction and mutual learning over time.101 The former group 
argues that the sources of vulnerability lie in the nature of the Sino-Russian energy 
relationship, which is driven by tangible interests and realities of power rather than by a 
fundamental convergence of national interests or ideology. This approach pays attention 
to the countries’ relative status of power – China’s rise and Russia’s decline – in the 
international system and the widening gap between the two. On the other hand, the latter 
group contends that outcomes are contingent on mutual learning through multifaceted 
interaction over time and on the course of domestic, regional, and global developments.  
Whether Sino-Russian energy ties can evolve into an enduring partnership or are just 
fragile bonds has become a matter of scholarly debate. This debate on the Sino-Russian 
partnership and its regional and global implications has intensified with China and 
Russia’s long-awaited $400 billion deal in May 2014 to deliver 38 billion cubic meters 
(bcm) of natural gas to China annually over the next thirty years through the Power of 
Siberia pipeline. Some studies track these countries’ energy relations since the 1990s, but 
not many of them fully examine the nature of Sino-Russian energy relations and their 
geopolitical and energy market implications in the scholarly context. Chapters 4 and 5 fill 
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this analytical gap by paying particular attention to tracking bilateral energy relations 
since the 2010s.  
Compared to relations in the natural gas sector, which had stalled until recently, Sino-
Russian relations in the oil sector are being actively developed. The major achievement 
on this front was the construction of the Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil 
pipeline and the spur to China from ESPO. While much scholarly attention has focused 
on why cooperation in the oil sector was easier and materialized earlier than with natural 
gas, and on how developing oil pipelines is different from building gas pipelines, few 
studies focus on the fundamental similarities between oil and gas relations, and the nature 
of Sino-Russian energy partnership.  
I fill this analytical gap by examining similarities and differences in Russia and China’s 
oil and gas sector cooperation. I argue that they are similar in that deals for both cross-
border oil and gas pipelines were signed when 1) Russian-Western relations were at a low 
point – during Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and Russia’s annexation of Crimea 
in 2014 – and/or 2) unexpected external factors, such as the Global Financial Crisis and 
the collapse of oil prices, compelled Russia to search for funding sources overseas. On 
the other hand, the development of oil and gas pipelines is also driven by different 
domestic factors in each country, which reflect national politics and institutional 
arrangements, energy policies, state-owned oil and gas companies’ commercial 
considerations, central and local governments’ interests, and other private-interest groups. 
In addition, interests tend to evolve in response to changing domestic and international 
circumstances, given that the axis of Sino-Russian relations operates on several levels – 




In developing energy relations with China, Russia has often implemented “wait-and-see” 
tactics. It has signed a series of documents with China when Moscow’s relations with 
West were complicated or on bad terms, but it has not been willing to compromise on 
price and equity issues until it desperately needed China’s help. Changes in the 
geopolitical environment, however, have driven both Russia and China to approach their 
bilateral energy relations differently. Russia decided to make concessions to China to 
maintain its geopolitical leverage with major powers such as the United States and 
Europe at critical historical junctures. For China, meanwhile, there are strong incentives 
to combine market and strategic considerations and diversify its energy import portfolio 
with Russian oil and gas. China’s decision to import Russian oil and gas demonstrates 
how government concerns about security of supply and domestic political agendas are 
linked with national oil companies’ commercial interests.  
I also argue that the nature of the Sino-Russian strategic energy partnership is 
transactional or instrumental102 rather than comprehensive due to the following 
impediments in the overall Sino-Russian relations: lingering historic distrust, Russia’s 
perceptions of China’s demographic threat in the Russian Far East, and strategic 
competition over regions such as Central Asia. At the nexus of the Sino-Russia strategic 
partnership lie energy and trade, and Chinese and Russian political leaders have sought to 
transcend a contentious shared history over the past two decades. While historical 
suspicions have softened, they have not disappeared. Bilateral cooperation efforts have 
left a mixed legacy of mistrust and anxiety on the one hand, and accommodation, 
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calculation, and pragmatism on the other,103 which have created the basis for the Sino-
Russian energy relations. In sum, the strategic energy partnership will likely remain 
transactional for the time being, given that the overall Sino-Russian relationship has both 
competitive and cooperative elements and that the Sino-Russian dynamic is not equal but 
asymmetrical.  
Chapters 4 and 5 are organized as follows. Chapter 4 examines Sino-Russian oil relations, 
with a particular focus on the development of the Eastern Siberia Pacific Ocean (ESPO) 
pipeline. It begins by explaining the role of energy in the development of Sino-Russian 
relations with a brief historical overview. Then key elements of this Sino-Russian oil deal 
are analyzed on the domestic and international level. Power dynamics in the Russian oil 
industry and the rise of Rosneft, China’s “loans for oil” as an import strategy, and the 
impact of Russia’s invasion of Georgia and the Global Financial Crisis on the oil deal are 
examined in depth in order to measure the gains and losses for each country. Chapter 5 
discusses Sino-Russian gas relations, with special attention to the development of the 
Power of Siberia (POS) and the Altai pipelines. With a brief historical overview of the 
Sino-Russian gas trade, this chapter explores the key political-economic drivers for the 
gas deal on the domestic and international levels. The international drivers include the 
impact of the Ukraine crisis and resulting Western sanctions, as well as the impact of 
falling global oil prices. In Russia, domestic factors include the country’s “eastward 
strategy” and the competition between Rosneft and Gazprom. In China, relevant factors 
include the changing role of national oil companies (NOCs) with the country’s aggressive 
anti-corruption campaign and increasing concerns about air pollution.  
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Chapters 4 and 5 answer my puzzle regarding what brings China and Russia into binding 
cross-border oil and gas pipeline deals and how political and economic factors play out 
interactively in the decision-making process regarding pipeline projects in the following 
respects. First, Sino-Russian oil and natural gas pipelines are cases where deals are 
delayed for decades due to lack of political willingness among the parties, despite clear 
economic incentives (as these neighboring states could enjoy supply-demand 
complementarity – with one as a major energy importer, and the other as a major energy 
exporter). While Sino-Russian oil and gas pipeline deals involve fewer actors than the oil 
and gas pipeline projects to bring Caspian hydrocarbons to Europe (which are discussed 
in Chapters 6 and 7), Sino-Russian direct-link pipeline deals took much longer to finalize 
than the deals for multi-state export pipelines carrying Caspian oil and gas. In this respect, 
Sino-Russian oil and gas pipelines challenge the conventional understanding that the 
more parties involved in a cross-border pipeline project, the harder it is to negotiate, 
reach investment decisions, and finalize intergovernmental agreements.  
Through the Sino-Russian oil and gas pipeline projects, I find the answers to why some 
bilateral deals for direct-link pipelines face or have faced many more obstacles than 
multi-state export pipelines in Eurasia. I argue that the explanation can be found in the 
interaction between three underlying political and economic factors – (1) mutual distrust 
or lack of political alignment between Russia and China, (2) a pipeline ownership 
structure where only state-owned enterprises in China and Russia are allowed to 
participate in the financing, construction, and operation of Sino-Russian pipelines, and 




After discussing the fundamental similarities between Sino-Russian oil and gas relations, 
which are the three factors mentioned above, Chapters 4 and 5 examine how and to what 
extent the strategic framework of calculations regarding oil pipeline development is 
different from natural gas pipeline development. The Sino-Russian case studies offer 
more nuanced and sophisticated explanations than the statistical analysis as to why 
natural gas pipeline development is more susceptible to geopolitical factors than oil 
pipeline development, and therefore takes longer to finalize. These chapters explore the 
distinction between oil and natural gas as commodities, different subnational political-
economic dynamics in each country regarding bilateral Sino-Russian oil and gas deals, 
and different geopolitical factors affecting oil and gas deals.  
ENERGY AND SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS 
Despite a history of suspicion and rivalry compounded by lingering memories of military 
confrontation, border disputes, and ideological conflict, Sino-Russian bilateral relations 
have yielded significant dividends in recent years. Since the primary catalyst behind the 
formal strategic partnership agreement between the two countries in 1996104 was a shared 
desire to check hegemonic American global preeminence105, the trajectory of Sino-
Russian relations reveals a complex security and economic partnership interwoven with 
competitive and cooperative elements. The 2001 Treaty of Good Neighborliness and 
                                                        
104 The April 1996 Joint Declaration announced the resolve of China and Russia “to develop a strategic 
partnership of equality, mutual confidence, and mutual coordination towards the 21st century.” “Text of 
PRC-Russia Statement Released,” in Xinhua Domestic Service, April 25, 1996 (FBIS Daily Report).   
105 President George H.W. Bush’s “new world order” discourse, the Clinton administration’s doctrine of 
“enlargement of markets and democracies, and the President George W. Bush’s muscular unilateralism 
were deeply disconcerting to Moscow and Beijing alike. China and Russia had continued concerns over 
American policies, which was reflected in the opening sentence of the 1997 Joint Statement issued in 
Beijing, calling for the promotion of the “multipolarization of the world and establishment of a new 




Friendly Cooperation enabled both sides to upgrade multifaceted cooperation in trade and 
civilian technology, reflecting a pragmatic Russian desire to move away from a 
relationship based largely on arms sales. In 2003, when the Chinese leadership had 
changed to President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao from Jiang Zemin and Zhu 
Rongji, the two countries recognized the importance of economic considerations, and 
addressed the need to boost trade and energy ties. Moreover, border delimitation 
agreements allowed China and Russia to stop viewing each other as imminent threats.106 
In sum, China and Russia in the 2000s were not only engaged in bilateral and regional 
military contacts, finally settling all pending boundary demarcations, but also started to 
consider energy and trade as key elements in the further development of bilateral 
economic ties.107   
Energy certainly has served as a key element in developing the Sino-Russian economic 
partnership and the evolution of their relationship from the largely political partnership of 
the 1990s to “pragmatic and business-like” interaction.108 Indeed, the energy sector has 
seemingly been where both China and Russia can enjoy a supply-demand 
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complementarity. China is the world’s second-largest oil consumer (behind the United 
States) and became the largest global energy consumer in 2010.109 Russia is a major 
producer and exporter of oil and natural gas; Russia was the world’s third-largest 
producer of oil (after Saudi Arabia and the United States) in 2013 and the second-largest 
producer of natural gas in 2012 (after the United States). Russia’s economy largely 
depends on energy exports; oil and gas revenues accounted for 52 percent of federal 
budget revenues and over 70 percent of total exports in 2012, according to IHS 
Energy.110  
Moreover, energy is fundamental to the rise of Russia and China as (re-)emerging powers 
in a very different context. As the Kremlin officials speak of Russia being an “energy 
superpower,”111 energy for Russia has not been just an instrument of influence in itself, 
but has impacted other dimensions of power, including military, political, economic, and 
technological. Energy has been no less vital to China from a different standpoint. For 
Beijing, energy is not an instrument of geopolitical ambition, but the principal rationale 
for an assertive foreign policy to facilitate its global quest for energy resources as well as 
a policy tool to fuel its economic development and modernization.112  
Despite the supply-demand complementarity, the Sino-Russian energy relationship has 
been dogged by problems. First, Moscow has been locked in an asymmetrical economic 
relationship with its giant southern neighbor, although trade between the two countries 
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has increased substantially. The bilateral trade pattern has shown structural asymmetries, 
in that energy and arms constitute Russia’s principal exports to China while China 
exports consumer goods and industrial products to Russia. Even Russia’s exports of 
machinery to China have dropped dramatically since the mid-2000s.113 As the share of 
machinery and industrial equipment of China’s total exports to Russia increased from 8.2 
percent in 2000 to 20 percent in 2005, to 29 percent in 2006, and to 42.4 percent in 2012, 
the corresponding figures for Russian machinery exports to China dropped from 28.7 
percent in 2001 to 20.1 percent in 2002, to 1.2 percent in 2006, and to 0.7 percent in 
2012.114 The share of Russian energy exports to China, meanwhile, increased 
exponentially from about 10 percent in 2001 to about 54 percent in 2006, and to about 
67% in 2012,115 and China became Russia’s second-biggest trading partner after the EU 
in 2013, totaling $89 billion in bilateral trade.116  
The asymmetric nature of bilateral trade reflects the relative status of these countries’ 
power – China’s rise and Russia’s decline – in the international system, and the gap 
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between the two is even widening. China has become a major player on the global stage 
both economically and politically, becoming more integrated to the global economic 
system and having better ties with the rest of the world. China comes to the developing 
world, armed with preferential loans and infrastructure projects, in the hopes of locking 
up energy resources and other raw materials to aid its economic development. In contrast, 
Russia’s efforts to reach out to the rest of the world are hindered by the fact that it has 
little to sell besides oil, gas, chemicals, and metals. In addition, China’s and Russia’s 
interests conflict in other areas, including the widening gap in terms of the countries’ 
demography and their competition in Central Asia. These “overlapping but not 
identical”117 interests play a significant role in hindering efforts by the two countries to 
develop a stable and predictable relationship.  
SINO-RUSSIAN OIL RELATIONS – EASTERN SIBERIA PACIFIC OCEAN 
(ESPO) OIL PIPELINE  
Preliminary Setting 
Sino-Russian energy relations during the last two decades have been both good and bad, 
depending on when one or the other country was in a more advantageous bargaining 
position. As Erica Downs points out, the dynamics of the China-Russia energy 
relationship have been shaped by fluctuations in world oil prices.118 Shortly after the 
normalization between the Soviet Union and China, Moscow began to talk about 
constructing oil and gas pipelines to China in the late 1980s. In the 1990s, when world oil 
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prices were low and the Russian oil industry was starved for capital, Russia was 
interested in selling oil and natural gas to China.119 Beijing, however, was rather 
indifferent toward these projects: oil prices were as low as $20 a barrel throughout the 
1990s, and there was an excess of supply on the market.120 Once China became a net 
importer of oil in 1993 and oil prices rose in the 2000s, however, the situation changed. 
The search for foreign sources of crude became a priority in China’s national strategy. 
Beijing’s going abroad policy provided incentives for its national oil companies to 
pursue overseas investments in targeted regions: Central Asia, Russia, Africa, and the 
Middle East.121 Russia, along with Central Asia, received particular attention because of 
the geographical advantage of short supply lines and its geopolitical significance.122  
China’s proactive stance toward cooperation with Russia on oil issues was driven by 
three factors: 1) the sharp decline of production at the Daqing oil field which traditionally 
met a third of China’s oil needs123; 2) the lack of substantially large-scale alternatives in 
Central Asia (i.e., the difficulty of the China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline development due to 
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limited crude availability)124; and 3) China’s diversification strategy regarding energy 
imports.125 In the early 2000s, Chinese authorities started talks with their Russian 
counterparts on the laying of an oil pipeline to China based on a concept originated by the 
Russian private company Yukos in the late 1990s. At that time, Beijing officials were 
ready to take any steps necessary to secure crude supply from Russia, but Moscow was 
dragging its feet. For most of the 1990s and in the early 2000s, the Kremlin did not 
pursue new markets, but rather played the Chinese card in negotiations with Gazprom’s 
European clients.126 In contrast, due to China’s rapid increase in demand for oil and 
higher global oil prices, China was eager to diversify the sources of its oil imports. 
Transporting oil overland from Russia represented a potential improvement over 
transporting oil from the politically instable Persian Gulf and through strategically 
vulnerable sea lanes through which more than 85 percent of China’s crude oil imports 
flow.127 Chinese policy makers consider the land-based supply routes less vulnerable than 
the sea lanes where the Chinese navy does not have a major presence.128 In this sense, 
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China has been eager to expand its access to Russian oil through overland pipeline 
supplies as part of its strategy to lessen its heavy dependence on Middle Eastern oil 
imported by sea.129 
Competition between Different Power Groups in the Russian Oil Industry 
The Russian oil industry and the Russian state are inseparably intertwined. At the center 
of the story is the emergence and evolution of a new oil industry after the breakup of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. The weakness of the Russian state in the 1990s enabled the oil 
industry to restructure, privatize, and begin to modernize. The resurgence of strong state 
power in Russia since 2000 enabled the state to regain control over the oil industry, even 
as the state itself became increasingly dependent on oil revenues. Although both oil and 
gas are the main drivers of the Russian economy, Russian oil is different from Russian 
gas in two ways. First, whereas Russia exports three-quarters of its oil output, it 
consumes nearly two-thirds of its gas output at home, much of it at prices below export 
parity – that is, at artificially low, subsidized prices. Second, Russia’s oil exports generate 
more than four times the revenue of its gas exports. Therefore, there is a fundamental 
difference in that oil pays the bills abroad, while gas subsidizes the economy at home.130  
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In order to understand how Sino-Russian oil relations began to take shape, it is important 
to explore how different power groups in the Russian oil industry competed over China 
and rival oil pipeline proposals. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, former head of oil giant Yukos, 
first began the policy of petroleum cooperation with China in the late 1990s by shipping 
oil via rail to China.131 As his company Yukos became one of the first Russian oil 
companies to develop an interest in Eastern Siberia, Khodorkovsky was pushing the 
Angarsk-Daqing pipeline focused on a single commercial market, China. Although the 
Angarsk-Daqing option was carefully designed to be a profitable investment132, Russian 
President Vladimir Putin instead supported Russian state-owned oil pipeline company 
Transneft’s plan of an Angarsk-Nokhodka pipeline that is longer and more expensive, but 
allows for the diversification of end-markets.133 The choice between the two routes was 
defined by political considerations, given that the Angarsk-Daqing option would have left 
Russia dependent on one monopoly buyer – China.134 This was the first time that Asian 
export development confronted severe competition between different powers in the 
Russian establishment.135  
The Rise and Fall of Yukos136 
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Khodorkovsky’s independent overtures to China with his company Yukos were attacked 
because many in the Russian political and economic elite viewed China as a foreign 
threat. In the eyes of Russian elites, Khodorkovsky’s picture of the oil industry seemed to 
be based on the image of the era of the Seven Sisters.137 It clashed with Putin’s 
fundamental logic that the role of oil industry in post-Soviet Russia is not just as a source 
of wealth for powerful individuals and clans, but also as a resource for political power 
and state policy. As Putin has rebuilt central government power since his inauguration in 
May 2000, the areas of conflict between the Kremlin and the private oil companies have 
multiplied and intensified. The Kremlin’s increasingly favorable view of Rosneft as an 
emerging national oil company created a new rival to the private companies for the 
privatization of the remaining state-owned oil assets and for control of oil licenses in East 
Siberia and the Russian Far East. Putin’s determination to exploit the potential of oil and 
gas as instruments of foreign policy clashed with the oil companies’ insistence that 
profitability alone should determine the choice of production levels and export markets. 
Yukos resembled the other private oil companies in kind (LUKoil, TNK, Sibneft, Surgut, 
etc.), but stood out in degree; on every point of contention with the Kremlin, Yukos was 
more strident, more aggressive, and more radical than others. Khodorkovsky was arrested 
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on October 25, 2003, and Yukos’ most valuable asset, its Yuganskneftegaz subsidiary, 
was bought by Rosneft at auction for $9.35 billion in 2004.138  
The Oil Industry in China  
Between 1994 and 1998, the Chinese government reorganized state-owned oil and gas 
assets into two vertically integrated firms: the China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) and the China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec). Dominating China’s 
upstream and downstream oil markets, these two companies report directly to the State 
Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) under the supervision of the State Council. 
CNPC is the largest and most influential national oil company (NOC), as well as the 
leading upstream player in China. Along with its publicly listed arm PetroChina, accounts 
for roughly 60 percent and 80 percent of China’s total oil and gas output respectively. 
Sinopec has traditionally focused on downstream activities such as refining and 
distribution, which represented three-fourths of the company’s revenue in past years. The 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), meanwhile, is responsible for 
offshore oil exploration and production, and has seen its role expand as a result of 
growing attention to offshore hydrocarbon resources.139  
China did not experience the degree of competition between different power groups that 
the Russian oil industry had during its period of developing Asian and Chinese markets. 
Although Sinopec also explored the possibility of oil supply from Russia with its interest 
in a crude oil pipeline, China’s State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) gave 
CNPC exclusive authorization in any petroleum-related negotiations, including pipelines 
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with Russia at that time. In 2001, China’s top priority was to explore oil supply from 
Russia, as CNPC had realized that the China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline development could 
not be implemented as planned due to limited crude oil availability. In its negotiations 
with Yukos in August 2002, CNPC indicated a readiness to provide credit for the 
construction of the Russian section of the Angarsk-Daqing oil pipeline and to buy all the 
crude that would go through the new route. With these guarantees, CNPC placed all its 
bets on Yukos. CNPC had never expected any delay to, or suspension of, the Angarsk-
Daqing pipeline plan.140 Beijing authorities did not fully understand the internal and 
external political dynamics that led Russia to reject Yukos’ initiative and choose the 
pipeline plan of the Russian state-owned pipeline company Transneft instead.141 Indeed, 
the Kremlin and the Russian state energy firms became increasingly irritated with CNPC 
for continuing to negotiate with Yukos rather than the Russian state.142 
The reason why Beijing authorities did not fully understand the internal dynamics 
involved in Russia’s energy policies on cross-border pipelines seems to be driven by the 
fundamental differences in the energy bureaucratic structures of the two countries. 
Although China and Russia are similar in that the decision-making regarding energy 
policy is a top-down process in both countries,143 they are different in terms of the degree 
of influence that state-owned oil and gas companies have in shaping and implementing 
energy policies. For instance, the chairmen of Gazprom and Rosneft are considered to be 
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the most powerful men after President Putin in Russia, while the chairman of CNPC is at 
most only as powerful as a cabinet minister in China.144   
Russia’s “Triangularism”145 – Moscow’s Playing Between China and Japan 
On April 3, 2002, Transneft’s vice president, Sergei Grigoryey, said that: 
…global consideration[s] rather than the cost of the project is what one should have in 
mind. The Chinese pipe[line] will be cheaper to build, but it would provide access to just 
one market. And what if all of sudden they no longer needed our oil? The Pacific 
pipe[line] ensures access to markets in the USA, Japan, South Korea, Southeast Asia, 
Australia, and China, too.146  
Transneft’s proposal of extending the pipeline to the Pacific coast drew attention from 
Japan. During Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to Moscow in January 
2003, he publicly announced that Japan was greatly interested in the project to construct a 
crude oil pipeline from East Siberia to the Pacific coast (hereafter referred to as the 
Eastern Siberia – Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline). In May 2003, Moscow formulated a 
compromise plan to designate the Pacific route as the trunk line (with a maximum 
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capacity of 50 million tons of oil per year) and the Daqing route as the spur pipeline (with 
a capacity of 30 million tons of oil per year). This Russian government officially 
endorsed this plan in August 2003 with its, “Energy Strategy for Russia for the Period up 
to 2020.” However, Moscow maintained an equivocal stance on whether the spur pipeline 
to Daqing would be built before the trunk pipeline to the Pacific coast, despite repeated 
requests for clarification from Beijing and Tokyo.147 
Putin’s triangulation strategy,148 playing China against Japan, arose for two main reasons: 
1) Moscow’s hope to reduce its dependence on Beijing (and possible blackmail from 
China as the monopoly customer) by diversifying oil exports to the wider Asia-Pacific 
market149; and 2) Russia’s desire to maximize foreign investment in the ESPO project,150 
as well as concessions from both countries, by exploiting competition between China and 
Japan.151 The concept of triangularism reflects not only a desire to improve relations with 
Japan for Russia’s own sake, but also to allow Russia greater strategic flexibility in the 
region. However, the deeper rationale behind such triangulation strategy is to preserve the 
strategic status quo between the existing power of Japan and the emerging power of 
China. Viewing Japan as a strategic counterweight to China, Russia continuously delayed 
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confirming whether priority would be given to the development of the pipeline between 
Skovorodino152 and Daqing field.  
Russia’s strategic delay, however, did not allow it to consolidate its position either in 
China or in Japan. First, Moscow failed to understand that support for the ESPO project 
in Japan was minimal. The pro-Russian players in the Japanese government who shared 
Moscow’s anti-Chinese sentiment during the Koizumi period attempted to maximize 
Japanese investment in the Russian energy sector, such as the ESPO project, regardless of 
the associated investment risks. As Sino-Japanese relations stabilized in subsequent years, 
however, this group received only limited domestic support given the high degree of 
uncertainty concerning the ESPO investment framework and the availability of proven 
crude reserves in East Siberia. Russia not only overestimated the impact of Japan’s 
geopolitical rivalry with China, but also its desire for Russian oil to alleviate Japan’s high 
degree of dependence on the Middle East. These miscalculations came when Russia 
failed to consider two key points: (1) Japan has one of the world’s largest oil 
stockpiles153; and (2) Japan’s desire to diversify its crude supply sources does not 
necessarily mean that it will ignore economic considerations. Such naïve calculations by 
Russia resulted in the failure to attract large-scale investment from Japan to cover the 
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pipeline’s construction cost.154 At the same time, from Moscow’s perspective, the 
substantial increase in Russian revenue from oil and gas since 2003 has made Japanese 
financing for ESPO less attractive.155 
On the other hand, Russia’s ongoing pipeline delays also drove the Beijing authorities to 
reconsider their energy strategy. Due to the stalling of the Angarsk-Daqing pipeline, 
China learned that Russia would not be in a hurry to decide the pipeline route and clarify 
the investment framework. China thereby began actively to seek other suppliers of oil in 
other regions including Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. For 
instance, in 2003 PetroChina indicated “the Kazakhstan-China pipeline also tops our 
agenda” and the Central Asian option was “no longer a backup to the Russia-China 
pipeline.”156 Moreover, at a meeting with Kazakhstan’s Primer Minister Daniyal 
Akhmetov during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) conference in Bishkek 
in September 2004, China’s Prime Minister Wen Jiabao said that Sino-Kazakh energy 
cooperation is a win-win situation.157 These statements show that the Chinese authorities’ 
patience with Russia was running out and that they had decided to prioritize pipeline 
development with Central Asia.158 In sum, due to its strategy of delay regarding China 
and Japan, Russia had missed the opportunity to consolidate its position in China, which 
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was quickly overtaken by other players. While China was not the only choice for Russia 
at that time, Russia overlooked the fact that Russian oil was not the only choice for China 
either.  
The Rise of Rosneft – The Driver of Russia-China Energy Cooperation 
The “Yukos Affair” and the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky during the early 2000s 
influenced relations between the state and the oil industry and the overall course of oil 
policy in Russia. Russia in the 1990s moved toward privatizing its oil industry mainly 
due to the collapse of the Soviet planned economy, the disintegration of the Soviet oil 
sector, the ambitions of the oil and financial oligarchs, and above all, the weakness of the 
state.159 However, in the early 2000s, as the Russian state regained power, the idea of an 
autonomous oil sector was rejected. The primacy of the state over the private sector was 
reasserted as Putin embarked on a course of state intervention in the economy – first and 
foremost in the oil and gas sector – after being elected as president in 2000 and the 
Kremlin increasingly supported the idea of a state-owned national oil champion. As Putin 
argued in his 1997 doctoral dissertation, greater state control of energy assets is essential 
given that Russia’s energy resources are an important vehicle for revitalizing Russia’s 
economy and restoring its great power status.160 Therefore, Rosneft, which had barely 
survived the 1990s as a state-owned company, emerged as the lead player in the next 
phase of the Russian oil industry in the twenty-first century.  
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The decisive point came in 2005, when Rosneft succeeded in capturing Yuganskneftegaz, 
Yukos’ most valuable asset, while also avoiding a takeover by Gazprom.161 Having Igor 
Sechin, then the deputy chief of Presidential Administration, as chairman of its board of 
directors, Rosneft began to possess unique administrative clout and played an important 
role in Russia’s domestic and foreign policy.162 For instance, the company declared East 
Siberia and the Far East as areas of strategic interest, and became a driving force in 
Russia’s eastward strategy and attempts to establish close business relations with Asian 
countries, including China.163  
The First Loan for Oil 
Some analysts consider Rosneft’s acquisition of Yuganskneftegaz in 2005, which it 
accomplished with Chinese financial help, as a breakthrough for Russian-Chinese 
petroleum cooperation. However, I contend that this initial “loan for oil” deal, the type of 
arrangement that began to shape oil relations between Russia and China, was unbalanced. 
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As part of its efforts to remain independent from Gazprom, Rosneft pledged to export 
48.4 million tons (354 million barrels) of oil to China by 2010 to pay back the $6 billion 
that China offered to lend as an upfront payment.164 Rosneft was desperate for cash to 
finance its $9.4 billion purchase of Yuganskneftegaz, the main oil-producing asset of 
Yukos, which Rosneft deemed essential to its survival as an independent company.165 
Given that, analysts speculated that the price for Yuganskneftegaz was set too low, 
although the terms of the contract were not disclosed.166 China, meanwhile, was eager to 
take advantage of Rosneft’s plight to negotiate a new supply contract with a substantial 
discount on the market price of oil.167 Both the internal political games in Russia (private 
vs. national oil and gas companies; Rosneft vs. Gazprom; the Kremlin vs. different 
lobbying groups) and Kremlin’s strategic delay of the ESPO launch (in its attempt to play 
China and Japan against each other) prevented Russia from beginning its petroleum 
exports to China in a timely fashion. During this delay, China was diversifying its 
petroleum imports through other sources, and Russia was no longer the main priority in 
the Chinese energy strategy. However, China’s $6 billion loan clearly provided a lifeline 
                                                        
164 According to the Federal Energy Agency, Rosneft received a $6 billion credit from Russian banks to 
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165 According to Downs, the Chinese loan was especially valuable as Rosneft was unable to borrow from 
Western banks because Yukos had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the United States. See 
Downs’s chapter in Bellacqua, The Future of China-Russia Relations.  
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to Rosneft and laid the foundation for Rosneft’s successful initial public offering (IPO) in 
2006.168 
The Layout for the Eastern Siberia Pacific Ocean (ESPO) Oil Pipeline 
After the fallout from the “Yukos Affair” subsided, neglected pipeline projects seemed to 
regain strength with the rise of Rosneft. On the last day of 2004, Russia’s Prime Minister 
Mikhail Fradkov signed a decree on the establishment of the ESPO pipeline. The decision 
to construct the ESPO pipeline was facilitated by Russia’s decision-makers, who were the 
main actors driving the project forward.169 The layout of the ESPO pipeline was 
politically motivated, given Russia’s national agenda for an eastward shift in its oil and 
gas development. Russia’s eastern energy policy has three objectives: 1) exploitation of 
the oil and gas fields in East Siberia, replacing declining fields in West Siberia; 2) 
diversification of Russia’s oil and gas exports to East Asian markets (while avoiding 
dependency on one single buyer of oil, namely China); and 3) socioeconomic 
development in the Russian Far East and East Siberia in order to deal with a worsening 
demographic situation and increasing Chinese immigration to the regions.170  
                                                        
168 CNPC subscribed to $500 million worth of Rosneft shares during the company’s initial public offering. 
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Meets the Eye," Bloomberg Business, July 13, 2006. See also Paik (2012), p. 348.  
169 Tabata and Liu, “Russia’s Energy Policy in the Far East and East Siberia,” in Russia's Energy Policies: 
National, Interregional and Global Levels, ed. Pami Aalto (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2012).  
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develop their economies by themselves. From the end of 1991 to the end of 1999, while Russia’s 
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For more details, see Tabata and Liu, “Russia’s Energy Policy in the Far East and East Siberia,” in Russia's 
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In Russia, where oil and gas fields are located in landlocked areas far from energy-
consuming regions, oil and gas needs to be transported through long-distance pipelines. 
With the ESPO pipeline, the Russian decision-makers desired to break a vicious cycle: oil 
fields were not being developed in Eastern Siberia because there was no pipeline to 
export oil, but no pipeline was being built because there was no crude immediately 
available to fill it.171 Until the idea of the ESPO pipeline was introduced, all Russian oil 
trunk pipelines delivered oil westwards, including those reaching the former East 
European and Baltic countries and those connecting to export terminals at the Black or 
Baltic Sea. The decision to construct the ESPO pipeline was made in order to both 
facilitate the discovery of new oil fields in East Siberia that would replace the stagnant 
Western Siberian fields, and to export oil eastward from East Siberian oil fields.  
The first phase of the ESPO oil pipeline from Taishet in Irkutsk Oblast to Skovorodino in 
Amur Oblast was started in April 2006 and completed in October 2009. While Rosneft 
played a key role in catalyzing the ESPO project, the question of whether to build a spur 
to China was left unresolved for a long time. Transneft and CNPC signed a protocol 
concerning the construction of the oil pipeline from Skovorodino to the Chinese border in 
2006, and the project was planned to begin in 2007 and be completed in 2008, 
simultaneous with the launch of the first stage of the ESPO. The negotiations stalled, 
however, mostly due to a disagreement over the price of Russian crude. An objection 
against the ESPO from Vladimir Yakunin, the head of the Russian Railways, was another 
                                                        




factor delaying the process; without a pipeline, oil supplies to China would have to be 
delivered by the Russian railway monopoly.172  
Map 1. Eastern Siberia Pacific Ocean (ESPO) Oil Pipeline 
 
Source: Center for Easter Studies http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-
01-09/completion-espo-oil-pipeline-connects-siberia-to-pacific-ocean 
 
Russia’s Invasion of Georgia  
Progress on the ESPO project began to take shape only in October 2008, when CNPC and 
Transneft (the Russian state pipeline monopoly) signed the deal to build an oil pipeline 
with an annual capacity of 15 million tons from Skovorodino to Daqing as a branch of the 
main ESPO trunk pipeline. This deal came after talks between Chinese Prime Minister 
Wen Jiabao and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin on October 28, 2008. It is worth 
noting that the deal with China was signed when Russian-Western relations were at one 
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of their lowest points since the Cold War era due to Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 
August 2008.173 China has been valuable to Russia as a tool to pressure Europe to 
reconsider any attempts to reduce its dependence on Russian energy.174  
After the breakup of the former Soviet Union, the clash over influence in the former 
Soviet republics became a stumbling block between Russia and the United States. When 
Moscow had lost its empire, it did not relinquish its assertion of privileged interests in 
Georgia, Ukraine, and the other former Soviet republics. The United States, meanwhile, 
viewed these lands in terms of promoting or defending democracy. For more than a 
decade, Moscow had supported secessionist provinces of Georgia, namely South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia, while Georgia had achieved the creation of passably democratic 
institutions and the implementation of an unwaveringly pro-U.S. foreign policy since the 
Rose Revolution of 2003.175 The military intervention that Russia launched in August 
2008 was a firm rejoinder to the pro-Western Georgian leadership and a chance to stand 
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this political gesture of Russia’s non-binding agreement with China, EU nations renewed the long-term 
natural gas contracts, as had been Moscow’s aim.173 See Poussenkova, "Russia's Eastern Energy Policy: A 
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Russia traditionally charged Belarus below market prices for gas given Moscow’s desire to keep an ally on 
its Western flank. However, Gazprom moved to ensure the reliability of gas transits to Europe by 
attempting to establish control over the Belarusian transit network. Belarus initially agreed to sell 50% of 
the network, but after disagreement over price it refused and Gazprom announced price increases 
174 Downs, “Sino-Russian Energy Relations: An Uncertain Courtship,” in Bellacqua, The Future of China-
Russia Relations. 
175 The Rose Revolution was a change of power in Georgia in November 2003, which took place after 
widespread protests over the disputed parliamentary elections. As a result, President Eduard Shevardnadze 
was forced to resign on November 23, 2003 (Source from Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rose_Revolution#cite_ref-2). Also see Cory Welt, “Georgia's Rose Revolution: 
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up to U.S. influence in Moscow’s backyard.176 Whereas many of the region’s inhabitants 
as well as the Russian citizens viewed the war as a justified intervention rather than a 
brazen attempt to resurrect the empire, Russia’s actions distanced the country from 
Western institutions. In particular, European countries initially joined the United States in 
promising sanctions against Russia.   
In addition, Georgia’s geographical proximity to the Black Sea, Caspian, and Central 
Asia regions has made this transit country an important player in terms of energy exports. 
Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the U.S. and the EU have considered 
Georgia as one of the main building blocks in the formation of alternative energy export 
routes that bypass the territory of Russia. Georgia soon emerged as a major transit 
country for Western pipeline plans, including the successful construction of the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline (also 
known as South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP)).177 
Due to its geostrategic importance in terms of energy transit and political ideology, 
Georgia had become the site of the major open confrontation between Russia and the 
United States following the five days of the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008. 
Russia must have realized that it needed Chinese support against Washington,178 which I 
argue motivated Russia to complete a memorandum with China stipulating the 
apportionment of credit by China for construction of the ESPO and the future deliveries 
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of crude. However, the process of the oil deal and the ESPO pipeline began to drag once 
again. I also argue that Russia’s procrastination at this time was related to the fact that 
Chinese officials refused to endorse Moscow’s decision to recognize Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia as independent, and that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) refused 
to give unequivocal support to Russia’s violation of Georgian territorial integrity. In 
addition, the China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline that was going to be operational in 2009 and 
the Central Asia-China gas pipeline (Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China 
pipeline) that was under construction struck at Russian energy leverage in the region. 
While China and Russia remained suspicious about each other’s activities in Central Asia, 
where their state-controlled firms compete for energy resources, Moscow must have 
realized that growing Chinese power could obstruct Russia’s interests in the region.179  
The Global Financial Crisis and the Second Loans for Oil 
Disagreements over the price of Russian crude and the interest rate for Chinese loans to 
Russian companies were worked only out in February 2009, when the Russia’s Vice-
Premier Igor Sechin visited China. The breakthrough was apparently reached mainly 
thanks to the Global Financial Crisis and corresponding growing need of Rosneft and 
Transneft for cash.180 Russia and China signed a series of deals on oil pipelines and long-
term crude oil trade, collectively known as “loans-for-oil.” The China Development Bank 
(CDB)181, a government-controlled lender, agreed to provide $25 billion in loans: $15 
billion to Rosneft (Russia’s biggest oil producer and a state-owned company) for a 
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twenty-year contract on the delivery of oil between CNPC and Rosneft, and $10 billion to 
Transneft (Russia’s state-owned pipeline operator) for the construction and operation of a 
Skovorodino-Mokhe pipeline. In exchange for the Chinese loans, Russia initially pledged 
to export 15 million tons of oil annually (300,000 barrels a day, or nearly 10 percent of 
China's existing volume of oil imports) for twenty years starting in 2011.182 While the 
details of the agreement including the interest rate and the oil price were not disclosed, 
the Russian side acknowledged the interest rate was lower than the world market price.183 
The pipeline spur to China that the two countries had discussed for more than fifteen 
years was finally put into operation in January 2011. The reason why the two countries 
were not able to finalize the deal for a long time was partially because demand for 
Russia’s oil was ample and its companies enjoyed easy access to credit184 and partially 
because China insisted on being in charge of the full value chain185 – maximizing equity 
                                                        
182 Rosneft and Transneft concluded a bilateral agreement, according to which Transneft would buy six 
million tons per year from Rosneft for resale to China and a remaining nine million tons per year would be 
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Week, Beijing Moves to Lock up Natural Resources at Bargain Prices to Fuel Its Growth," The Wall Street 
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International Energy Agency, February 2011. 
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participation and constructing the related crude pipeline infrastructure linked to pipeline 
networks in China – until it had to compromise to sign a deal with Russia. However, any 
explanation of what actually drove the breakthrough for the deal cannot overlook the 
changes in the external economic and geopolitical environment surrounding Russia 
during the Global Financial Crisis.  
The period of 2008–2009 can be considered a watershed in terms of Russian geopolitical 
strategy. Russia has pursued partnership with China to leverage greater global standing 
vis-à-vis the United States. For years, Russia subordinated its standing in Asia in its quest 
for a global role equal to that of the U.S., leveraging its presence and influence in Europe, 
Central Asia, and Middle East to compel U.S. acknowledgement of its status and 
demands. However, Russia was not able to enforce its stance in the areas of its vital 
interest, including Syria, without Chinese support. On Syria, Beijing enjoyed watching 
Moscow distract Washington with minimal Chinese participation in an area of relative 
strategic unimportance to China. By 2008-2009, Moscow must have realized that 
growing Chinese power could be an impediment to Russia’s geopolitical strategy.186 
Following Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008, the Central Asian states 
followed China’s lead in refusing to recognize the Russia-backed separatist states of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This weakening of Russia’s traditional influence was 
changing the fundamental dynamics of the region, encouraging Central Asian leaders to 
become less deferential to the Kremlin.187 China’s ability to thwart Russia over Central 
Asia has increased —not only in foreign diplomacy, but also in the sphere of energy trade. 
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These developments drove Russia to play China and Japan against each other and delay 
the decision of the ESPO pipeline and its spur line project.  
As the financial crisis hit the Russian economy severely188, however, Moscow was finally 
pushed to sign a deal with China and rely on Chinese funding to repay Russian debts and 
refinance loans in the short term. According to an industry insider, Rosneft had to pay a 
debt of $13 billion back by the 2009 summer.189 Russia’s crude oil production fell in 
2008 for the first time in ten years, and the credit crisis and the decline in global demand 
turned the oil industry into a buyer’s market.190 Given such circumstances, Russia wanted 
to secure customers and find a counterbalance to its dependence on Western Europe. 
With all these factors combined, Russia had to end its strategic delay on the ESPO 
pipeline and seek out China for immediate financial help.  
Geopolitical Change and Sino-Russian Oil Cooperation 
In order to understand the Sino-Russian oil matrix, I examined both political and 
economic factors at both the domestic and international level. In this research, I paid 
particular attention to geopolitical and external crisis factors– Russia’s invasion of 
Georgia and the Global Financial Crisis – that facilitated the strategic oil partnership 
between the two countries. Given that the decisions to formalize binding energy 
agreements between the two countries were made at critical historical points, I borrow the 
concept of crisis in order to explain the key drivers of oil deals that go beyond market 
                                                        
188 The Russian GDP contracted by 8 percent while the stock market lost about 60 percent of its value. 
189 Morena Skalamera, "Booming Synergies in Sino-Russian Natural Gas Partnership," Paper, Belfer 
Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, May 2014. 
190 Oster, "China, Russia Strike $25 Billion Oil Pact: In Third Deal in a Week, Beijing Moves to Lock up 




reasons. Chapter 2 provides detailed explanations of how I apply the model of crisis to 
my own theory.  
The notion of crisis is very applicable to Russia’s strategic turn toward China and China’s 
decision to offer loan for a major oil deal at critical and historical turning points. The 
Global Financial Crisis, combined with Russia’s invasion of Georgia, had suddenly 
changed the pre-existing bargaining context for Sino-Russian oil sector relations and 
thereby opened opportunities for change. In the pre-existing setting for negotiations that 
had been delayed over a decade, Russia had never seemed willing to agree on the pricing 
formula or to allow China’s equity investment in the Russian upstream market. However, 
the crisis situations facilitated a breakthrough in bilateral oil sector relations. First, the 
fact that CNPC and Transneft signed a non-binding agreement for the construction of a 
spur pipeline (from Skovorodino to Daqing) when Russian-Western relations were at one 
of their lowest points does not seem so different from the Russia’s tactic of using China 
as a tool to pressure Europe to reconsider reducing its dependence on Russian energy. 
However, shortly after being hit by the Global Financial Crisis and the subsequent fall in 
world oil prices, Russia was forced to end its strategic delay and take a major step 
forward with China by signing a deal for immediate financial help.  
Decision-makers in Moscow who had delayed making a final decision on the ESPO 
pipeline and its spur to China in order to maximize concessions from China were forced 
into sudden and high-stakes decisions during the crisis situations. They were pressured to 
devise a solution within a sharply limited period in order to secure a massive loan from 
China. China also decided to compromise with Russia by lending cash-strapped Russian 




and a twenty-year oil supply contract) without equity oil participation in the Russian 
upstream market. Starting with its first loan offer of $6 billion in 2005, Beijing planners 
had learned that it had to compromise with the Russian approach to doing business, 
which only allows foreign investors to take minority stakes even while it seeks major 
investment capital in the Russian upstream market. Within a limited timeframe at the 
critical juncture discussed here, Beijing authorities decided to give up their maximizing 
equity participation, which they had enjoyed in Central Asia, and to play by the Russian 
rules of the game in order to meet China’s desperate need for oil supply in the 
northeastern provinces. Compromises had become possible in both countries as the 
pressure on decision-makers to negotiate a workable framework was intensified during 
the crisis.  
The Gains and Losses for Russia and China 
While both the Chinese and Russian media regarded the loan-for-oil deal of 2009 as a 
win-win arrangement, it is necessary to examine both gains and losses that each country 
have experienced since the deal through an analysis of Chinese and Russian oil policies.  
On the China side, its desperate need for oil for its northeastern provinces forced it to 
commit to major investments and financing without being permitted to take any equity 
positions in Russia’s upstream projects.191 The crude supply from Eastern Siberia to 
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Therefore, the widening gap between supply and demand of oil was a big concern for China at that time. 




China’s three northeastern provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning (especially 
Heilongjiang, due to the decline of the Daqing field192) was one of China’s highest 
priorities. Crude supply from Central Asia (with equity participation in various projects) 
was another Chinese priority. While Beijing pursued oil and gas supply from both Russia 
and Central Asian republics simultaneously, Beijing learned that its “Central Asian 
Model”193 of maximizing equity oil participation did not work in Russia. Instead, Beijing 
authorities realized the importance of financing in Russian oil deals: the loans-for-oil 
approach of the “Russian Model” that finances the target supply source to make sure of 
long-term supply security.194 The first loan-for-oil deal of $6 billion in 2005 provided the 
logical basis for China to offer the second loan-for-oil deal of $25 billion in 2009, which 
is regarded as a breakthrough for Sino-Russian oil cooperation. From the first loan-for-oil 
deal, China had learned that in order to conclude the deal, it had to compromise with the 
Russian approach to business that does not allow foreigners to have significant equity 
stakes but seek for major external investment capital in the upstream and infrastructure. 
In compromising with Russia, however, China was able to promptly take advantage of 
the crisis situation, as Chinese financial institutions were relatively insulated from the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Cooperation (APEC) Joint Symposium (“Energy Links Between Russia and East Asia: Development 
Strategies for the XXI Century”), August 30 – September 3, 2010 (Irkutsk, Russia). 
192 The local government of Heilongjiang said that the Daqing oil field, which supplies about a quarter of 
China’s domestic production as China’s largest inland oilfield, would cut output by 11.5 million tons in 
2015. Limited oil reserves, high-cost oil development, and declining international oil prices have caused the 
aging and fast-depleting Daqing oil field to reduce output. Xiang Bo, “China's Largest Oilfield to Reduce 
Output,” Xinhua Net, December 28, 2014. Mark Magnier and Brian Spegele, “Forecasting China’s Oil 
Buying Grows Harder: Purchases for Stockpiles Appear to Skew Figures,” Wall Street Journal, February 
25, 2015.  
Also see footnote #26 for the data explaining the decline of the Daqing oil field.  
193 Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation: The Reality and Implications.  




Global Financial Crisis’s problem of toxic assets that had crippled many other global 
banks and debt-laden energy companies, giving China the resources to fund big deals.195  
From a broader Chinese perspective, a stable oil supply of about 300,000 barrels a day 
from the Russian Far East, or nearly 10 percent of China's volume of oil imports (as of 
today), ensures the success of its diversification strategy. China imports about 60 percent 
of the oil it uses,196 much of it through strategically vulnerable shipping lanes such as the 
Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. This has been driving China’s efforts to 
diversity supply lines with new overland pipeline routes that are less vulnerable to supply 
disruption and ensure more stable supplies.197 Xia Yishan, an energy expert at the China 
Institute of International Studies, said the pipeline would make Russian oil a “more 
straightforward, consistent, and long-lasting” alternative to Middle East and African 
sources, which make up 80 percent of China’s oil imports. Xia added, “Oil imports from 
Russia will diversify China’s energy sources, which guarantees its strategic need for the 
crude.”198 In this sense, China has been eager to expand its access to Russian oil through 
pipeline supplies as part of its strategy to lessen its heavy dependence on Middle Eastern 
oil imported by sea. China had already refurbished some of the refineries in the 
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northeastern provinces, including the Liaoyang and the Dalian refineries, which also 
pushed China to secure at least a minimum volume of crude oil from Russia.199  
From the Russian perspective, the oil deal enabled Russia to take a major step forward in 
its eastern policy as a counterbalance to its dependence on Europe and to boost 
investment and development in the Far East and Eastern Siberia. Moreover, Russia not 
only secured a massive loan for the major infrastructure development without allowing 
China’s equity stakes in the Russian upstream market, but also gained more diversity in 
its oil exports to Asia. By all appearances, Russia seemed to have achieved most of what 
it wanted from the deal. However, there still remains a puzzling question of what real 
gains and losses there are for Russia in the deal. Such a puzzle can be solved by re-
examining the implications of the Sino-Russian oil deal at two levels of analysis: 1) the 
internal dynamics in the Russian oil sector, involving the government, state-owned 
enterprises, and private-interest groups; and 2) the impact of the deal at the international 
level, especially in terms of bilateral Sino-Russian relations. And effect in Russo-U.S. 
relations? 
On the first point regarding the Russian domestic sphere, Russian state-owned oil 
companies enjoyed an undeniable advantage over their private rivals in the Far East and 
East Siberia. On the second point regarding the international sphere, the Russian state lost 
its leverage over oil exports to China due to the delay stemming from internal 
competition between different power groups in the oil sector. Rosneft and Transneft 
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received exclusive access to the pipeline for the delivery of oil to China for the project’s 
first twenty years.200 Once Russia set a strategic goal of developing the Eastern vector of 
its energy policy and strengthening oil and gas cooperation with the Asia-Pacific 
countries201, Rosneft certainly served as a main catalyst in petroleum relations, getting an 
influential lobbyist of Igor Sechin behind the project. Rosneft received credits for the 
project from Chinese banks against guaranteed supplies of oil, lobbied for the 
construction of a spur to China from the ESPO pipeline system, and subsequently 
increased its oil exports to the Asia-Pacific countries dramatically.  
Oil exports to the Asia-Pacific began from Russia’s Kozmino terminal once the first stage 
of the ESPO pipeline construction was completed in 2009 (along with the spur pipeline to 
China at the end of August 2010), amounting to 10.53 million tons in 2009 and 16.9 
million tons in 2010. When the second stage of the pipeline was completed at the end of 
2012, the American market received 35 percent of the oil through the Kozmino terminal, 
Japan received another 30 percent, China 25 to 28 percent, and the rest went to Singapore, 
Malaysia, and South Korea.202 The volume of China’s total imports from Russia has 
expanded significantly after imports of 15 million tons of oil by the spur pipeline to 
China (the Skovorodino-Daqing line) began in 2011. However, in the 2000s and the early 
2010s, there was still no guarantee for China to receive a higher allocation of Russian oil 
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exports from Kozmino since other Northeast Asian consumers such as Japan and South 
Korea were also anxious to secure bigger volumes of Russian supply. In particular, China 
has not received the same level of Russian crude oil import increases that Japan and 
South Korea enjoyed during the 2000s. Japan’s crude oil imports from Russia increased 
from 3.5 percent of Japan’s total oil imports in 2007 to 7.1 percent in 2010.203 South 
Korea’s imports of oil from Russia have increased since 2007 as well and, thanks to 
imports from Kozmino, Russia’s share of the South Korean market increased from 4.2 
percent in 2007 to 5.6 percent in 2010.204  
Without a doubt, the ESPO pipeline deal provided the foundation for Rosneft to become 
a flagship enterprise of the Russian oil industry and turn itself into a leading international 
energy corporation among publicly owned oil companies. However, due to domestic 
political games involving the Russian oil sector, Russia began exporting its petroleum to 
the Chinese market a bit late.205 Once China started reconsidering its energy import 
strategy vis-à-vis Russia during the delay, Russia had missed the opportunity to 
consolidate its position in China. Russia supplied 8 percent of all petroleum imported to 
China in 2010, and 11 percent in 2014.206 However, the Middle East remains the largest 
source of China’s crude oil imports and African countries, particularly Angola, began 
contributing more to China’s imports in the past decade. In 2014, the Middle East 
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supplied 52 percent of China’s oil and Africa supplied 22 percent.207 Today, Chinese 
petroleum sources are well-diversified, and Russia is no longer a top priority in Chinese 
energy strategy. 
Figure 4. China’s Crude Oil Imports by Source (2014)
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 
 
Sino-Russian Oil Cooperation – Not Very Balanced 
China and Russia’s $25 billion deal on the ESPO oil pipeline system in 2009 and the 
long-term petroleum trade it ensured marked a historic turning point in Sino-Russian oil 
sector cooperation. It appeared to be a win-win deal for both Russia and China: Russia 
secured a massive loan in exchange for a sizeable supply of crude to China, while China 
secured a significant portion of its future crude supply from Russia. Structural analysis of 
                                                        




the deal, including each country’s subnational dynamics, however, reveals that oil sector 
relations between Russia and China do not appear very balanced. Notwithstanding the 
economic and security benefits offered by the geographical proximity between the two 
countries (a shorter distance can save on transportation costs; an overland pipeline 
reduces China’s heavy reliance on oil imports through vulnerable sea-lanes), Russia 
seems less attractive to China relative to other petroleum exporting countries (who have 
greater competitiveness in oil prices), due to the aging resource base in the Russian oil 
industry, the lack of large-scale infrastructure in the country, and the high production 
costs in the Russian Far East (RFE). In the end, however, the urgency of Chinese oil 
supply situation made Beijing take a more proactive stance toward Sino-Russian oil 
sector cooperation.  
In the short term, China did not secure the massive quantities of oil it wanted, while 
Russia seemed to have achieved most of what it desired, including major infrastructure 
development in East Siberia and more diversity in its oil exports to Asia. In the process, 
China contributed substantial investment to Russia, but without the benefit of major 
equity participation in the Russian upstream market. In the long term, however, the 
widening gap between rising China and declining Russia is likely to make the terms of 
bilateral energy cooperation more favorable to China. When it delayed the ESPO deal 
during the 2000s, Russia lost time to establish a petroleum dialogue with China in a more 
equalized and balanced manner. As it dealt with severe competition between different oil 
sector power groups after the breakup of the former Soviet Union, Russia was unable or 
unwilling to take into account the fact that China’s choice of reliable suppliers was 




Georgia in 2008, Russia made the political gesture of concluding the ESPO deal, but it 
still was not ready to make any tangible progress. Not until Russia struggled with the 
Global Financial Crisis, and Rosneft and Transneft needed Chinese money urgently, was 
Russia ready to act on the deal. Russia soon learned, however, that the buyer (and 
creditor) in oil deals has more power than the seller (and debtor).208 Moscow has found 
itself more and more addicted to Chinese money as the Russian oil sector deteriorates and 
the resource base depletes.  
The Third Loans for Oil – Comprehensive Partnership or Fragile Alignment? 
It is worth examining how Russia and China have strived to strengthen their energy ties 
since recent leadership changes in each country. Xi Jinping visited Russia for his first 
overseas trip as president of China on March 22, 2013, signing a series of energy deals 
and calling Russia China’s “friendly neighbor.”209 Since the ESPO pipeline development 
with Chinese financing has shaped the fundamental characteristics of the Sino-Russian 
oil (more broadly energy) relationship, Xi seems to have learned how to use the money 
card effectively to expand the flow of energy from Russia. The past decades of 
negotiations over cross-border pipeline projects indicate that geographical proximity and 
economic complementariness are necessary, but not sufficient, for the development of a 
robust bilateral energy relationship.210 The inflow of Chinese capital has undoubtedly 
served as a key driver in finalizing non-binding agreements between the two countries.  
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One of the key features of the deals signed during the 2013 Xi-Putin summit is Russia’s 
agreement to allocate maximum crude for China in return for Chinese capital – primarily 
in the form of loans from the China Development Bank (CDB). Rosneft pledged to triple 
its oil deliveries to China from 300,000 barrels per day (b/d) to as much as one million 
b/d, which is double the total amount of oil Russia exported to China in 2012 and equal to 
the amount of oil Saudi Arabia, China’s top crude oil supplier, delivered to China last 
year.211 At the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, on June 21, 2013, Rosneft 
inked a deal with CNPC to double oil supplies to China, which amounts to additional 15 
million tons annually (300,000 barrels per day) for twenty-five years.212 Rosneft and 
CDB completed documents for a long-term $2 billion loan under an accord signed March 
2013 and Rosneft could get up to a $70 billion prepayment from China under this $270 
billion supply deal (which calls for exporting a total of 365 million metric tons of crude 
to China over twenty-five years).213 Rosneft also signed a second contract for oil supplies 
to China with Sinopec for 10 million tons of oil over ten years starting in 2014. Under the 
agreement, Sinopec will make an advance payment of between 25 and 30 percent of the 
total cost of the ten-year contract.214 
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Russia seems to be continuing the practice of raising Chinese money for Rosneft’s 
corporate purposes.215 According to Standard and Poor's, Rosneft is facing large debt 
maturities in 2013, 2014, and 2015 of $6.6 billion, $15.9 billion, and $16.2 billion, 
respectively. Accordingly, prepayment from China would allow Rosneft to lighten the 
burden on its balance sheet by reducing debts to banks and to minimize financing 
risks.216  
Some speculate that the $270 billion deal, one of the biggest ever in the history of the 
global oil industry, signals the growing energy ties between Russia and China and 
China’s rising interest in gaining greater access to Russian oil.217 For instance, the deal 
involves a joint venture between CNPC and Russia's Rosneft to develop Russia's East 
Siberian oil fields where Rosneft holds 51 percent and CNPC 49 percent. The deal gives 
China access to the Srednebotuobinsk field, which is one of the key assets held by Taas-
Yuriakh Neftegazodobycha (Rosneft subsidiary) with an estimated 2.05 million barrels of 
oil and equivalents in Siberia.218 Although development of the Srednebotuobinsk field 
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might serve as a foundation for the future joint venture between the two countries, it 
should be noted that the two countries have not reached a final agreement, but have only 
signed a memorandum for future upstream development. According to Sergey Sanakoyev, 
executive secretary of the Russian-Chinese Chamber for Facilitating Trade in Machinery 
and Innovative Products, talks seem to be taking longer than expected because Rosneft 
and CNPC are still haggling over the price and the size of the future Chinese stakes. 
Moreover, Chinese companies tend to be reluctant to become minority stakeholders in 
joint ventures.219   
China has been expanding participation in the Russian upstream market since 2005, but 
has not engaged in any major joint venture participation in significant upstream fields. In 
2005, Rosneft offered Sinopec the opportunity to set up a joint venture for the purposes 
of geological survey of the Veninsky fields, where Sinopec holds 25.1 percent shares and 
Rosneft holds 74.9 percent.220 In 2006, Sinopec purchased a 97 percent stake in 
Udmurtneft, which was the subsidiary of TNK-BP, BP’s main vehicle in Russia.221 In 
that same year, Rosneft and CNPC signed an agreement about the creation of a joint 
venture Vostok Energy in which Rosneft holds a 51 percent stake and CNPC 49 percent. 
In 2007, Vostok Energy won licenses for two small deposits in Irkutsk Oblast, located 
near the ESPO. However, the joint venture has been mothballed after the licenses it 
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obtained proved to be uninspiring.222 There has been a tendency where Russia invites 
Chinese participation only in less significant upstream projects, and more substantial joint 
ventures have been in limbo due to various reasons. Rosneft’s proposal to grant CNPC a 
stake in the Vankor oil fields, Rosneft’s third-largest onshore production subsidiary and 
one of largest oil fields in Russia, seems too premature to be considered as another 
landmark project in Chinese-Russian energy cooperation, as the proposal comes when the 
future of Western companies in Russia became uncertain with the outbreak of the 
Ukraine crisis.  
The story is similar in the downstream. In 2007, Rosneft (49 percent stake) and CNPC 
(51 percent stake) created the joint venture Vostok Petrochemicals to construct a $5 
billion Chinese refinery in Tianjin with an annual capacity of 13 million tons and to sell 
petrochemicals on the Chinese market. Although it was initially planned to be 
commissioned by 2011, it took much longer because of disagreements over a number of 
issues, including the financing of the project and access to retail outlets in China. 
Ironically, talks have not focused on the missed deadlines regarding refinery construction, 
but on the way to market products from the refinery that has not been built. Rosneft has 
long insisted that it wants the joint venture to help it access China’s domestic fuel market 
by creating a network of 300 retail outlets.223 Although CNPC and Rosneft signed the 
agreement in May 2014 by endorsing the crude refining portion of a feasibility study for 
the construction, they have not endorsed the petrochemical production package included 
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in the feasibility study.224 Although Chinese companies have been invited to join the 
Russian downstream project, they have not made serious practical steps toward accepting 
the proposals and are concerned about how Rosneft’s large refinery and petrochemical 
facility on the Pacific Coast might compete with other commercial arrangements.225  
In conclusion, the third massive loans for the long-term petroleum trade seem to make the 
terms of bilateral energy cooperation more favorable to China. With the development of 
the ESPO oil pipeline system, Russia seemed to have achieved most of what it desired in 
the short term, while China did not secure the massive quantities of oil that it wanted. 
With the widening geopolitical-economic gap between rising China and declining Russia, 
however, Russia is becoming more dependent on Chinese capital, and China does not 
seem to be as desperate as it used to be in securing oil supplies from Russia. For instance, 
a second spur from Russia to China was supposed to be operational in 2015 to ship the 
extra 90,000 barrels of oil per day (4.5 million tons per year) in addition to the 300,000 
barrels of oil per day that has been operational from the first spur from Skovorodino to 
Daqing. However, the Chinese did not finish construction on their side for this second 
spur to Daqing and have opted to obtain the 300,000 barrels of oil per day from Kozmino 
instead.226 China’s decision to not meet the construction schedule for the second spur 
shows that the increase in the oil supply from Russia via pipelines is not China’s top 
priority.  
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Progress in Sino-Russian oil cooperation has been slow (although it was faster than the 
progress in Sino-Russian gas cooperation, which will be discussed in Chapter 5). 
Moscow began to talk about constructing oil and gas pipelines to China in the late 1980s, 
shortly after the normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and China. The two 
countries signed binding agreements on the construction of the spur section of the ESPO 
oil pipeline and the long-term petroleum trade in 2009, when Russia-Western relations 
were at low point with Russia’s invasion of Georgia and when Russia was struggling with 
the Global Financial Crisis. I argued that Sino-Russian oil deals were delayed due to lack 
of political will in the two countries, despite the clear economic incentives due to the 
countries’ supply-demand complementarity. Although energy has become a central plank 
in China and Russia’s bilateral economic relationship, energy is still a weak link to bind 
the two countries together due to the following impediments: lingering historic distrust, 
Russia’s perception of China’s demographic threat in the Russian Far East, strategic 
competition over shared neighboring regions such as Central Asia, and the widening 
power gap between a rising China and a declining Russia. Given such obstacles, China 
and Russia were not willing to compromise on fundamental disagreements over oil prices 
and China’s equity participation in the Russian upstream sector until changes in the 
geopolitical environment drove both countries to approach their bilateral energy relations 
from a different angle.  
The development of Sino-Russian oil pipeline came from different motivations and 
interests in each country. For Russia, cross-border pipelines are strategic projects to drive 




economic gains. In particular, Russia’s oil pays the bills abroad while natural gas 
subsidizes its domestic economy because Russia’s oil exports generate more than four 
times the revenue of its gas exports. The role of the oil industry in post-Soviet Russia is 
not only as a source of wealth for powerful individuals, but also as a source of state 
power, as President Putin has rebuilt central government power since his inauguration in 
2000. In developing oil relations with China, Russia implemented “wait-and-see” tactics, 
as Moscow feared that with the widening gap between a rising China and a declining 
Russia, increasing dependence on China as an energy supplier would eventually 
constitute a threat to national security.  
However, Russia decided to make concessions to China to preserve its geopolitical 
leverage with major powers such as the United States and the European Union at critical 
historical points. The Global Financial Crisis and collapse in oil prices, together with 
Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, compelled Russia to rely on Chinese capital in 
developing its energy sector. Without a doubt, the inflow of Chinese capital (e.g., “loans 
for oil” to Russian companies from the Chinese Development Bank) has served as a key 
driver to the finalization of cross-border agreements between the two countries. 
On China’s end, there were strong incentives to combine market and strategic 
considerations to diversify its oil import portfolio with Russian oil. Once China became a 
net importer of oil in 1993, its search for foreign sources of crude and a diversification 
strategy regarding energy imports have become top priorities in China’s national strategy. 
With China’s rapid increase in oil demand and high global oil prices, China was eager to 
import oil from various regions of the world and diversify its oil importation routes and 




improvement over transporting oil from politically instable sea lanes off of Southeast 
Asia, through which more than 85 percent of China’s crude oil imports flow.  
In addition, crude supply from Eastern Siberia to China’s three northeastern provinces of 
Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning was one of China’s highest priorities, mainly due to the 
projected decline of production from the Daqing oil field, the largest oilfield in China. In 
its negotiations with Moscow, Beijing learned the importance of financing in Russian oil 
deals – namely the “loans-for-oil” approach that finances the target supply source to 
ensure long-term supply security – instead of its “Central Asian Model” of maximizing 
equity oil participation. The first loan-for-oil deal of $6 billion (which financed Rosneft’s 
$9.4 billion purchase of Yuganskneftegaz) in 2005 provided the logical basis for China to 
offer the second loan-for-oil deal of $25 billion in 2009 for the construction of the ESPO 
oil pipeline and the twenty-year contract of oil delivery between Rosneft and CNPC. The 
third loan-for-oil deal of $270 billion in 2013 to allocate maximum crude for China over 
twenty-five years seems to make the terms of bilateral oil cooperation more favorable to 









SINO-RUSSIAN ENERGY RELATIONS AND 







This chapter discusses Sino-Russian gas relations, with special attention to the 
development of the Power of Siberia (POS) and Altai pipelines. With a brief historical 
overview of the Sino-Russian gas trade, this chapter explores the key political-economic 
drivers for the gas deal on the domestic and international levels. The international drivers 
include the impact of the Ukraine crisis and resulting Western sanctions, as well as the 
impact of falling global oil prices. In Russia, domestic factors include the country’s 
“eastward strategy” and competition between Rosneft and Gazprom. In China, relevant 
factors include the changing role of national oil companies (NOCs) with the country’s 
aggressive anti-corruption campaign, increasing concerns about air pollution, and 
diversification strategy regarding energy imports.  
Sino-Russian natural gas pipelines are a case where the deals are delayed for decades due 
to lack of political will among the parties despite clear supply-demand complementarity, 
such as in the case of Sino-Russian oil pipeline development. The chapter explains why 
Sino-Russian bilateral deals for direct-link pipelines face or have faced many more 
obstacles than multi-state export pipelines, even though Sino-Russian deals involve fewer 
actors. While existing studies focus on gas prices and China’s equity participation in the 
Russian upstream sector to explain fundamental obstacles to deal finalization, the chapter 
examines three underlying, interactive political and economic factors that are 
underexplored in the political science literature and that are overarching themes of my 
dissertation: (1) mutual distrust or lack of political alignment between Russia and China; 
(2) pipeline ownership structures where only state-owned enterprises from China and 




Russian pipelines; and (3) geopolitical changes due to crisis situations. I argue that the 
mechanism of these underlying political and economic factors shapes Sino-Russian 
energy relations and affects the likelihood and speed of successful pipeline gas deals.  
In addition to demonstrating the fundamental similarities between Sino-Russian oil and 
gas relations in terms of the three factors described above, the chapter also explains how 
the strategic framework of calculations regarding oil pipeline development is different 
from natural gas pipeline development and why gas deals took longer to materialize than 
oil deals. The chapter also examines differences between oil and gas as commodities, as 
well as different domestic factors in each country, to explain the differences between 
Sino-Russian oil pipeline development and gas pipeline development. Domestic factors 
include Russia’s state-run gas monopoly Gazprom’s rigid stance toward China, Russia’s 
eastward strategy, and the competition between Gazprom and Russia’s state-run oil 
company Rosneft. In China, relevant factors include the changing role of national oil 
companies (NOCs) with the country’s aggressive anti-corruption campaign and 
subsequent energy sector restructuring, increasing concerns about air pollution, and the 
development of a diversification strategy regarding energy imports. The Sino-Russian 
case of gas pipelines offers more nuanced and sophisticated explanations than the 
statistical analysis as to why natural gas pipeline development is more susceptible to 
geopolitical factors than oil pipeline development and therefore takes longer to finalize.  
The SINO-RUSSIAN GAS MATRIX AND THE POWER OF SIBERIA (POS) GAS 
PIPELINE 
During President Vladimir Putin’s visit to China for the Conference on Interaction and 




National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a thirty-year “take-or-pay”227 contract to 
deliver Russian gas through the “Power of Siberia (POS)” pipeline to northeast China. 
The contract stipulates gas supplies of 38 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year, starting in 
2019 according to Gazprom. The 4,000-kilometer POS pipeline will pump gas from the 
Kovykta and Chayanda fields in Eastern Siberia through Khabarovsk to China and to 
Vladivostok, Russia. The initial segment of the POS will extend from Yakutia to 
Blagoveshchensk, from where a pipeline spur enters China, serving the Beijing-Tianjin-
Hebei metropolitan area in the north of China and the Yangtze River Delta in the east.228 
The pipeline’s second segment will extend from Blagoveshchensk to Vladivostok, 
although the exact timing remains unclear. The total cost of the pipeline is estimated at 
$55 billion229, out of which $25 billion was expected to come from an advance payment 
from CNPC, but this approach failed.230 Gazprom thereby plans to attract loans from the 
Chinese banks, but no concrete agreements have so far been reached.231 
                                                        
227 “Take-or-pay” clauses require the buyer to take an annual minimum volume of gas, or to pay for that 
volume whether or not it is taken. For more details, see James Henderson and Simon Pirani Henderson,ed. 
The Russian Gas Matrix: How Markets Are Driving Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); 
Jonathan P. Stern and Howard V. Rogers, "The Transition to Hub-Based Gas Pricing in Continental 
Europe," Oxford Institute of Energy Studies (2011). 
228 The pipeline system consists of two parts – the Yakutia-Khabarovsk-Vladivostok gas trunk pipeline and 
the Irkutsk-Yakutia pipeline. The Yakutia-Khabarovsk-Vladivostok (about 3,200 kilometers) gas pipeline 
will supply gas directly to China and run in parallel with the already operational Eastern Siberia Pacific 
Ocean (ESPO) oil trunk pipeline. The first stage of this line will be constructed by 2018. See Tatiana 
Mitrova, “Russia-Northeast Asia Energy Trade and Investment: Opportunities and Challenges,” 2014 North 
Pacific Energy Dialogue in the Shale-Gas Era Conference Paper, East-West Center (2014). 
229 Aditya Suresh et al, “China’s Gas Choices: Dawn of the Russian-China Axis?”, Macquarie Research, 
June 4, 2014, p. 1-36.    
230 Pang Changwei—a researcher at Energy Strategic Institute, China University of Petroluem—says 
“There is no tradition of advance payment in international market, as [the] natural gas market is changeable. 
China could take stakes, but not accept advance payment.” For quotation, see Guo Yan, “Natural Gas 
Prices Negotiations into Deadlock Between China and Russia,” China’s Foreign Trade (中国对外贸易(英
文版)), Issue 21, 2011: 12-13. 
231 Keun-Wook Paik, “Sino-Russian Gas and Oil Cooperation: Entering a New Era of Strategic 




While the precise terms of the gas deal have not been disclosed232, the timing and general 
outlines that are known have broader energy market and geopolitical implications. First, 
the deal will not only make CNPC Gazprom’s single largest customer, but it also opens 
the door for the large-scale entry of Russian gas to the Asian market, including Japan and 
South Korea. Moreover, the fact that the deal moved forward in 2014 after more than a 
decade of delay demonstrates how the crisis in Ukraine changed geopolitical 
underpinnings, triggered the historic mega deal, and provided the ideological justification 
for Russia to move faster toward China and Asia. While some argue that powerful drivers 
to make the deal happen were already in place long before the Ukraine crisis,233 this 
chapter emphasizes the impact of the U.S. and European financial sanctions on Russia’s 
changing geopolitical and export strategies. It also analyzes how political and economic 
motivations interact to influence cooperative trans-border arrangements.234 By examining 
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both domestic and international factors, I aim to explain the logic behind this secret-mega 
deal for China and Russia. 
Map 2. Power of Siberia Gas Pipeline 
 
(Source: Gazprom) 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, it tracks the history of Sino-Russian relations 
in the natural gas sector and analyzes the main obstacles that have stalled bilateral 
cooperation until recently. It then explores the key political-economic drivers for the 
breakthrough in Sino-Russian gas sector cooperation – namely, the delivery of Russian 
gas to China through the Power of Siberia pipeline – at both the international and 
domestic levels. International drivers include the impact of the Ukraine crisis and the 
resulting Western economic sanctions, and falling global oil prices. Domestic factors in 
each country are as follows: Russia’s eastward strategy and the competition between 
Rosneft and Gazprom; in China, the changing role of national oil companies (NOCs) with 
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the national anti-corruption campaign and the air pollution issue in Chinese domestic 
politics. The impact of geopolitical and external economic factors, as well as the interplay 
between domestic political and economic motivations, will be examined in depth.  
SINO-RUSSIAN GAS RELATIONS 
Historical Overview   
Despites numerous meetings and negotiations, no visible cooperation was made in the 
natural gas sector between China and Russia during the 2000s. The key difference 
between the oil and the gas sectors in terms of progress lies in the contrast between 
Rosneft’s proactive approach and Gazprom’s rigid stance toward China. Gazprom’s 
monopoly status and its European-oriented business strategy caused it to delay in 
reaching a gas price compromise with China, which motivated China to prioritize its gas 
supply option from Central Asia, especially from Turkmenistan. While Gazprom insisted 
that China pay European prices for gas, it refused to offset China’s financial burden of a 
high import price through an equity gas stake for CNPC. Given that CNPC has no 
authority to make any compromise on price negotiations and that the ultimate decision on 
the final price must come from the Price Department in China’s National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC),235 numerous negotiations have stalemated without 
any tangible progress.  
In 2007, Russia approved the Eastern Gas Program (Map 3), its “state-run development 
program for an integrated gas production, transportation and supply system in Eastern 
Siberia and the Far East, taking into account potential gas exports to China and other 
                                                        




Asia-Pacific countries.” Yet Gazprom, appointed by the Russian government as the 
coordinator of this program, has not been successful in making any single possible 
pipeline scenario into a reality.236 Although a memorandum was signed between 
Gazprom and CNPC on natural gas supplies and the construction of two gas pipelines in 
2006, no major steps were taken by Russia until Putin returned to the Kremlin in May 
2012 for a six-year presidential term.237 Putin urged Gazprom to reconsider Russia’s gas 
export policy to take advantage of rising Asian demand and to develop capacity to 
produce liquefied natural gas (LNG) for the Asian market.238 “The priorit[y] should be 
diversification of markets to account for the prospective Asian segment and means of 
delivery,” said Putin.239 Putin’s order to end the delay in launching Russia’ Eastern Gas 
Program, despite ongoing concerns about its high costs, pressed Gazprom to move 
forward and develop the giant Kovykta gas field in Irkutsk Oblast and the 
Chayandinskoye (Chayanda) gas and condensate fields in Yakutia of the Sakha Republic.  
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Map 3. Eastern Program 
 
(Source: Gazprom) 
During the World Gas Conference held at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in June 2012, China 
offered a very large upfront payment without interest to secure the prioritization of 
eastern, China-bound natural gas pipeline routes from Eastern Siberia. In return, Russia’s 
Deputy Premier Arkardy Dvorkovich confirmed that Moscow was reviewing the Chinese 
proposals in December 2012.240 In retrospect, Gazprom’s purchase of the Kovykta field 
in 2011 enabled negotiations to focus on the China-bound eastern route,241 but Gazprom 
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continuously pursued the Altai (western) route until the Sino-Russia summit on March 22, 
2013.242 From Xi Jinping’s first presidential visit to Russia (his first international trip as 
president), as many as thirty agreements have been signed with Russia, mostly in the 
energy sector. The two highlights are Russia’s agreement to allocate a maximum volume 
of crude to China and Russia’s acceptance of China’s preference for the eastern route of 
natural gas pipelines from Eastern Siberia. Gazprom and CNPC signed a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) for the delivery of 38 bcm of natural gas to China over thirty years 
starting in 2018, with the option of expanding to 60 bcm.243 At the St. Petersburg 
International Economic Forum in June 2013, Rosneft signed a deal to double oil supplies 
to China (365 million tons for twenty-five years), and CNPC agreed to take a 20 percent 
stake in Novatek’s $20 billion Yamal-LNG project, with Novatek’s agreeing to supply at 
least 3 million tons of LNG to China.244 On the same day, Putin announced the gradual 
end of state-controlled Gazprom’s monopoly on exports of natural gas, opening the way 
for rivals Novatek and Rosneft to compete for huge new Asian markets.245 Gazprom 
noted that “the price of gas to be supplied to China won’t be linked to the U.S. spot 
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market prices” after the negotiations between Gazprom Chairman Alexey Miller and 
CNPC President Zhou Jiping.246 Gazprom also announced that the company expects to 
sign an agreement in September 2013 on the basic terms of a deal to provide gas supplies 
to China and aims to conclude the deal by the end of 2013.247  
At the G20 meeting in September 2013, Gazprom and CNPC signed an agreement 
outlining the major terms and conditions of pipeline gas supply from Russia to China via 
the eastern route,248 but the final price was still not determined. During premier Dmitry 
Medvedev’s visit to Beijing in October 2013, it was announced that the price formula 
was agreed, but again, the final border price was not determined.249 However, with its 
economy reeling from the geopolitical crisis sparked by its annexation of Crimea and its 
falling out with the West, Moscow wanted to finalize the long-delayed deal more 
desperately than China, and had to acquiesce to a larger Chinese investment role.250   
Main Obstacles for the Sino-Russian Gas Cooperation 
Unlike Sino-Russian cooperation in the oil sector, cooperation in the natural gas sector 
showed very little tangible progress for more than a decade due to the disagreements over 
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prices, pipeline routes, and China’s equity investment in Russian upstream market, as 
well as the lack of trust between the two countries.251 Understanding these impediments 
is crucial to understanding the fundamental and multidimensional aspects of the Sino-
Russian strategic energy ties.  
First, the main obstacle that delayed the agreement was a pricing formula for the Russian 
gas deliveries. Russian negotiators wanted China to pay the same high price for gas as its 
European customers, whose long-term contracts link gas prices to oil prices. As domestic 
gas prices in China are strictly controlled by the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), on the other hand, Chinese negotiators find Gazprom’s price offer 
unattractively high. The NDRC would lose billions of dollars on gas imports.  
Second, the development of the Altai pipeline (West Siberia) route that was prioritized by 
Gazprom was not supported by the Beijing authorities. China was fully aware of that 
Gazprom is pursuing a “swing supplier” strategy from the Altai project because Gazprom 
would be easily able to switch its West Siberia gas exports to China from Europe when 
the European demand for Russian gas stagnates or shrinks. The Chinese authorities 
apparently had no interest in inviting any criticism for dividing up the share of European 
gas and preferred buying Russian gas from East Siberia rather than West Siberia.252 In 
addition, China needs gas from East Siberia and Sakhalin because regional capacity in the 
three northeastern provinces of China (Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning) is relatively 
small. Without the access to the Russian Far East region, China would have to rely on 
more expensive LNG imports.  
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Third, Russia had refused to allow any foreign companies to acquire equity in its oil and 
gas fields, and pipeline projects until recently.253 This obstacle motivated China to 
construct the West-East Pipeline (WEP) II Pipeline in order to accelerate gas imports 
from Central Asia. In line with this development of domestic gas grid, the Beijing 
authorities chose to develop Turkmenistan gas as an equity supply source, which was to 
compensate for the burden of the high border price.254 In addition, China diversified its 
import options by building a gas pipeline to Myanmar and by increasing LNG volumes.  
Finally, Sino-Russian relations lack trust and still confront a range of tensions in their 
shared region. Particularly in Central Asia, China has eroded Russia’s previously 
dominant presence by emerging as the number one trading partner and source of foreign 
investment in the region (Table 3),255 while Russia strives to reintegrate the former Soviet 
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Table 3. Russia and China’s Share of Central Asian Countries’ Total Trade (2000-2012) 
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blocs. In addition to the region’s rising economic ties with China, the prospect of 
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan and the closure of the Manas Transit 
Center256 in Kyrgyzstan led China to be the primary source of “external” influence in 
Central Asia.257 Russia has established the Eurasian Customs Union to slow down the 
region’s reorientation toward China as well as to deepen the integration of economy, 
politics, security, and culture in the territories of the former Soviet Union. China has 
instead promoted the idea of a Silk Road Economic Belt, which Beijing sees as linked to 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Competing Sino-Russian ambitions are 
becoming more visible in the region.258 Moreover, the xenophobic image of the “yellow 
peril” or the “China threat” – the Chinese invading in their millions by immigrating to the 
vast expanse of Siberia and Russia’s Far East – is reflected in the multi-dimensional 
aspects of the Sino-Russian bilateral relationship. Tensions between the two countries 
have been exacerbated by the widening demographic imbalance between the Russian Far 
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East (RFE) and China’s northeastern provinces, by Russia’s larger population crisis, and 
by the growing Chinese economic influence in eastern Russia.259 
Drivers for Sino-Russian Gas Cooperation 
Notwithstanding these major obstacles, Sino-Russian cooperation in the natural gas 
sector has moved forward. What political and economic factors have served as immediate 
catalysts in this breakthrough? Are there any critical and historic turning points shaping 
this strategic decision-making? Why do both sides need the deal after more than a decade 
of negotiations? This chapter examines the strategic, political, and economic factors that 
are driving both sides to sign the long-delayed deal (in both international and domestic 
levels).  
(1) The Ukraine Crisis  
First, I explore the international and external factors that are driving the strategic gas 
partnership between China and Russia. I argue that changes in the geopolitical 
environment during the historically critical turning point of the Ukraine crisis in 2014 
motivated China and Russia to make a strategic political-economic decision to build a 
long pipeline and to develop the gas fields in the RFE. Although there were other 
important signs and drivers prior to the signing of the deal in May 2014, they were only 
rhetoric or diplomatic gestures, given that the two sides had not agreed on the core 
elements of price and equity. In the wake of its annexation of Crimea and the resulting 
Western sanctions, Russia faced the new reality of increased isolation from the United 
States and Europe. As Russia finds its choices limited, it has become more desperate to 
                                                        




shift back toward a more Sino-centric approach to Asia. “Putin has long talked about 
shifting east…The Ukraine crisis provides the ideological justification for moving ahead 
faster,” said Fyodor Lukyanov, chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defence 
Policy.260 Likewise, other Russian analysts say the country’s falling-out with the West 
has acted as a catalyst in Russia’s new approach to China. Russia had to take an action to 
show that Russia’s moving toward a more comprehensive partnership with China and 
Asia as a whole is not only political rhetoric, but also has tangible outcomes. However, 
Russia’s efforts to play the China card are coming at a higher price to Moscow than 
previously, putting Beijing increasingly in the driver’s seat. While China remains neutral 
diplomatically in the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation, it does not want a collapsed ruble, 
nor a weakened Russia in its struggle with the U.S.-led Western allies over the crisis of 
Ukraine.261 Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi offered Chinese assistance to Russia to 
overcome Western pressure.262   
The notion of crisis that I discussed in Chapter 2 is well applied in explaining Russia’s 
strategic turn to China and Putin’s decision-making at a critical historical turning point. 
The Ukraine crisis changed the pre-existing bargaining context for Sino-Russian energy 
relations and opened opportunities for change. For more than a decade, Chinese and 
Russian negotiations had failed to agree on the pricing formula, and Russia had never 
allowed China’s equity investment in the Russian upstream gas market. However, 
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compromises have become suddenly possible as the pressure on individual policy makers 
to negotiate a workable framework was intensified by the pressing need to deliver results 
during the crisis. Without a doubt, Russia was placed under more pressure than China, 
given that Putin was struggling to prevent the Russian economy from falling into 
recession amid lingering sanctions and plunging oil prices. Putin was forced into sudden 
and high-stake decisions because he was pressured to devise a solution within a sharply 
limited time period. While the precise terms over the gas deal including the price were 
not disclosed, Putin had to compromise on the optimal conditions that Russia had 
continuously pursued concerning the gas deal with China, in order to deal with the 
sanctions and their potential crippling blow to the Russian economy.  
Some have argued that the geopolitical implications of the Ukraine crisis on Russia-
China relations should not be overstated, and that powerful drivers to bridge the price gap 
and make the natural gas deal happen were already in place long before the crisis.263 I do 
not argue against this perspective, but suggest that changes in the external geopolitical 
environment resulting from the crisis put the finishing touches on Russia’s agreement 
with Beijing. To better understand the fundamentals of the Sino-Russian gas deal, it is 
crucial to grasp how geopolitical factors caused by the Ukraine crisis interacted with key 
political and economic factors in Russia and China. 
(2) Falling Global Oil Prices  
Although global oil prices started to fall after China and Russian signed their huge natural 
gas deal in May 2014, I want to briefly analyze their impact on ongoing Sino-Russian 
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energy relations. This analysis also requires a discussion of the fall of the Russian ruble. 
Structurally linked to the sanctions imposed by Western governments in response to 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the collapse of the ruble in 2014 — following the harm to 
the Russian economy from the steep drop oil prices beginning earlier that year — has 
pushed Russia into crisis mode.264 The Russian government expects the country’s 
economy, which grew by 0.8 percent in 2014, to contract by at least 4 percent in 2015. 
Moscow has already committed more than $9.7 billion (590 billion rubles) to prop up 
banks and large companies in the wake of the ruble rout.265 Standard & Poor’s 
downgraded Russia’s credit rating to BB+, one notch below investment grade, on January 
26, 2015. Such pessimism by the rating agencies sends a clear signal that the country is 
now potentially facing a much more dangerous crisis than that of 2008–2009, given that 
Russia preserved investment grades in 2008 when global oil prices fell threefold to below 
$40 a barrel and in 2009, when Russia’s GDP collapsed by 8 percent. The economic 
burden of a downgrade is not nearly as important as its symbolic and political impact.266 
The political burden comes from the embedded structural link between the decline in oil 
prices (from $100 to below $50) and the Ukraine-related sanctions that cut off any 
opportunities for Russia to borrow its way out of the crisis. It is very likely that Russia 
will run out of cash by the end of 2016 if oil prices do not rise and sanctions are not lifted. 
In such a situation, Russia would be more likely to rely on China both financially and 
politically.  
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(3) Russia’s Eastward Strategy and Internal Dynamics Between Rosneft and 
Gazprom 
Russia’s Eastward Strategy 
The changing landscape of global energy markets and geopolitics is significantly altering 
Russia’s position as a major global player. Traditionally, most of Russia’s energy exports 
are directed to Europe (74 percent in 2010), where Russia controls large shares in oil (30 
percent), gas (22 to 30 percent), and coal (13 to 15 percent) markets.267 However, the 
European market, Russia’s major export destination for energy, has experienced 
structural change in recent years, while the Asian market is driving future global 
hydrocarbon growth. 
First, the stagnation in European oil and gas demand is not likely to recover to previous 
levels, mainly due to recessions in Eurozone countries and slower than expected 
economic recovery after the Global Financial Crisis.268 Second, the liberalization process 
following the European Commission’s adoption in 2009 of the Third Energy Package has 
created unfavorable regulatory and market conditions for Russia, which include 
“unbundling” (the separation of gas supply from transportation businesses) and the new 
(national but especially) EU network codes that were created to regulate cross-border 
transportation of energy resources.269 Russia is now confronting new painful 
developments, such as changing gas pricing mechanism with a much higher share of spot 
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indexation and buyers’ pressure to review the contracts, shrinking refinery margins, 
European anti-trust investigations against Gazprom, and third-party access requirements 
for North European (NEL) and South Stream pipelines.270 In addition to such unfavorable 
market conditions, Europe is now stressing its desire to lessen its dependence on Russian 
energy supplies,271 as a result of geopolitical tensions between Russia and the West 
arising from the Ukraine crisis. 
In addition to the changing market environment in Europe, other factors — such as the 
North American shale gas and oil boom, the rise of oil and gas production from non-
OPEC countries such as Central Asian republics and East Africa272, and Iran’s potential 
large-scale emergence on global oil and gas markets — are creating additional 
competitive pressure on Russia. According to the general scenario in the April 2013 
Global and Russian Energy Outlook up to 2040273, Russian exports of oil and gas will 
drop by more than 20 percent over the next ten to fifteen years, with their share of the 
country’s GDP decreasing by one third. The report alerted Russian officials that, even in 
the most optimistic forecast, it will take Russia at least ten years to catch up with the 
leaders of the new energy markets. In this sense, there is an urgent need for Russia to 
diversify its energy export markets and to turn to its Asian markets by developing its 
offshore and LNG production and its pipeline gas exports to Asia.  
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The Russian government’s “Energy Strategy of Russia to 2030” adopted in 2009 states 
that Russian energy exports of liquid hydrocarbons (oil and oil products) to Asia should 
grow from its baseline of 6 percent to 22 to 25 percent while natural gas exports should 
grow from 0 percent to 19 or 20 percent by 2030.274 The development of trade relations 
in the energy sphere with the Asia-Pacific region and the rapidity in the development of 
the Chinese market have become important elements in Russia’s official energy strategy. 
In addition, the eastern vector of Russian energy policy is related to the necessity of 
securing economic and industrial development in East Siberia and the Far East, given that 
raising living standards and stopping the outflow of population from the region have been 
among the most important tasks on the Russian national agenda.275  
However, until the recent gas deal between Gazprom and CNPC in May 2014, Gazprom 
did not seem particularly interested in or capable of establishing gas sector cooperation 
with China or Asia more broadly. Short-term interests have typically prevailed over the 
long-term task of modernizing Russia’s energy sector. For instance, during Gazprom’s 
conflict with EU consumers following the first gas dispute with Belarus in 2005/2006, 
Putin visited China in March 2006 and signed memoranda on the construction of a spur 
of the ESPO pipeline to China as well as other gas pipelines. Rather than moving forward 
in forging energy ties with China, however, Russia used the deal to secure concessions 
from its European consumers, once it demonstrated that Russia had other attractive 
export options and China represented a viable gas export option.276  
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Rosneft’s Maneuvers and Gazprom’s Concessions 
Since Russia’s 2006 gas export law entitled Gazprom to become a monopolist, it has 
created a bottleneck in Russia’s turn toward Asia. Despite Gazprom’s underperformance 
and inefficiency, Putin constantly defended it from tax increases, anti-monopoly 
investigations, and attacks by the European Commission and members of the Russia 
government and business community, because it has been a backbone of his political 
regime. He has relied on Gazprom’s resources in building the so-called “vertical of 
power.” However, as Gazprom’s capitalization dropped by almost four times and its 
profit decreased by one-third over the last five years,277 it is getting harder for Putin to 
deny Gazprom’s failures, and he has had to encourage other gas producers to develop 
their resources in order to stimulate diversification of the gas market.278  
Under this strategy, Novatek279 started to grow fast to become the second-largest gas 
producer in Russia, by acquiring stakes in several companies, including Yamal LNG. By 
the end of 2012, Novatek had increased its market share in Russia’s overall gas 
production to 9 percent and its share of the domestic supply to 16 percent. Rosneft’s 
acquisition of TNK-BP in a $55 billion deal in the fall of 2012 not only made it the 
largest oil company in the world, but also enlarged its gas assets. Rosneft increased its 
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gas production by one-third and became one of the three largest gas producers in the 
country, behind Gazprom and Novatek.280  
More importantly, Rosneft has already taken a lead in the Russian Far East, as the 
company views the Asia-Pacific market as the baseline for its business. In contrast, 
Gazprom is lagging in Asian markets while it still remains the single channel for the 
Russian gas business in Europe. When Gazprom’s largest gas project at the Shtokman 
field281 was put on hold due to the U.S. shale gas revolution in 2013, however, the 
company decided to accelerate its Eastern Gas Program. The key features of the program 
include the development of the Chayanda gas field in Yakutia, the construction of the 
Power of Siberia pipeline (from Yakutia to Khaborovsk to Vladivostok), and the 
construction of the LNG plant in the Far East, which will cost an estimated $45 to $60 
billion. The program is one of the most expensive projects in the world and raises 
questions of cost efficiency and viability.  
On the other hand, Rosneft is fulfilling the Russian government’s strategic plans on the 
diversification of markets for hydrocarbons and the economic development of eastern 
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parts of the country. Rosneft has participated in the Sakhalin-1 offshore development 
project since 2005 as part of a production-sharing agreement (PSA).282 It has reached an 
agreement with ExxonMobil to build an LNG plant in the Far East283, and signed an LNG 
supply agreement with two Japanese companies (Marubeni Corporation and Sakhalin Oil 
and Gas Development)  and the oil trader Vitol in July 2013.284 More importantly, 
Rosneft has become the primary moving force in Russo-China petroleum cooperation. 
The opening of the strategic ESPO pipeline in 2012 paved the way for new export deals 
with China and the Asia-Pacific region.  
Given the declining significance of Gazprom and Rosneft’s previously successful moves, 
along with the changes in the global energy market, competition between the two 
companies is likely to be unavoidable.285 Gazprom has been increasingly pushed aside by 
aggressive competitors – Rosneft and Novatek – in both the Asian and domestic markets. 
Gazprom’s notorious inefficiency in its core business emboldens competitors to capture 
greater shares of the domestic market and to demand exemptions from its export 
monopoly.286 Along with opposing the increase in the mineral tax for independent gas 
producers enacted in 2012, Rosneft and Novatek officially appealed to the Energy 
Ministry to request liberalization of LNG exports. In this strategic move to end 
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Gazprom’s long-standing monopoly in the gas field, Rosneft’s Igor Sechin is well-
positioned as head of world’s largest oil corporation and someone who has gained 
significant political weight and administrative leverage.  
As a result of this lobbying, the Russian State Duma passed legislation for the limited 
liberalization of Russia’s LNG exports in November 2013. This was followed by long-
awaited amendments to gas export law by the Russia’s Parliament on December 1, 2013, 
a move that ended Gazprom’s monopoly and was designed to help Russia meet its goal of 
doubling its share of the global LNG trade by 2020. However, “[t]he limited 
liberalization of Russia’s LNG exports will not threaten Gazprom’s monopoly on the 
export of Russian gas to Europe, which is conducted entirely via pipelines” according to 
Jack Sharples, a researcher at the European Geopolitical Forum. The new law only opens 
the door for LNG exports to private companies – Rosneft and Novatek – that received gas 
extraction licenses of national importance before January 2013 and for operations of state 
groups from offshore fields.287 
In the system of decision-making on the Russian oil and gas sector, Putin acts as a 
supreme arbiter in the “flexible triangle”288 formed by the government and two super-
large state companies – Gazprom and Rosneft. In this arrangement, it appears that 
changing dynamics between Rosneft and Gazprom – Rosneft’s maneuvers and 
Gazprom’s concessions – will strongly influence the future path of the Russian energy 
sector’s development, but the state will still play a major role. The modern history of the 
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Russian oil and gas industry shows competing political and commercial agendas between 
the government and companies. Business decisions in the Russian energy sector are very 
often influenced by short-term political considerations, which can conflict with the long-
term or short-term economic and commercial interests of the industry. At the same time, 
it is also true that the government itself is not strong enough to make a strategic decision 
and implement a plan if it encounters powerful opponents, and the state’s decisions can 
be crippled by diverse private interest groups that are closely connected to state decision-
makers.289   
The Russian energy sector is now undergoing a gradual redistribution of exclusive export 
rights among major players – away from Gazprom and toward Rosneft, and Novatek. In 
return, however, these non-Gazprom producers are likely to become hostage to a large 
number of government interests that are not often commercially and economically 
viable.290 In some cases, the Russian government puts more weight on geopolitical 
considerations than commercial interests. Mega-projects bypassing Ukraine, costly LNG 
projects, gas imports from Central Asia designed to promote Russia’s political influence, 
and projects in Eastern Siberia and the Far East are examples of projects that are 
economically dubious but have geopolitical importance to Russia. It may be logical that a 
state oil and gas company serves as a driver of government policies in this strategically 
important sphere, given that the state creates significant non-market competitive 
advantages for the company in comparison with private counterparts. For instance, the 
Russian state granted Rosneft and Gazprom exclusive access to offshore fields and 
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included Rosneft in the list of strategic companies that receive special bankruptcy 
protection.291 National oil and gas companies sometimes have to pay the price for such a 
close relationship with the state, but they also have to make a choice between national 
geopolitical goals and corporate interests.  
The Russian oil and gas industry is at crossroads, and the rise of Rosneft and the decline 
of Gazprom lie at the nexus of the change. Rosneft serves as an instrument of Russia’s 
foreign policy, facilitating the government’s strategic plans regarding the development of 
the Russian Far East and the diversification of markets for hydrocarbons. At the same 
time, Russia’s foreign policy has enabled Rosneft to pursue its corporate interests, and 
the company’s high-ranking state agents and private interest groups frequently help 
implement its Chinese strategy. Obviously Rosneft has been the primary driving force of 
Sino-Russian energy cooperation. In petroleum relations with China, Rosneft has not 
only pursued long-term national strategic interests, but also sought both long-term and 
short-term corporate interests. From its oil deal with China, Rosneft was able to achieve 
the long-term corporate goals of becoming a flagship enterprise of the Russian oil 
industry and transforming itself into an international energy company. The company was 
also able to obtain Chinese money for its short-term corporate goals; the first two loans 
from China were utilized to pay for the acquisition of Yukos and the third loan was used 
to pay for the takeover of TNK-BP.  
It is worth noting that the competition between Gazprom and Rosneft drove Gazprom to 
sign its gas deal with China. Considering the internal dynamics in the Russian energy 
industry, Gazprom must have agreed to the deal that Rosneft could have otherwise taken. 
                                                        




Gazprom was reluctant to sign the deal with China because it does not understand the 
Chinese business culture as well as Rosneft does, was tired of long negotiations, and was 
not attracted to the deal’s low margins. If Gazprom did not take the deal, its competitors 
would probably have built the LNG terminals within a couple of years, which would have 
caused Gazprom to lose its window of opportunity in the Asia-Pacific market. Gazprom 
was instead forced to participate in the deal by Putin.292  
Whether independent non-Gazprom gas producers can get access to the Power of Siberia 
pipeline has been one of the key issues in Russia since the deal between Gazprom and 
CNPC. Rosneft, with its considerable gas production potential in Eastern Siberia, has 
raised this issue, as its wants to gain access to export markets. In June 2014, Rosneft 
requested an anti-monopoly investigation to the Energy Ministry, in order to have third 
party-access both to the Power of Siberia and Sakhalin pipelines. Genuine gas pipeline 
liberalization is unlikely, however, and Gazprom is most likely to buy gas from Rosneft 
to resell it to China.  
Perhaps the key question concerning these changing internal dynamics is whether 
national oil and gas companies’ short-term corporate interests correspond to Russia’s 
long-term strategic goals. In regard to oil relations with China, Rosneft indirectly placed 
the country in a position of depending on China as a creditor in order to fulfill its short-
term corporate interests of getting Chinese money for its projects while it pursued long-
term national interests.293 Since its first loan-for-oil from China in 2005, Russia has 
regarded China not only as a market but also as a source of financing. In addition, 
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Chinese financial resources have become involved in a redistribution of property in 
strategic sectors of the Russian economy.294 Both the ESPO and POS pipelines are 
geostrategic projects in the grand Soviet tradition, built by state-owned monopolies. Both 
the oil and gas industries are footing the bill for the state’s strategic objectives and for 
Russia’s rent-distribution system of Russia. The strategic project is driving investment 
priorities, rather than the other way around.295 Given a tacit marriage between the state 
and national oil and gas companies, in many cases a decision is made first, then the 
project is implemented, money is invested, and later it too often stands idle and 
unclaimed.296 After the decision to invest in the Eastern Gas Program was made, 
Gazprom did not reach any concrete agreements with China until recently. There seems 
to be a high concentration of special interests in the Russian oil and gas industry, 
whereby a group of people gain from making strategic decisions on certain large-scale 
projects that are economically dubious. In the middle of the Ukraine crisis, for example, 
Gazprom moved toward Asia, in order to rebalance its interests, not to switch from 
Europe to Asia entirely. Such an action seems to align with Russia’s long-term strategic 
interests, but Beijing will be more likely to dictate the terms of energy cooperation 
between China and Russia if Gazprom pursues both short-term corporate interests and 
long-term national interests, as Rosneft appears to do.  
(4) Changing Dynamics Involving Chinese NOCs and Air Pollution Issues in 
Chinese Domestic Politics  
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Air Pollution and President Xi’s Initiative for Energy Revolution 
At his meeting with ruling Communist Party officials on June 13, 2014, Chinese 
President Xi Jinping’s call for an “Energy Revolution” focused attention on the country’s 
diversification into non-carbon energy sources, especially replacing coal with natural gas. 
In his agreement with U.S. President Barack Obama in November 2014, Xi also pledged 
to cap China’s carbon emissions and turn to renewable sources for 20 percent of the 
country’s energy by 2030. A key driver for Xi’s initiative for an energy revolution has 
been China’s continuing problems with air pollution. The Chinese government previously 
focused on economic growth at all costs, but has recently become sensitive to its 
environmental challenges. Smog in Beijing and Shanghai made the government realize 
that it has to take measures to rein in pollution, which otherwise will lead to social 
discontent.297 With protests over pollution turning violent in Chinese cities at least three 
times, the government realizes that it has to inflict pain on some sectors such as the 
transportation and energy sectors and deal with any political and social disquiet that may 
result.298 
In this respect, natural gas seems to be a most feasible and accessible option to aid in 
China’s efforts to address the environmental degradation issue. Considering gas’s higher 
price than coal, however, the increase in gas consumption creates new opportunities and 
challenges. Moreover, given that the prospects for developing unconventional shale gas 
in China appear slim, China has committed to increasing domestic production of 
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conventional gas and imports. The Chinese leadership implemented a radical reform of 
the gas pricing system in 2013 to replace the old cost-based approach. Under the new 
pricing mechanism, further price increases are expected in the domestic natural gas 
market, which will likely make China more reliant on foreign gas imports (that are more 
competitive in terms of price) and thereby decrease pressure on major gas importers.299  
Fully aware of the necessity to cut coal consumption, Beijing planners have been looking 
for ways to maximize the use of natural gas. According to the China Energy Fund 
Committee (CEFC)’s study, the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015)’s projection of 
domestic natural gas consumption reaching 230 bcm is an attainable target, but further 
expansion is less feasible. The study examines the main driving forces for the growth in 
gas consumption during the period of China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015): 1) 
domestic environmental pressure; 2) Chinese commitment to a low-carbon economy; 3) 
development of unconventional gas; 4) a gas import infrastructure built in recent years; 5) 
energy security300; and 6) uncertainty over the pace of clean energy development. In the 
upcoming 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020), domestic natural gas consumption is 
projected to range from 350 bcm to 450 bcm, with the following factors affecting the 
projection: 1) international commitments to reduce carbon emissions301; 2) increased 
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domestic supply of natural gas; 3) scaling -up of unconventional gas development; 4) 
continuous improvement in pipeline infrastructure; and 5) price restrictions.302  
China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign and Its Impact on the Energy Industry 
Since President Xi unleashed a wide-ranging anti-corruption drive in September 2013, 
China’s government has pursued major changes in its energy sector and launched 
targeted investigations of high-ranking energy technocrats.303 National prosecuting 
departments investigated twenty-four high-ranking officials in 2014, including former 
Chinese Communist Party security chief Zhou Yongkang and CNPC’s former chairman 
Jiang Jiemin.304 During the same period, over one hundred officials were dismissed from 
employment, the majority of which were from the National Energy Administration, 
CNPC, State Grid, and  Shanxi Province, China’s major producer of coal.305 The arrest of 
Mr. Zhou in December 2014 had huge symbolic implications, as he was arguably the 
most powerful man in China after building up patronage networks that spanned the oil, 
mining, and security industries, as well as regional support bases.306  
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New chairmen have been named for the country’s top three state-owned oil companies 
since major reforms began in 2014.307 Guo Jiaofeng, a deputy director at the Institute of 
Resources and Environmental Policy under the State Council's Development Research 
Center, said recent changes in the international and domestic energy markets – changes 
marked by falling profits for oil companies – have offered an opportunity to push China's 
energy reform agenda.308 However, the implementation of this reform agenda  is likely to 
remain unchanged as the country deals with rising dependence on foreign supplies of 
crude, said Lin Boqiang, director of the China Center for Energy Economics Research at 
Xiamen University.309 
Speculations about the linkage between energy reforms and the corruption campaign 
raise a question: Is the government weakening the monopolies to stem corruption, or is it 
using corruption charges to overcome resistance to energy reforms?310 A common ground 
between these explanations is that the energy sector is dominated by state-owned 
enterprises and that cases in which people trade power for money abound.311 Whatever 
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the connections between the two explanations may be, state-owned oil companies have 
been scrambling to satisfy the government’s demand for “opening up” the energy sector, 
producing a series of incremental steps.  
On June 25, 2014, stated-owned CNPC announced the opening of its oil and gas pipeline 
network to suppliers other than its PetroChina subsidiary and existing customers, four 
months after the National Energy Administration (NEA) issued a plan partially to end 
CNPC’s monopoly over China’s pipeline system. The opening of CNPC’s pipelines to 
third parties can be a breakthrough for energy development that could attract more 
producers to Chinese markets, since CNPC controls 90 percent of the country’s pipelines 
for crude oil and 70 percent for natural gas. However, it is not clear how far CNPC’s 
move goes toward satisfying the NEA mandate, which is a part of a larger plan to open 
up China’s petroleum sector to mixed ownership and investment. In his report to the 
National People’s Congress in March 2014, Premier Li Keqiang outlined plans for 
developing a “mixed-ownership economy” allowing non-state capital to invest in state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). In line with this move, China Petrochemical Corp. (Sinopec) 
announced restructuring plans for its distribution business that would allow social and 
private capital to buy up to 30 percent of the shares in its chain of filling stations. In 
addition, CNPC PetroChina stated plans to spin off sections of its vast gas pipeline 
system into a new subsidiary to be sold by public tender.312 
Clearly, the Chinese energy sector is undergoing a difficult time both at home and 
overseas. Low oil prices are bringing the state giants out of their shell, and large overseas 
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energy deals are unlikely because the state oil majors are distracted by anticorruption 
investigations at home. Legal disputes in Africa are also another variable. The home front 
mirrors the trend of China’s overseas investment, with energy and power firms in the 
unwanted position of being front and center in Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. The arrests 
of high-ranking energy technocrats at home reflect that Chinese oil companies were less 
competitive in overseas investment in 2014.313 In this respect, Chinese NOCs are likely 
to be inward focused at least for the short-term. For instance, Sinopec’s top priorities for 
2014 are domestic-focused, such as development of shale gas and the sale of a minority 
stake in its retail fuel business.314 
Strategic Rush for the Altai Gas Pipeline, and Russia’s Cancelation of the South 
Stream Pipeline 
On November 9, 2014 Gazprom and CNPC signed a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) and a framework agreement to supply gas from Russia to China via the western 
route through the “Altai” pipeline. The agreement called for the delivery of 30 billion 
cubic meters annually from West Siberia for 30 years starting in 2018. Since Xi and Putin 
brokered the deal just one day before Obama’s arrival in Beijing for the APEC summit, 
analysts have been debating why China and Russia took a giant step on another massive 
energy deal and how significant the deal is likely to be.  
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Map 4. Altai Gas Pipeline 
 
(Source: Gazprom) 
Some speculate that the agreement on the Altai pipeline seems more of a political 
statement than a substantial effort, given that the new deal is not binding and lacks 
agreement on key elements, most notably price.315 These analysts pay attention to the fact 
that a handful of similar memorandums were announced during the decade-long 
                                                        





negotiations that preceded the May deal on the “eastern route,” efforts that had little 
effect.316  
Some Russian and Chinese energy specialists contend that China does not seem really 
enthusiastic about the idea of the “western route” despite the political rhetoric, given that 
Chinese authorities considers it as only one of several energy supply possibilities and 
certainly not a top priority. China already has gas supply contracts with Central Asian 
countries, Russia via the “eastern pipeline route,” and Myanmar in terms of overland 
pipelines, in addition to huge amounts of LNG contracts. China would not necessarily 
want to create supply bubbles by adding the Altai project to the current portfolio, which 
might cause problems for CNPC.317  
On the other hand, some pronounced the deal as a game-changer, a symbol of a new 
strategic partnership between long-estranged countries. Zhang Xin, CNPC’s director of 
foreign relations, said the companies are confident they will sign a commercial contract 
as early as next year. Zhang said this confidence is based on the fact that talks for western 
route deliveries have been underway for a long time, and – even though tensions did arise 
– the level of mutual understanding and trust has grown, citing CNPC’s strategic 
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partnership agreements with Gazprom and Rosneft.318 Highlighting that the Altai deal 
will make Russia a “swing supplier” between the European market and Asian market319, 
Keun-Wook Paik, senior fellow at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, said “China 
would like to show openly that Sino-Russian energy cooperation is no longer driven by 
necessity but forms a core part of strengthened, strategic-level cooperation between the 
two countries.”320  
According to Interfax, the conclusion of the western route would see Russia pump up to 
68 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas per year to China (together with the 38 bcm 
gas deal signed in May) by the middle of the next decade, which would be about one-fifth 
of China’s  expected gas demand in 2020.321 If China and Russia agreed on price and 
transformed this Altai pipeline memorandum into a binding agreement in the near future, 
it could certainly ease Russia’s isolation, help wean China off its unhealthy dependence 
on coal, and thus strengthen economic and political ties between the two countries. 
However, the deal is far from complete. There remain a host of unresolved issues, 
including the price China will pay for the gas. Moreover, this time Russia will have to 
make even more concessions than in the May 2014 deal, given that the new deal requires 
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Russia to ship gas to China’s sparsely populated west and China to then ship the gas a 
thousand miles overland.322 Arguably, the Ukraine crisis has already made Russia more 
desperate to avoid the appearance of isolation, meaning the second pipeline deal of 2014 
(the Altai deal) involved more substantial concessions to China on pricing than the first 
one (the Power of Siberia deal).323 Together with the recent dip in oil prices, which is 
driving down the price of natural gas (given that many gas contracts in Asia are indexed 
to the price of oil), prolonged Western sanctions on Russia’s energy, defense, and finance 
sectors have resulted in the collapse of the ruble, thereby pushing Russia into a crisis 
mode. Given that Russia will likely run out of cash by the end of 2016 if oil prices do not 
rise and sanctions are not lifted, Russia is likely to make more concessions and rely on 
China both financially and politically. Russia, therefore, had been eagerly anticipating the 
second natural gas deal with China ever since the ink dried on the first one in May 2014. 
Snagging anther major contract with China significantly offset Russia’s reliance on the 
European market, giving Moscow a powerful ally when friends appear hard to come 
by.324 
In October 2014 Gazprom, announced for the first time that it is ready to shelve its 
Vladivostok LNG project and focus on supplying more gas to China via pipelines. Much 
of the LNG produced at Vladivostok would have been sold to Japan, with production 
starting in 2018 at an annual capacity of 10 million tons. The project would be the first 
major Russian energy project to be scrapped since the United States and Europe targeted 
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the country’s energy industry with sanctions.325 On December 1, 2014 Putin announced 
that Russia halted the South Stream pipeline that would supply gas to southern Europe, 
bypassing Ukraine . Instead, he named Turkey as its preferred partner for an alternative 
pipeline, by signing a preliminary deal with the Turkish company Botas Petroleum 
Pipeline to build a pipeline under the Black Sea to Turkey. Fyodor Lukyanov, head of the 
Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and an advisor to the Russian government, 
explained that “Europe for some years has seen Russia not as a source of energy security, 
but as a risk. When the conflict with Ukraine started, it became clear that building this or 
any other new pipeline to Europe was impossible.” 326 Interestingly, however, Putin made 
a U-turn, announcing that his country has not given up on the South Stream during his 
visit to Hungary on February 17, 2015.327 
During the last decade, Russia has exhibited some regular patterns in dealing with 
geopolitical turmoil. First, Russia tends to send political messages to the rest of the world 
that it always has other options during a crisis. Second, Russian political leaders tend to 
be willing to bear economic costs for geostrategic gains, and such a tendency is likely to 
intensify when Russia’s political and economic relations with the West are at risk. In 
order to keep its geopolitical leverage, Russia keeps sending its political messages to the 
West that it has other strong partners to work with. Russia’s eagerness for the second 
major gas deal with China was driven by geostrategic calculations rather than commercial 
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considerations, given that Russia will have to make more substantial concessions to 
finalize the second deal and strengthen economic and political ties with China. The 
decision to shelve the Vladivostok LNG project can be understood under the same logic, 
with Russia intending to focus on selling more gas to China via pipelines rather than 
starting a new project for LNG (which is one of the major trends of the global 
transformation of energy market) and rather than selling gas to Japan. Pipelines are 
strategically important to Russia because they create infrastructure and investment.328 In 
the current geopolitical environment, China is a more important country than Japan to 
Russia both politically and economically as Russia struggles to prevent the country from 
falling into recession amid plunging oil prices and lingering sanctions. Similarly, the 
decision to concentrate on supplying gas to Turkey through a different Black Sea pipeline 
in lieu of the South Stream pipeline to southern Europe is part of Putin’s message to 
Europe and his attempts to increase its geopolitical leverage. 
Another puzzle is what has changed the mindset of Chinese decision-makers, as Beijing 
had previously not welcomed the western Altai pipeline route. One major factor is that 
China’s social stability is at stake, as public anger has spiraled over air pollution caused 
by decades of coal burning. Boosting the supply of cleaner burning gas could help wean 
China itself off of its unhealthy dependence on coal, which is a key political goal in the 
country’s  current domestic politics.329 Next, having one more gas pipeline can provide 
additional security of supply to China, given that Chinese leaders have always been 
uncomfortable with the country’s growing dependence on seaborne energy imports, crude 
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oil in particular, because it exposes a critical vulnerability in global chokepoints where 
the U.S. Navy is still dominant. Piped gas from Russia also dovetails with Moscow’s 
desire to edge out the prospects of American LNG exports to Asia.330 More broadly, it 
makes sense for China to keep Russian onside as much as possible in order to promote 
Beijing’s ambitious “Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB)” initiative effectively, which has 
already raised tensions with Moscow over its sphere of influence. Chinese decision-
makers are very aware that Moscow has drifted closer towards Beijing’s orbit since the 
Ukraine crisis, and might try to take this opportunity to not only remove any political 
obstacles from Russia, but also to secure more economic gains (as Russia has to make 
more concessions on pricing).331 
After Gas Deals: Delaying Pipeline Projects?  
On March 18, 2015, Reuters reported that Russia might postpone the Power of Siberia 
project until after it builds the cheaper Altai pipeline route from existing fields to China’s 
western regions. Although Russia denied any such delay (and Gazprom declined to 
comment), such a change would effectively downgrade one of Putin’s signature projects 
to find new markets for the country’s energy resources in Asia, in response to Europe’s 
reduction of its reliance on Russian energy.332 Given the fact that the giant Bovanenkovo 
Yamal field (Map 5) that opened in 2012 now pumps around 40 billion cubic meters 
(bcm) of natural gas a year and has a maximum capacity of 140 bcm, the western Altai 
route that would provide China with gas from Yamal is much cheaper for Russia than the 
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Power of Siberia project that requires the development of new gas fields in remote 
eastern Siberia. Given the 50 percent decline in global oil prices since the May 2014 gas 
deal was signed (the gas price under the contract is linked to oil prices), the Power of 
Siberia would be unprofitable for Gazprom.333 However, the Altai route is considerably 
less attractive to China — as it already has surplus supplies in the west, but is short of gas 
in the industrial east. In addition, the Altai route would require a huge new pipeline 
system within China to bring gas from Yamal to China’s remote far western border, 
which might even require a serious change in China’s Five-year Plan.334  
In fact, the contract between Russia and China for gas supplied via the Altai gas pipeline 
is also being delayed mainly because China is reviewing its energy needs. China’s growth 
in demand for gas is slowing due to the country’s economic slowdown335 and liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) is becoming more available in the country due to the fall in oil prices. 
According to Russian Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich, the negotiations on the 
Altai pipeline were underway in July 2015, but it is unclear how much it would take to 
finalize the deal.336 Final agreements for the Altai pipeline would require strong political 
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motivations on both sides, said Sergei Sanakoyev, president of the Russia-China 
Analytical Center.337  
Map 5. The Yamal Peninsula and the Bovanenkovo field
 
(source: Gazprom) 
It might seem logical for Russia to delay the Power of Siberia project and develop the 
Altai project by utilizing spare capacity from existing gas fields, given that the fall in 
global energy prices along with prolonged Western sanctions on Russia have hurt the 
case for investing in new fields. However, the Altai route has been a longtime Russian 
priority in negotiations with China, and Russia consistently pursued the Altai pipeline 
until it finally accepted China’s preference of the eastern gas supply route along with the 
                                                        




major Chinese loans for oil deals between Rosneft and CNPC and between Rosneft and 
Sinopec in 2013. If Russia wants to advance the Altai route before the Power of Siberia 
pipeline (the terms of which have already been finalized), Russia will have to make even 
more concessions on price and other key elements than it estimated when signing a MOU 
with China on the Altai project in November 2014.  
Given all the factors that are pushing Russia into a crisis mode, including the collapse of 
the Russian ruble resulting from extended Crimea-related Western sanctions on the 
Russian economy and the recent dip in global energy prices, the Altai option might be the 
most effective strategy and probably the only way for Russia to accomplish the two goals 
at the same time: 1) to be a swing producer in both the European and Asian natural gas 
markets and 2) to strengthen economic and political ties with China, which has been a 
major source of financing for Russian energy projects. However, it is not likely that 
China would be willing to change its prioritization of the eastern over the western gas 
pipeline route between the two countries, in spite of the challenges that China is currently 
facing. China’s energy sector is undergoing a difficult time both at home and overseas 
due to its being a target in President Xi’s anti-corruption campaign and due to low oil 
prices. Chinese energy planners, and CNPC in particular, do not seem eager to take any 
political or economic risks by entering into different negotiations with Russia to develop 
an additional pipeline that is a top priority for Russia, but not China. Once China takes a 
stronger position in the course of negotiations, it tends to give the other side (Russia in 
this case) little leverage.338 
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Russian energy policy does not seem to have been a coherent process shaped by a 
strategic assessment of fundamentals.339 Cross-border pipelines, in most cases, are 
strategic projects in the grand Soviet tradition, built by state-owned enterprises. The 
strategic project drives the investment priorities, rather than the other way around.340 For 
Moscow, creation of new energy infrastructure such as pipelines is regarded not only as a 
tool to revitalize its economy, but also as a means to achieve international political and 
economic gains.341 In many cases, the decision is made first, then the project is 
implemented, money is invested, and later the project stands unclaimed or idle.342 In 
China, things are different, as Beijing has a history of building pipelines first and then 
securing the oil or gas supplies to fill them, whereas Moscow prefers to sign supply 
agreements first and then construct pipelines.343 However, the development of pipelines 
is politically driven in both China and Russia. Although it is not as easy as in the Russian 
case to understand which power groups in China supported certain pipeline projects, it is 
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obvious that political leadership in Beijing has generally been more supportive of 
pipeline projects than NOCs have.344 The fact that not even top CNPC decision-makers 
were sure about their May 2014 Power of Siberia pipeline deal until last minute, and with 
presidents Xi and Putin involved in the final stages of pipeline negotiations, shows that 
the POS project was ultimately a political decision.345 And given that Xi’s anti-corruption 
campaign has paralyzed CNPC’s decision-making since 2012, it makes sense to speculate 
that the political leadership in China has more power than NOCs in developing cross-
border pipelines.346  
In this respect, I have argued that the nature of the Sino-Russian strategic energy 
partnership is transactional rather than comprehensive. Energy is a weak link binding the 
two countries together,347 as the strongest element in any bilateral relationship is shared 
political interests. Mistrust between China and Russia has hindered their more pragmatic-
oriented energy ties from evolving into an enduring partnership. This mistrust has been 
driven by Russia’s perceptions of China’s demographic threat in the Russian Far East and 
strategic competition over the countries’ shared neighboring regions such as Central Asia. 
Moreover, Moscow fears that with the widening gap between a rising China and a 
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declining Russia, increasing dependence on China as an energy export destination will 
eventually constitute a threat to national security. Beijing, meanwhile, is concerned with 
whether Russia will fulfill its promises. The delay of the POS project mentioned above 
provides a strong example of why China is suspicious of Russia as reliable trading 
partner. Given that the development of Sino-Russian pipelines is driven by political 
decisions in each country, and that the two countries are still suspicious of each other on 
other major dimensions such as politics, the argument that China-Russia energy ties are 
bolstering cooperation or comprehensive partnership are misplaced.  
The transactional nature of energy relations between Russia and China hindered the two 
countries from successful engagement and materialization of any major joint venture 
participation in the Russian upstream sector so far. As Table 3 shows, there has been a 
pattern where Russia invites Chinese participation only in less significant upstream 
projects, and more substantial joint ventures have been in limbo due to various reasons. I 
argue that lack of political alignment (i.e., low political trust) between the two countries 
is one of the key factors that prevented Chinese companies from gaining access to 
significant reserves in Russia independently. While Rosneft has been consistently trying 
to open the Russia’s upstream sector to Chinese NOCs (mainly for the purpose of helping 
manage its accumulated debt), no Chinese equity acquisition of major stakes in the 
Russian upstream sector has been realized—not only because of the limited participation 
of foreign companies in the development of Russia’s strategic assets, but also because of 
the lingering political mistrust between Russia and China. Unlike the oil sector, there 
have been no discussions of equity arrangements in Russian natural gas production, since 




Table 4. Current Status of Chinese Participation                                                           
in the Russian Oil and Gas Upstream Sector* 
Venineft, a joint venture of Rosneft (74.9%) and Sinopec (25.1%) established in 2005 to 
run the geological survey and develop the Veninsky block of Sakhalin-3 project. 
Sinopec withdrew from the project in 2010 because Rosneft repeatedly delayed the 
signing of a formal exploration and development agreement with Sinopec despite the 
high exploration costs and huge amount of money Sinopec had already put into the 
project.348  
Sinopec purchased a 97% stake in Udmurtneft, the subsidiary of TNK-BP, through the 
company Promleasing, in August 2006. Later Rosneft acquired 51% of Promleasing 
from Sinopec, and the two companies signed a shareholder agreement on the joint 
management of Udmurtneft. However, Rosneft implemented the strategy of “your money 
for our assets but still under our control”349 and ultimately purchased TNK-BP in 2012.  
Rosneft (51%) and CNPC (49%) formed the joint venture Vostok Energy in 2006 for 
the exploration and production of hydrocarbons in Russia. In 2007, Vostok Energy won 
licenses for two small deposits in Irkutsk Oblast, located near the ESPO pipeline. 
However, the joint venture has been mothballed after the licenses it obtained proved to be 
uninspiring. 
In the course of Rosneft’s IPO, CNPC acquired 0.6% of Rosneft shares for $500 million 
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in 2006.  
Rosneft (51%) and CNPC (49%) set up a joint venture for upstream developments in 
East Siberia, in 2013. However, they have not reached a final agreement, but have only 
signed a memorandum for future upstream development. No progress has been made so 
far because the estimated cost for the project is too high according to CNPC.350  
Rosneft and CNPC signed a framework agreement for CNPC to take a 10% stake in 
Russia’s Vankor oil field in November 2014.351 There has been no update on this project 
so far.  
(*Table 3 made by author based on the sources: Nina Poussenkova, "Russia's Eastern 
Energy Policy: A Chinese Puzzle for Rosneft " Russie.NEI.Visions 70 (2013), and 
Tatiana Mitrova, “Russia-Northeast Asia Energy Trade and Investment: Opportunities 
and Challenges,” 2014 North Pacific Energy Dialogue in the Shale-Gas Era Conference 
Paper, East-West Center (2014). For other sources, see footnotes.) 
Moreover, China and Russia have not formed a joint venture (JV) as a consortium in the 
development of cross-border pipeline projects. The ESPO pipeline is owned and operated 
by Transneft, Russia’s state-owned pipeline monopoly company, with the exception of 
the Chinese section of the spur line from Russia.352 The construction of the ESPO 
pipeline was financed by the Chinese Development Bank (CDB) in the form of loans. 
The CDB lent $10 billion to Transneft for the construction of operation of a 
                                                        
350 Interfax, Russia & CIS Oil and Gas Weekly, 13-19 November 2014.  
351 Ibid.  
352 The Chinese section of the Skovorodino-Daqing spur (from Mohe to Daqing) was built and is operated 




Skovorodino-Mohe pipeline.353 As Russia did not allow Chinese NOCs to take equity 
positions in Russia’s upstream sector, China instead financed the target supply source to 
ensure long-term supply security. The CDB provided $15 billion in loans to Rosneft, 
Russia’s largest state-owned oil producer, for a twenty-year contract on the delivery of 15 
million tons of oil annually.  
Although the arrangements in terms of financing for the construction and gas supply of 
the POS pipeline have not been disclosed, they are likely to be in a similar to the terms in 
the ESPO pipeline project. An estimated $25 billion out of the total capital cost of $55 
billion for building the POS pipeline was expected to come from CNPC, but prepayment 
failed to materialize. Consequently, industry experts now speculate that Gazprom plans to 
attract loans for the project from Chinese banks. Although no concrete agreements have 
been reached yet, Chinese loans seem the only viable option for Russia to finance 
pipeline construction and upstream development, given that financing from Western 
companies is blocked under the economic sanctions following Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea and that these investments are less attractive due to lower global oil prices since 
2014.   
In sum, no major Sino-Russian joint venture participation in the Russian upstream or 
related cross-border pipeline projects has been realized so far, which seems to show that 
the low level of mutual trust between China and Russia prevents shared ownership of 
large-scale infrastructure projects such as pipelines that are strategically important to both 
countries. Therefore, the Sino-Russian strategic energy partnership will likely remain 
transactional for some time.  
                                                        




The key finding of the Sino-Russian oil and gas pipeline cases is that the changing 
geopolitics due to crisis situations has profoundly shaped the Sino-Russian energy 
relations. Binding agreements for cross-border oil and gas pipelines were signed when 1) 
Russian-Western relations were at odds – with Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and/or 2) unexpected external factors such as the 
Global Financial Crisis and collapsing oil prices compelled Russia to rely on Chinese 
capital (see Figures 5 & 6). Although I also examined the difference between oil and gas 
deals, I focused on the similarity between the two in order to explain why Sino-Russian 
bilateral deals for direct-link pipelines have faced more obstacles and taken longer than 
the deals for multi-state export pipelines carrying Caspian oil and gas to European 
markets (which I will examine in Chapters 6 and 7).  
In developing energy relations with China, Russia repeatedly engaged in tactics of 
strategic delay through political gestures or through signing non-binding agreements. 
Russia tends to have signed its series of agreements with China when Russia’s relations 
with West were complicated or on bad terms, but has not been willing to compromise on 
fundamental disagreements over price and equity until Russia desperately needed China’s 
help. The inflow of Chinese capital (e.g., three major “loans for oil” from the Chinese 
Development Bank) has undeniably served as a key driver facilitating the finalization of 
binding agreements between the two countries. Ultimately, changes in the geopolitical 
environments have prompted both Russia and China to approach their bilateral energy 
relations from a different angle. Russia decided to make concessions with China to 
preserve its geopolitical leverage at critical historical junctures. On China’s end, there are 




energy import portfolio through Russian piped oil and gas.354 China’s decisions to invest 
in importing Russian oil and gas captures how government concerns about security of 
supply and domestic political agendas are linked with national oil companies’ 
commercial interests. 
Figure 5. Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Pipeline Deals  
and the Impact of Geopolitics and External Crisis 
 
In addition to external geopolitical and economic factors, I also argue that lack of 
political alignment between China and Russia due to mutual distrust was one of the key 
elements to delay the finalization of both oil and gas deals. Sino-Russian pipeline deals 
took a long time to finalize due to low political will within the two countries, despite 
substantial economic incentives for energy cooperation as complementary partners. 
Conversely, relatively high levels of political alignment among host countries enabled 
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Caspian pipelines to move ahead more quickly despite relatively less substantial 
economic incentives (e.g., relatively small volumes of oil and gas). Moscow fears that 
with the widening gap between a rising China and a declining Russia, increasing 
dependence on China as an energy export destination will eventually constitute a threat to 
national security. Beijing, meanwhile, is suspicious of Russia’s reliability as a trading 
partner.  
Changing internal dynamics in each country have also driven the development of cross-
border pipelines. In Russia, the changing dynamics between Rosneft and Gazprom under 
Putin’s leadership will likely determine the future path of the Russian energy sector’s 
development. With Rosneft’s strategic moves into the Asia-Pacific market, particularly 
into China, and its efforts to end Gazprom’s monopoly in gas exports, the alignment of 
oil and gas companies’ short-term corporate interests with Russia’s long-term strategic 
goals will be critical to determining Russia’s future, especially given the geopolitical 
turmoil with the Ukraine crisis and resulting Western sanctions, the collapse of the ruble, 
and the fall of global oil prices. In China, meanwhile, President Xi Jinping’s anti-
corruption campaign, as well as the increasingly salient political issue of air pollution, 
helps explain the changing dynamics involving its energy sector. Under Xi’s energy 
revolution initiative, natural gas seems to be the most feasible option to aid in alleviating 
air pollution, and the Chinese leadership implemented a radical reform of the country’s 
gas pricing system in 2013. Moreover, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign will likely to drive 
Chinese national oil companies to be inward-focused rather than engaging in overseas 




Finally, Sino-Russian gas pipeline development took much longer to materialize than oil 
pipeline development. From the market point of view, it is more technologically difficult 
and consequently more expensive to build natural gas pipelines than oil pipelines. 
Beyond clear market reasons, natural gas trade tends to be more vulnerable to political 
influence than oil trade due to oil and natural gas’s inherently different characteristics as 
commodities. While oil is an internationally traded commodity, natural gas is a regionally 
traded commodity. While the price of oil generally refers to the spot price355 of a barrel 
of benchmark of crude oil,356 the pricing mechanism of natural gas displays regional 
differentiation. Outside of North America (where a deregulated Henry hub pricing 
mechanism of spot indexation reigns), countries typically sign a contract for natural gas 
trade that is linked to oil prices and has a long-term (usually thirty years) “take-or-pay” 
clause.357  In this respect, the gas pricing mechanism requires direct and long-term 
relationships between supplier and consumer states. I argue that the gas trade is more 
vulnerable to political orientation of the involved governments than the oil trade because 
natural gas is produced, transported, and traded through regional and fragmented markets. 
Natural gas transport infrastructure such as pipelines and LNG terminals is more 
susceptible to changes in the political orientation and stability of the governments 
involved.    
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China and Russia viewed gas pipeline projects as riskier than oil pipeline projects 
because they were uncertain whether they could ensure consistent political and security 
cooperation between the two countries for thirty years (the period of a gas pipeline take-
or-pay contract). Underlying political-economic arrangements between Russia and China, 
and within each country, have a greater impact on the successful launch and deal speed of 
cross-border pipeline projects for natural gas than for oil. First, natural gas pipelines seem 
to be more affected by geopolitical and external crises than oil pipelines. For example, 
binding agreements for the China-Russia spur section of the ESPO oil pipeline were 
signed in 2009 after both Russia’s invasion into Georgia (in 2008) and the Global 
Financial Crisis (in 2008-2009) happened, while the agreements for the POS gas pipeline 
were signed in May 2014, shortly after the Ukraine crisis happened with the Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea (in March 2014). It is worth noting that the gas deal was finalized 
before the fall in global oil prices happened (since the summer 2014) and major Russian 
state-owned oil and gas companies were listed under the U.S. and EU economic sanctions 
(in July and September 2014, respectively).358 Second, the low level of political trust 
between China and Russia also explains why the POS gas pipeline deal was delayed 
longer than the ESPO oil pipeline deal. As seen in Figure 2, the discussion for both Sino-
Russian oil and gas pipelines was started in the late 1980s. While the gas deal was 
finalized in 2014, the first “loan for oil” deal was signed in 2005 and the oil deal for the 
ESPO spur was signed in 2009.     
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Table 5. Summary of Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Pipelines 
 Sino-Russian Oil 
Pipeline: 
Eastern Siberia 
Pacific Ocean (ESPO) 
Sino-Russian Gas 
Pipeline: 





Speed of Deal Proposed in the late 
1980s; (binding) deal 
signed in 2009 (phase 
1 operational in 2009, 
and phase 2 (spur) in 
2012) 
Proposed in the late 
1980s; (binding) 
deal signed in May 
2014  
Proposed in the late 
1980s; (non-binding) 
deal signed in 
November 2014 
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This chapter begins by explaining how the cases of cross-border oil and gas pipelines 
linking the Caspian region with Europe fit within the overall architecture of my 
dissertation. First, I chose the cases of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and 
the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) as projects that show variations in terms of the 
relationship between economic and political incentives. The BTC oil pipeline is a case 
where strong political alignment between states drove the deal despite low economic 
incentives for international oil companies (IOCs), particularly until the late stage of 
pipeline planning (e.g., the project involved a relatively small volume of oil). The SGC 
pipeline project is a case where the deals proceeded with a high-to-medium level of 
political alignment and economic incentives among host countries.359 Second, I chose the 
BTC oil pipeline and the SGC pipeline projects to explain why the multi-state export 
pipelines from the Caspian region materialized more quickly than the Sino-Russian 
direct-link pipelines, even though the multi-state export pipelines involve more parties 
(including transit states without overarching jurisdiction) than the direct-link pipelines. 
Third, I selected the BTC and SGC pipeline projects since they both involved combined 
pipeline ownership between national oil companies (NOCs) and international oil 
companies (IOCs), which created joint venture (JV) consortiums for the financing, 
construction, and operation of pipelines. 
                                                        
359 The degree of political alignment (i.e., political trust) among host countries for the SGC pipeline project 
is not resolved, given that dynamics in the region are changing quickly due to the Ukraine crisis, Russia’s 
subsequent cancellation of the South Stream pipeline, and Moscow’s strategic moves toward the Turkish 
Stream pipeline. The degree of political alignment among host countries seems to keep declining and is 
difficult to estimate because participating countries with different policy goals are taking diverging 
approaches to energy resources. Compared to the other three cases in my dissertation, however, the SGC 
pipeline project is a case where there are substantial political and economic incentives, rather than a case 




Chapters 6 and 7 explain the similarities and differences between the BTC oil pipeline 
and the SGC gas pipeline development given the logic for case selection described above. 
Chapter 6 explains how political motivations drove commercial decisions for the BTC oil 
pipeline deal through examining three underlying political and economic factors: (1) a 
geopolitical goal of enhancing Western involvement in the energy and security sectors of 
the Caspian region through the development of pipeline transportation bypassing Russia 
and Iran; (2) a strong political alignment among host countries and consistent U.S. 
involvement; and (3) the NOC-IOC combined ownership structure of financing that 
facilitated a successful materialization of the BTC oil pipeline project. This chapter also 
explains how a complex set of commercial interests and geopolitics in the Caspian region 
came into play among the key state and non-state actors, including Azerbaijan, Turkey, 
Georgia, Russia, the United States, and Western oil companies. It focuses on the colossal 
political efforts of states involved in the Caspian pipeline negotiations and competition 
among major players despite the relatively modest volumes of oil in the Caspian Sea by 
examining U.S. involvement as an outside actor, Turkey’s role and political objectives, 
and Azerbaijan’s strategic interests after the Soviet collapse.  
INTRODUCTION 
The Caspian Sea region360 is geographically landlocked, but on the crossroads between 
Western Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. Until the collapse of the Former Soviet 
Union (FSU), the region’s energy resources were largely untapped aside from 
                                                        
360 In this study, I refer to Caspian region as the territory covering the present five littoral countries of the 




Azerbaijan’s oil production, although it has significant oil and natural gas reserves.361 As 
the breakdown of the Soviet opened up enormous potential reserves of oil and gas in the 
region, the key question has been how and where to develop the export infrastructure of 
pipelines in order to bring Caspian oil and gas to the international market. With several 
newly independent countries gaining access to valuable hydrocarbon deposits, different 
countries have taken diverging approaches to developing Caspian energy resources and 
export infrastructure. In a broad sense, the geopolitical atlas of energy export after the 
FSU breakdown has been drawn differently between eastern and western Caspian 
countries. While eastern Caspian countries such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan orient 
greater volumes of oil and gas east to China, western countries such as Azerbaijan have 
targets to the west, accessed largely through Georgia, to Turkey and Europe. 
Turkmenistan, meanwhile, is seeking to diversify supply options to the south.  
In Chapters 6 and 7, I examine how the cross-border pipelines linking the Caspian region 
with Europe have developed from oil to gas, by focusing on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) oil pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) projects. I briefly explain other 
pipeline projects – the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), the South Caucasus Pipeline 
(SCP) or Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum (BTE) gas pipeline, the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline 
(TCGP), Nabucco, the South Stream, and the Turkish Stream – in order to better 
investigate the geopolitical and geo-economic dimensions of BTC and SGC in 
relationship with participating countries and actors (i.e., international and national oil and 
gas companies) of other pipeline projects. Therefore, the countries that are not main 
                                                        
361 The region has 48 billion barrels per day of oil and 292 trillion cubic feet of natural gas according to the 




players in the BTC and SGC projects, such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, are less 
explored here.  
The basic trends and opportunities for energy transportation in the Caspian region have 
changed with different political and economic environments. During the 1990s, low oil 
prices, lack of regional cooperation between the countries’ governments, and few export 
options for Caspian hydrocarbons slowed the development of Caspian oil and gas 
resources. In the 2000s, however, the combination of foreign investment and rising 
energy prices allowed the Caspian littoral countries to shift from diverting oil extraction 
for domestic use to supplying regional and world oil markets.362 Sustained high oil prices, 
foreign (mostly Western) capital and technology, and increased world demand for oil and 
gas (mostly from developing Asia) in the 2000s enabled landlocked, non-OPEC countries 
of the Caspian region to produce greater volumes, which require greater export capacity 
through a larger number of routes than existed in the 1990s.  
Until the mid-2000s, the energy transportation infrastructure of the region was still 
dominated by the pipeline architecture of the Soviet era, even after more than a decade of 
active investments from Western oil companies. This means that the oil and gas pipelines, 
though extensively developed, still conform more to the political, security, and 
commercial realities of the FSU than to the needs of independent Caspian states that have 
sought to maximize national benefits by contributing to global energy security.363 The 
addition of new pipelines to the traditional transportation system that has been mostly 
                                                        
362 Caspian Sea Region: Country Analysis Brief (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2013). 
363 Jan H Kalicki and Jonathan Elkind, "Eurasian Transportation Futures," in Energy and Security: Toward 




operated by Transneft, the Russian state-owned pipeline monopoly, is still a top policy 
priority in the current Caspian region of the 2010s. However, the prospect of the 
“multiple pipeline strategy”364 to ensure diverse and reliable transportation of Caspian 
energy resources – especially natural gas – to regional and international markets still 
seems challenging in the 2010s, given the rapidly changing geopolitical and geo-
economic environment of the region due to the Ukraine crisis, low oil prices, increasing 
competition between Russia and China, and the dynamics regarding the Eurasian Union 
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), as well as due to changes with regard 
to the Shah Deniz consortium, the international effort to develop Azerbaijan’s largest 
natural gas field.365  
The emerging trend of trans-regional oil and gas pipelines and the development of the 
east-west corridor linking Europe to Central Asia and beyond via the Caucasus has 
impacted Eurasian geopolitics and economies to a large extent. The process of 
realignment and integration of the Caspian region is continuing within this broader trend. 
This chapter is organized as follows. It briefly introduces the geopolitical change after the 
former Soviet breakdown through the discussion of the “early oil” pipeline routes from 
the Caspian. It explains how political necessity drove commercial decisions in the 
                                                        
364 Since the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, the U.S. government—involved in close cooperation 
with Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan— elaborated the “multiple pipeline strategy” as 
the only economically and politically viable export solution for Caspian hydrocarbons. See: Jan H Kalicki, 
"Caspian Energy at the Crossroads," Foreign Affairs  (2001). Svante E Cornell, Mamuka Tsereteli, and 
Vladimir Socor, "Geostrategic Implications of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline," The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
Pipeline: Oil Window to the West (2005). 
365 The Shah Deniz (SD) gas and condensate field is the largest natural gas field in Azerbaijan. The field 
was discovered in 1999. BP operates Shah Deniz on behalf of its partners in the Shah Deniz Production 
Sharing Agreement (PSA). The SD field is operated by BP, which has a share of 28.8%. Other partners 
include TPAO (19%), SOCAR (16.7%), Petronas (15.5%), LUKoil (10%), and NIOC (10%). See: 





development of the BTC oil pipeline. Geopolitical and strategic considerations of 
Azerbaijan and Turkey, and the strong U.S. involvement as an outside actor in the BTC 
pipeline, are examined. Then the chapter moves on to how state and non-state actors 
aligned commercially to finance the BTC pipeline project. This section accounts for 
foreign investment in the Azerbaijan’s upstream oil fields and the BTC pipeline project, 
where shareholders in each joint venture consortium comprise both national oil 
companies (NOCs) and international oil companies (IOCs). Finally, the chapter examines 
how host countries of the BTC pipeline project (Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia) and 
the United States are politically aligned and remained committed to each other in 
implementing the pipeline project. 
GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY IN THE CASPIAN REGION 
The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline is a 1,760 kilometer (km)–long oil pipeline 
through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey with a capacity of around 50 million tons of oil 
per year (i.e., one million barrels per day). It is the first oil pipeline coming out of the 
Caspian Sea region that does not cross Russian territory to reach the international market. 
The pipeline’s construction began in 2003 and was completed in 2006. In explaining the 
course of events that led to the realization of the BTC pipeline, this chapter focuses on 
the colossal political efforts of states involved in the Caspian pipeline negotiations and 
competition despite the relatively modest volumes of oil in the Caspian Sea. The BTC 
pipeline route was mainly decided by political considerations, both domestic and 




studies contend.366 This chapter explains how U.S. involvement as an outside actor, 
Turkey’s role and political objectives, and Azerbaijan’s strategic interests after the Soviet 
collapse affected the development of Caspian pipeline politics and an east-west energy 
corridor. A complex set of commercial interests and geopolitics in the Caspian region 
came into play among the key state and non-state actors, including Azerbaijan, Turkey, 
Georgia, Russia, the United States, and Western oil companies. 
Map 6. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Oil Pipeline 
 
(Source: The State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan) 
 
                                                        
366 For studies that argue political factors and geopolitical calculations are the dominant considerations in 




Preliminary Setting for Geopolitics – Post-Soviet “Early Oil” Pipelines 
During the Soviet era, no major pipeline was built to carry Caspian oil to the outside 
world, since the oil from the Caspian region was used to serve Soviet domestic needs 
rather than export. Azeri and Kazak oil production were linked to the internal Russian 
pipeline network and carried to Russian refineries for domestic use.367 After the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Caspian oil producers found themselves with an 
urgent need to find an export route that could sustain Caspian oil production. Azerbaijan 
and Kazakhstan started looking for alternatives to reduce their dependence on the Russian 
pipeline system in the long run, although it was much more difficult for Kazakhstan to 
bypass Russia because of its geographical location.368 While Azerbaijan tried to avoid 
dependence on Russia for its energy transport, it also did not want to antagonize Moscow 
in determining the transportation routes for the “early oil” from the Caspian. The U.S. 
government also did not push for an option that would completely exclude Russia from 
the hydrocarbon business in the Caspian. Therefore, the Azerbaijan International 
Operating Company (AIOC) and the Azerbaijani political leadership agreed in October 
1995 on a dual pipeline strategy: a northern route from Baku to Novorossiysk, Russia 
(completed in 1997)369, and a western route from Baku to Supsa, Georgia (completed in 
                                                        
367 Nurettin Altundeger, "Geopolitical Rivalry in the Caspian-Caucasus Region and the Dilemma of 
Interstate Cooperation," Order No. 3281462, Old Dominion University, 2007. 
368 John Roberts, “Pipeline Politics,” in The Caspian: Politics, Energy and Security, ed. Shirin Akiner 
(London: Routledge, 2004). 
369 The Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline runs for 1,330 kilometers from Azerbaijan's Sangachal Terminal to the 
Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. The contract was signed in 1996 between the Azerbaijan 
International Operating Company (AIOC), SOCAR, and Transneft. According to SOCAR, maximum 





1999)370. While the Russian government pushed for Baku-Novorossiysk to be the main 
outlet for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, the U.S. and Azerbaijani governments insisted on 
the availability of a second route of Baku-Supsa.371  
In negotiating the transportation of “early oil” from the Caspian, each party was willing 
to modify its policies to accommodate other parties, as the stake in “early oil” was not as 
high as the political and economic benefits expected from the transportation of the 
region’s primary volumes of “main oil” that would be developed later.372 Russia secured 
the biggest portion of this “early oil”, but it also accepted the inclusion of the second oil 
transportation route. While the United States and Azerbaijan agreed on the northern route 
to Russia, they also agreed on excluding the Iranian route and secured the second route 
from Russia because the United States remained steadfastly against any project that could 
give Iran more leverage in Western oil markets.373  
                                                        
370 The Baku-Supsa line, also known as the Western Route Export Pipeline (WREP), runs for 830 
kilometers from the Chirag field in the Caspian Sea, via the Sangachal terminal, to the Supsa terminal on 
the Black Sea coast in western Georgia. Just under half of the pipeline is located in Georgia. The line 
became fully operational in 1999, and has a capacity of 155,000 barrels per day (bpd). 
http://wiki.openoil.net/index.php?title=Baku-Supsa_pipeline  
371 Tuncay Babali, "Energy Diplomacy in the Caspian Basin: Since the End of the Cold-War." Order No. 
3095034, University of Houston, 2003. 
372 Up to 80,000 barrels per day were expected to flow from the Caspian by late 1996, which is a very 
modest volume of oil. The output was expected to grow to 700,000 barrels per day by 2010, but until the 
early 2000s, the “early oil” was expected to be in much smaller quantities.  
373 Although Tehran had adopted a hostile stance toward Azerbaijan’s pro-Turkish President Abulfaz 
Elchibey, it became more accommodating toward Heydar Aliyev, who replaced Elchibey after the June 
1993 coup d’état. Interested in staying in good terms with Tehran, Aliyev repeatedly stated that Baku 
intended to have mutually beneficial relations with Tehran based on cooperation in the fields of oil 
production and marketing. On November 12, 1994, Aliyev transferred 5% out of SOCAR’s 20% share in 
the AIOC to Iran. Facing objections from the U.S. government, however, the AIOC turned down this 
transfer, thus sabotaging Aliyev’s effort to buy Tehran’s support against Russian projection of a big-power 





BTC Main Oil Export Pipeline and Geopolitics: Political Necessity Drove Commercial 
Decisions 
The BTC pipeline is the first oil pipeline in the Caspian region to bypass Russia, 
transporting oil from Azerbaijan to the international market via Georgia and Turkey. The 
key element in the successful completion of BTC is that political necessity of enhancing 
Western involvement in the energy and security sectors of the Caspian region has driven 
commercial decisions. Many Western oil companies initially opposed strong U.S. 
political involvement in the decision-making process for Caspian oil transportation 
options, but in this case, political decisions contributed to the creation of commercially 
effective solutions.374  
After the U.S. government established economic relations with a newly independent 
Azerbaijan in 1992, high-profile government officials such as the U.S. Secretary of 
Energy Hazel O’Leary and Undersecretary of State Strobe Talbott visited Baku to 
explore opportunities for energy cooperation.375 The U.S. government became very 
interested in Azerbaijan’s oil export to the United States and NATO partners because of 
its landlocked geographical location bordering Russia, Iran, Georgia, and Armenia. 
Linking Azerbaijan with Turkey, a NATO member, was a U.S. strategic priority, as it had 
the potential to create a solid foundation for the integration of Azerbaijan into Western 
economies, thus creating further opportunities for the American presence in the region. 
Washington was not interested in gaining control over Azerbaijan’s modest hydrocarbon 
                                                        
374 Cornell, Tsereteli, and Socor, "Geostrategic Implications of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline." 
375 Robert Finn, "Dilpomatic Beginning in Baku," in Azerbaijan in Global Politics: Crafting Foreign 





volumes, but rather saw the energy transit route as a tool to foster security and political 
ties with Caspian states.376  
The idea of the BTC was first introduced in 1992 by Turkey. From the U.S. perspective, 
the goals of the BTC include reducing dependence on OPEC oil producers in the Middle 
East, creating a secure supply of oil to Israel, and beginning to end dependence on 
Russian and Iranian oil transportation networks from the Caspian region.377 The 
successful completion of BTC means the ambition of building the east-west pipeline 
corridor linking Central Asian with Europe has been realized. The east-west corridor is 
aligned with the “multiple pipeline strategy” that the U.S. government elaborated as the 
only politically and economically viable export solution for Caspian hydrocarbons from 
the beginning of the 1990s. This strategy serves broad U.S. policy objectives toward the 
region: 1) assuring the sovereignty and the independence of the countries of the Caspian 
Sea region; 2) supporting economic cooperation among the countries of the region and 
with Turkey, the U.S. ally in the area; 3) promoting diversified and reliable energy 
sources; and 4) supporting U.S. investments overseas.378 In particular, those in high-level 
U.S. policy circles believed that if Azerbaijan’s energy resources were transported 
through Russia or Iran, Baku would not be able to adopt a pro-Western security and 
political orientation.379  
                                                        
376 Shaffer, Energy Politics, p. 56.  
377 "Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Company Founded," Alexander's Gas & Oil Connections, August 30, 
2002. http://www.gasandoil.com/news/central_asia/06e64ce97241a092b52d5a35d6be6a60 Source: The 
World Socialist Web Site (WSWS). 
378 Cornell, Tsereteli, and Socor, "Geostrategic Implications of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline." 




Azerbaijan supported the BTC pipeline project for political and strategic reasons more 
than for commercial interests, especially when oil prices were low in the 1990s. From a 
purely market-oriented perspective, Azerbaijan should have chosen either the shortest 
route of oil export to world markets through Iran or the cheapest option of existing Baku-
Novorossiysk pipeline controlled by Russia for the main export pipelines (MEP). The 
Iranian route was not politically viable for Azerbaijan because of U.S. opposition and 
unstable relations between Baku and Tehran. Azerbaijani leaders were also deeply 
concerned about Russia’s control over pipelines and the volatile pricing policy set by 
Transneft. The unresolved nature of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict380 between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan was another main reason why Azerbaijan actively endorsed an alternative 
to the Russian energy corridor in the form of BTC. Armenia has close military ties with 
Russia,381 and Russia plays an important role in the security policy of Armenia. Russia 
has been repeatedly suspected of transferring large amounts of arms to Armenia during 
and after the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the area of Nagorno-
                                                        
380 Azerbaijan has been engaged with in a territorial dispute with neighboring Armenia since 1988. The 
conflict, which started over Armenian claims to the Azerbaijani area of Nagorno-Karabakh, grew into a 
full-scale war and resulted in Armenia’s occupation of over 17 percent of Azerbaijan’s territory, which 
caused the flight of more than half a million Azeri refugees. Although military actions were stopped with a 
1994 cease-fire agreement with the help of international mediators, the Nagorno-Karabakh question is still 
a “frozen conflict” in the post-Soviet region.  
For further details, see: Svante E Cornell and Fariz Ismailzade, "The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: 
Implications for Azerbaijan," ibid. Csaba Marosvari, "'Cold Reality in the Land of Fire': The Interrelations 
of Azerbaijan's Natural Gas Export and Foreign Policy" (M.A., The University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill, 2012). 
381 Russia and Armenia are bound together in the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) that institutionalizes their political-military alliance. Alternatively, Azerbaijan, along 
with other former Soviet countries such as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine founded the GUAM (Georgia, 
Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) Organization for Democracy and Economic Development. None of the 




Karabakh.382 Transporting oil through Georgia rather than Armenia, which is a more 
expensive route, was therefore logical and strategically desirable for Baku.383  
Azerbaijan has been trying to utilize its energy resources to strengthen its political 
independence and stimulate its economic development by bringing in foreign investment 
since its independence in 1991. The development of transport infrastructure is therefore 
considered to be a priority of Azerbaijan’s national development strategy, especially in its 
potential to link Europe and Central Asia.384 Given the geopolitical realities of 
Azerbaijan’s geographical location, Azerbaijan President Heydar Aliyev (1993-2003) led 
a pragmatic multi-vectoral foreign policy385, focusing on the diversification of oil exports 
through transport infrastructure, as the country must have pipelines through transit states 
to export its energy resources to its markets. Baku had hoped to build multiple export 
pipelines to avoid dependence on one transit state, but the oil volumes discovered in the 
state did not justify more than one pipeline. President Aliyev made a strategic decision 
that the main export pipeline should be built on an east-west route, through Georgia and 
                                                        
382 "Russia Denies Fresh Arms Transfer to Armenia," Armenian News Asbarez, January 14, 2009. 
http://asbarez.com/59917/russia-denies-fresh-arms-transfer-to-armenia/  
383 Initially the U.S. government tried to urge Baku and Ankara to select the Armenian route, as an attempt 
to solve the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict. The Armenian route, however, was rejected by Baku. See: 
Ekaterina Svyatets, "Power, Profits, and Politics: Energy Security and Cooperation in Eurasia" (Ph.D., 
University of Southern California, 2013). 
384 Alexandros Petersen and Fariz Ismailzade, Azerbaijan in Global Politics : Crafting Foreign Policy 
(Baku: Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, 2009). 
385 Multi-vectorism in foreign policy is a widely used term in official statements and the academic literature 
to define the foreign policy strategy or behavior of post-Soviet countries that have built strong relationship 
with other geopolitical actors (countries or institutions) in order to counterbalance Russia’s influence and 
enhance their own independence. Idnan and Shaffer (2011) describe the term as to “refrain from joining 
exclusive alliance systems and maintain cooperation with competing alliance system.” Ariel Cohen (2008) 
defines multi-vectoralism as “bilateral relations with each geopolitical actor, and [the avoidance of] 
sacrificing one vector for the sake of the other.” Bhavna for Dave (2007) describes the country with multi-
vectoral foreign policy as “geared at developing close relationship with all of neighbors and an active 
engagement in multilateral regional organizations. For more details, see: Marosvari, "'Cold Reality in the 





Turkey, and be led primarily by Western oil companies.386 In order to gain independence 
from the Russian transit system, Baku had strong political and strategic motives to 
develop the BTC pipeline, which was strongly supported by the U.S. government.387  
In Azerbaijan’s oil export strategy, the utilization of commercial incentives from 
increasing energy export revenues has been an instrument rather than a goal. As the 
country’s energy policy has been shaped and implemented to achieve goals in other 
policy fields, the utilization of energy resources serves as economic leverage for foreign 
policy priorities.388 For political and strategic reasons, Azerbaijan chose BTC, the most 
expensive and longest pipeline route among other options (such as developing the 
shortest route of oil export through Iran or the cheapest option of the existing Baku-
Novorossiysk pipeline controlled by Russia). Revitalization of the country’s economy, 
stabilization of its internal order, and preservation of its political independence, all of 
which were negatively affected by the post-Soviet transition and the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, had become urgent priorities for Azerbaijan. Foreign investment from Western 
oil companies not only brought essential capital and state-of-the-art technology to 
develop the country’s untapped offshore oil and gas fields, but it also gave Baku leverage 
against its neighbors.  
The involvement of Turkey was also a main driving force behind the BTC pipeline 
project. Turkey, as a regional power, has close ties with countries of the Caspian region 
                                                        
386 Shaffer, Energy Politics, p. 54. 
387 Adam N Stulberg, Well-Oiled Diplomacy: Strategic Manipulation and Russia's Energy Statecraft in 
Eurasia (SUNY Press, 2008). 
388 Heidi Kjaernet, "Azerbaijani-Russian Relations and the Economization of Foreign Policy." In: Indra 
Overland, Heidi Kjærnet, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Caspian Energy Politics: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan 




and supported their independence ever since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Although 
Turkey could not provide the resources that the former Soviet republics needed for their 
political and economic independence, it presented itself as a door to the Western world, 
as both a NATO member country and a longtime ally of Washington.389 Since it 
introduced the idea of BTC in 1992, Turkey strongly supported the pipeline route via 
Georgia and Turkey for the following reasons. First, the BTC pipeline route would 
provide an alternative to transporting large amounts of crude oil through the Bosporus 
region, where more than 12 million Turkish people live.390 BTC would bypass this choke 
point, delivering oil directly to a safe, deep-sea port. Second, Turkey supported the BTC 
pipeline route for geopolitical and strategic reasons. Turkey believed that the main 
country that the pipeline goes through would have a political influence over the region. 
As some have argued, the building of the BTC pipeline constitutes a strategic milestone 
in post-Soviet Eurasia, and has major implications for the South Caucasus and its role in 
European and world politics.391 The BTC pipeline presented itself as a big opportunity 
for Turkey to gain an important status in the region. Even though different countries 
agreed to having the Caspian region’s “early oil” go through Russia, neither Turkey nor 
                                                        
389 Altundeger, "Geopolitical Rivalry in the Caspian-Caucasus Region and the Dilemma of Interstate 
Cooperation," p. 84-120. 
390 The status of the Istanbul straits had been determined by the Montreux Treaty in 1936. The treaty 
proposes free passage to commercial ships and only gives Turkey the right to close them during the 
wartime against energy warships. Therefore, Turkey has no right to intervene in the passage of oil tankers 
through the Turkish straits. After 1990, traffic on the Bosporus intensified, and this has caused several 
serious accidents that threatened the city life in Istanbul. The Turkish government stepped up and 
introduced certain regulations to control the passage of heavy-loaded ships; however, these regulations 
could not help to solve the existing problems, as the traffic through the straits has increased each year since. 
Source: Altundeger, "Geopolitical Rivalry in the Caspian-Caucasus Region and the Dilemma of Interstate 
Cooperation," p. 108-110. 
391 Svante E. Cornell, Mamuka Tsereteli, and Vladimir Socor, "Geostrategic Implications of the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline," in The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil Window to the West, eds. S. Frederick 




the United States desired to see Russia establishing full control over the future of Azeri 
oil. The Turkish struggle for geopolitical influence is also related to its domestic politics. 
As a successful launch of the BTC pipeline became an issue of reputation for Turkey, 
each political party in Turkey, from the 1990s to 2007, made it a priority to increase the 
project’s popularity.392   
COMMERCIAL DECISIONS 
Preliminary Setting for Foreign Investment – IOC-led development of Azerbaijan’s oil 
fields 
The idea of the BTC was first introduced in the spring of 1992 by Turkish Prime Minister 
Süleyman Demirel, who called on Central Asian countries including Azerbaijan to export 
energy resources through Turkey.393 The first document of the framework agreement on 
the BTC construction was signed between Azerbaijan and Turkey on March 9, 1993.394 
After the signing of the first production-sharing agreement (PSA) between the State Oil 
Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) and mostly Western oil companies on the 
Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (ACG) oil fields in 1994, however, the BTC project had more 
direct involvement from the U.S. government. In the ACG project, SOCAR signed the 
“contract of the century” with British Petroleum (BP), Amoco, and other U.S. and 
                                                        
392 Altundeger, "Geopolitical Rivalry in the Caspian-Caucasus Region and the Dilemma of Interstate 
Cooperation," p. 111-112 (original source: Nejdet A. Pamir, “Baku-Ceyhan Boru Hatti,” Avrasya Stratejik 
Arastirmalar Merkezi (ASAM) Yayinlari (Ankara: Kirali Matbaasi, 1999).  
393 After the 49th Cabinet of the Republic of Turkey started under DYP (True Path Party) leader Süleyman 
Demirel on November, 20 1991, diplomatic ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan were established on 
January 14, 1992.  






European-based oil companies, setting the stage for foreign long-term involvement in 
energy-export projects in Azerbaijan.395  
This $8 billion contract provided for the development of the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli 
(ACG) oil fields in the Caspian Sea, which are estimated to contain reserves of 5 billion 
barrels.396 It was the first deal in the Caspian to bring together a diverse group of 
governments and companies – 11 foreign oil companies and six countries.397 It has 
thereby created an environment for foreign investment, which enabled the Azeri 
                                                        
395 It was Azerbaijan’s first offshore PSA. With a lifetime of 30 years, it represented the first major 
investment by Western multinational companies in any country of the former Soviet Union and became 
known as the Contract of the Century. The PSA signed on September 20, 1994 in Baku by the Government 
of Azerbaijan and a consortium of 11 foreign oil companies from six nations initiated a rapid period of 
development, which has transformed the country into a major global energy supplier and changed the 
energy map of Europe. It is operated by BP on behalf of the Azerbaijan International Operating Company 
(AIOC). AIOC was formed in February 1995 following the ratification of the PSA and originally 
comprised eleven partner companies, representing six countries. Azerbaijan's government receives 
approximately 80% of the total profits from a combination of royalties and SOCAR's share. The remaining 
20% of profits is divided among the other consortium members. The final division of stakes among the 
eleven final multinational signatories is as follows: SOCAR (20%), BP (17%), American Amoco (17%), 
Unocal (9.5%), Pennzoil (4.8%), Exxon (5%), McDermott (2.45%), Russia’s Lukoil (10%), Norway’s 
Statoil (8.5%), Scotland’s Ramco (2%), Turkish state oil company TPAO (1.75%), Saudi Arabia’s Delta 
Nimir (1.7%).  
ACG’s current shareholders and participating interests are: BP (35.8%), SOCAR (11.6%), Chevron 
(11.3%), Inpex (11%), Statoil (8.6%), ExxonMobil (8%), TPAO (6.8%), Itochu (4.3%), and ONGC (2.7%). 
ACG is a complex of six production platforms: Chirag 1, Central Azeri, West Azeri, East Azeri, Deepwater 
Gunashli, and West Chirag. A subsea pipeline was laid at the bottom of the Caspian Sea to transport oil 
from offshore to Sangachal Terminal, near Baku. Sangachal is one of the biggest and most efficient 
terminals in the world, which can receive and process up to 1.2 million barrels of oil per day.  
See: BP Operations and Projects in Caspian at 
http://www.bp.com/en_az/caspian/operationsprojects/ACG.html; Nasser Sagheb and Masoud Javadi, 
"Azerbaijan’s ‘Contract of the Century’finally Signed with Western Oil Consortium," Azerbaijan 
International 2, no. 4 (1994). 
396 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Brief: Azerbaijan (2014). The ACG holds 
over 70% of Azerbaijan’s total reserves and accounted for almost 75% of Azerbaijan’s total output in 2013.  





government to start another major international project in the Shah Deniz gas and 
condensate field in 1999.398  
Commercial Decisions for BTC  
Washington, especially during the Clinton Administration (1993-2001), perceived that it 
could help to create more stability and peace in the Caspian region through helping to 
transport landlocked Azerbaijan’s oil production to world markets via multiple pipelines 
that bypass Russia and Iran.399 However, there was substantial opposition initially to the 
BTC proposal in both business and governmental circles in the United States and the 
Caspian region. It required billions of dollars of investment and involved the logistical 
challenge of running a long pipeline with portions in less politically stable areas of 
Georgia and Turkey. It should be noted that the major U.S. energy companies active in 
the Caspian region did not strongly support Washington’s promotion of the east-west 
corridor pipeline, and that most of the major investment in the project came from non–
U.S. based oil companies such as BP.400   
In order to make the BTC project more feasible, the U.S. government became noticeably 
more active and coherent in its policy in the Caspian region between 1995 and 1998. In 
January 1995, the U.S. Embassy in Azerbaijan announced that its government would not 
                                                        
398 The Shah Deniz (SD) gas and condensate field is the largest natural gas field in Azerbaijan. The field 
was discovered in 1999. BP operates Shah Deniz on behalf of its partners in the Shah Deniz Production 
Sharing Agreement (PSA). The SD field is operated by BP, which has a share of 28.8%. Other partners 
include TPAO (19%), SOCAR (16.7%), Petronas (15.5%), LUKoil (10%), and NIOC (10%). See: 
wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shah_Deniz_gas_field; the BP website, 
http://www.bp.com/en_az/caspian/operationsprojects/Shahdeniz/SDstage1.html.  
399 Jim Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for US 
Interests (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2011). 




agree to the Iranian route for the oil pipeline. In 1997, the U.S. Department of State 
issued a report titled Energy Development in the Caspian Region, analyzing the 
expansion of the world’s energy supply and demand, the sovereignty and independence 
of the Caspian basin countries, and the need to isolate Iran.401 In this report, the United 
States gave preference to the BTC main export pipeline route. In November 1997, U.S. 
Energy Secretary Federico Peña visited the Caucasus and Central Asian republics on 
behalf of the U.S. president and urged leaders of the regional states to clarify their 
attitudes toward the BTC oil pipeline and the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline projects before 
October 1998. In February 1998, the White House urged the Turkish government to make 
the BTC project commercially viable. In the summer of 1998, the U.S. administration 
established the position of special counselor for Caspian energy diplomacy and appointed 
Richard Morningstar to the post. In October 1998, the new U.S. Energy Secretary Bill 
Richardson, together with representatives from the five regional countries, signed the 
Ankara Declaration calling for the construction of a pipeline to run from Baku via Tbilisi 
to Ceyhan. In the same month, the White House administration met with America’s 15 
largest oil companies in order to convince them that the BTC line was preferable to 
others from a geostrategic and geopolitical perspective. Washington was clearly 
determined to push through this pipeline, regarding it as a nucleus for geopolitical 
development in the region.402  
                                                        
401 Nasib Nassibli, "Azerbaijan’s Geopolitics and Oil Pipeline Issue," Journal Of International Affairs 4, no. 
4 (1999). 
402 For U.S. efforts on the BTC project between 1995 and 1998, see: "Azerbaijan: Policy Priorities Towards 





Although the United States declared its support for the BTC project immediately after the 
Turkish government proposed it, it was not until 1998 that this support had a direct 
impact on all sides – especially Western oil companies – involved in the decision-making 
process.403 One of the most decisive steps to boost the project took place in 1998, when a 
feasibility study and an environmental audit for transporting crude oil from Caspian 
region to the Mediterranean Sea was carried out by a German-based international 
engineering company, Pipeline Engineering GmbH – PLE, through a loan provided by 
the World Bank.404 The final results of the study in August 1998 provided the first 
evidence to persuade the AIOC members producing oil in Azebaijan’s ACG fields to 
think seriously about the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey route as a way to Western markets. 
During the 17th Congress of the World Energy Council in Houston on September 15, 
1998, U.S. Ambassador Morningstar, the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary 
of State for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy, stated that the U.S. administration’s “firm 
commitment to developing a network of east-west pipelines will enhance U.S. national 
security interests and business opportunities for U.S. companies in the strategically 
critical Caspian region.” He further argued that, “Building a Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline 
and a trans-Caspian gas pipeline (TCGP)405 makes absolute sense for both national 
security and commercial reasons…Both pipelines will increase energy security by 
avoiding the concentration of a vast new sources of oil and gas in the Persian Gulf region. 
                                                        
403 Tuncay Babali, "Energy Diplomacy in the Caspian Basin: Since the End of the Cold-War" (Ph.D., 
University of Houston, 2003). 
404 "Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline Project Directorate," http://www.btc.com.tr/eng/project.html.    
405 The Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) is a proposed subsea pipeline between Türkmenbaşy in 
Turkmenistan, and Baku in Azerbaijan. The TCGP project would transport natural gas from Turkmenistan 
and Kazakhstan to European Union member countries, circumventing both Russia and Iran. This project 
attracts significant interest since it will connect vast Turkmen gas resources to major consumer geographies 





Finally, both pipelines enjoy great potential to become lucrative investment opportunities 
for U.S. companies.”406  
Thanks to countless similar announcements and statements from the U.S. and Turkish 
governments on the BTC, negative public and private views about the project ultimately 
began to change.407 In addition, as a result of the feasibility study, the intergovernmental 
agreement (IGA) in support of the pipeline was signed by Azerbaijan, Georgia, and 
Turkey on November 18, 1999, during a meeting of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul, Turkey. U.S. President Bill Clinton also 
signed the Agreement as witness.408 The agreement regarding the establishment of the 
BTC Pipeline Company (BTC Co.) was finally signed in London on August 2, 2000. In 
order to make investment in BTC more feasible, the U.S. government made financing 
from government agencies, such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) 
and the U.S. Export-Import Development Bank, available.409 In October 2000, SOCAR 
and seven international oil companies holding interests in the ACG offshore oilfields, 
formed a Sponsor Group to pursue development of the BTC project and appointed BP as 
operator. During the “Tale of Three Seas” conference organized by the Cambridge 
Energy Associates in Istanbul on June 20, 2001, John Browne, CEO of BP, stated that the 
                                                        
406 Quotations are from: "Energy Diplomacy in the Caspian Basin: Since the End of the Cold-War." 
Original source: Pulse of Turkey, No: 57 October 2nd 1998.  
407 Ibid. 
408 "Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline Project Directorate ". During the OSCE summit, the Host 
Government Agreement (HGA), the Turnkey Agreement (TA), and the Government Guarantee (GG) were 
also initialed as Annexes to the Intergovernmental Agreement. The Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) 
and the Annexes were ratified by the Azerbaijan Parliament on May 26 and by the Georgian Parliament on 
May 29. The Turkish Parliament also ratified the agreement package on June 22, 2000.  
409 Richard Morningstar, "From Pipe Dream to Pipeline: The Realization of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 




BTC is commercially viable, based on the ACG and Shah Deniz (SD) (condensate) 
reserves alone, and reiterated BP’s determination to go ahead with the project.410 
Kazakhstan also showed its interest in shipping oil through the BTC pipeline following 
the discovery of the Kashagan oil field, and signed an agreement in 2006 with Azerbaijan 
to transport about three million tons of oil from its Kashagan oil field.411  
Pipeline Ownership Structure 
The total cost of the BTC project is $3.9 billion, approximately 70 percent of which was 
funded in the form of financing by third parties. The group providing loans, export credits 
and risk insurance to BTC comprises the European Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector 
arm of the World Bank, export credit agencies of seven countries, and a syndicate of 15 
commercial banks.412 To complete the project, the BTC Co. joint venture (JV) was 
established in 2002 and the finalization of the financing agreements came in 2004. The 
principal stakeholder of the JV is British Petroleum (BP) with 30.1 percent of shares (the 
project operator), followed by Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR (25%). Other 
consortium members include American UNOCAL (8.9%), Norwegian Statoil (8.71%), 
                                                        
410 Daniel Yergin, The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World (Penguin, 2011). 
411 “Revolutions in the Pipeline,” Kommersant, May 25 2005. “BTC: Kazakhstan Finally Commits to the 
Pipeline,” Eurasianet, June 18 2006. Because of the opposition from both Russia and Iran, Kazakhstan 
started to transport oil to the BTC pipeline by tankers across the Caspian Sea.  
412 “The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline Project,” Lessons of Experience Number 2, International 






Turkish TPAO (6.53%), Italian ENI (5%), French Total (5%), Japanese Itochu (3.4%), 
Japanese Inpex (2.5%), American ConocoPhillips (2.5%) and American Hess (2.36%).413 
As explained in Chapter 2, my dissertation focuses on the pipeline ownership structure, 
which captures how state and non-state actors involved in a pipeline project are 
commercially aligned. Contrary to the cases of Sino-Russian pipeline development, the 
BTC pipeline project was funded through a joint venture in addition to funding from debt 
financiers and multilateral agencies. Equity investors that sponsored the BTC project 
created the BTC Corporation and finalized the shareholder agreements. The BTC pipeline 
represents the combined ownership structure, where both NOCs (Azerbaijan’s SOCAR, 
Turkey’s TPAO, and Japan’s Inpex) and IOCs (BP, Unocal, Statoil, Eni, Total, 
ConocoPhillips, and Hess) are shareholders in the pipeline joint venture. BP, as principal 
shareholder and project operator, took the lead in establishing a JV consortium.   
POLITICAL ALIGNMENT  
There was a high degree of unity among the countries involved with the BTC pipeline 
project. Political leaders of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey were all fully committed to 
the project and to each other. Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev, Georgian President 
Eduard Shevardnadze, and Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel were able to settle 
all issues concerning the project easily because of mutual political trust.414  
                                                        
413 “Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline,” BP Caspian Operations and Projects, the BP website, 
http://www.bp.com/en_az/caspian/operationsprojects/pipelines/BTC.html.  
414 Author’s interview with Richard Morningstar, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State 




For the United States, the independence of Azerbaijan and Georgia became a geopolitical 
and strategic priority after the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially because of their 
geographical locations. The United States viewed the development of an east-west energy 
transit route as a tool to foster these countries’ political and economic independence and 
also wanted Turkey to be actively involved. Washington sought to increase the political 
influence of Turkey in the region and boost its economy, which was damaged by the lack 
of oil exported through its territory from Iraq since the end of the first Gulf War in 
1991.415 Washington was clearly aware that the southern Mediterranean coast of Turkey 
was the only potential endpoint for the BTC pipeline because Turkey would not allow 
any more oil tankers through Bosporus. Transporting oil through Georgia rather than 
Armenia was a political decision, given the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between 
Azerbaijan and Armenia and the close military relationship between Russia and Armenia. 
The United States remained steadfastly against any project that could give Iran more 
leverage in Western oil markets,416 and did not want any more Caspian oil to be 
transported through Russia.  
The full commitment of Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia to the project and the strong 
political involvement from the United States made every energy outlet other than the 
                                                        
415 Shaffer, Energy Politics, p.57. 
416 Oil & Gas Journal, January 14, 2002, p. 60.  
The U.S. Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) in 1995 (during the Clinton 
Administration), imposing proscriptions on any company – American or not – spending more than $20 
million developing Iran’s oil and gas reserves. French, Malaysian, and Russian companies defied ILSA by 
contracting for billions to explore Iran’s huge South Pars gas field in the Persian Gulf. During the Bush 
Administration, various interest groups including the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) 
got a five-year extension on ILSA in 2001, but the Bush Administration did not employ any sanctions on 
France, Russia, and Malaysia. At the first State of Union speech, President George W. Bush said that the 
administration is not yet prepared to allow American investment in Iran, by calling the three countries of 




BTC pipeline politically impossible. The BTC pipeline transit route was the only 
politically viable option that Western oil companies had.   
Table 6. Development of the BTC Oil Pipeline 
 In the spring of 1992, the Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel suggested t
o Central Asian countries (including Azerbaijan) that the pipeline should run thro
ugh Turkey. The first agreement on the construction of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan
 pipeline was signed between Azerbaijan and Turkey on March 9, 1993 in Ankar
a.  
 In 1994, a consortium of oil companies led by the British Petroleum (BP) signed 
an $8 billion PSA with the Azerbaijani state oil company, SOCAR (State Oil Co
mpany for the Azerbaijan Republic). Investors in the “contract of the century” in
clude: SOCAR, BP, Amoco, Unocal, Pennzoil, Exxon, McDermott, Lukoil, Stato
il, Ramco, TPAO, Delta Nimir.417  
 The first BTC Steering Committee meeting took place in January 1995. President
 Heydar Aliyev addressed the committee. 
 The third Steering Committee meeting approved the Early Oil Project as well as t
he two early oil export options – the northern route through Russia and the weste
rn route through Georgia in October 1995. 
                                                        
417 ACG’s current shareholders and participating interests are: BP (35.8%), SOCAR (11.6%), Chevron 
(11.3%), Inpex (11%), Statoil (8.6%), ExxonMobil (8%), TPAO (6.8%), Itochu (4.3%), and ONGC (2.7%). 





 The governments of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation signe
d the Intergovernmental Agreement on the transit of Azerbaijan oil via the pipeli
ne from Baku to Novorossiysk in January 1996.  
 The governments of the Azerbaijan Republic and Georgia signed the Intergovern
mental Agreement on the transit of Azerbaijani oil via the pipeline from Baku to 
Supsa in March 1996. 
 The presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine inaugurate the Western Rout
e Export Pipeline and the Supsa Terminal on the Georgian coast of the Black Sea
 in April 1999. 
 The Intergovernmental Agreement in support of the pipeline was signed by Azer
baijan, Georgia, and Turkey on November 18, 1999, during a meeting of the Org
anization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul, Turkey. 
 The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Company (BTC Co.) was established in Lond
on on August 1, 2002. 
 BTC Project Company signs Project Finance Agreements in February 2004. 
 Inauguration of the Azerbaijan section of the BTC oil export pipeline by the presi
dents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey in May 2005. Inauguration of the Geor
gian section of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil export pipeline by the preside
nts of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey in October 2005. 
 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) celebrates full commissioning. The official inaugura







The BTC oil pipeline is not only the first infrastructure link between Caspian 
hydrocarbons and international markets that does not cross Russia, but it is also a source 
of greater energy diversity, a symbol of the independence of the Caspian states, a proof of 
cooperation and mutual political trust among participating states, and a tool for economic 
development.418 It illustrates how major energy infrastructure projects inherently involve 
political considerations and how political willingness drove commercial considerations in 
the decision-making behind this energy transit route. With the strong political 
involvement of the U.S. government, the host countries of Azerbaijan, Turkey, and 
Georgia are fully committed to the BTC project and to each other given its geopolitical 
and strategic importance.  
With the BTC, Azerbaijan chose the most expensive and longest potential pipeline route 
among other options (including the shortest route of oil export through Iran or the 
cheapest option of the existing Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline controlled by Russia) in 
order to gain independence from the Russian transit system and create a potential link 
with Europe and the West.419 Baku’s policy was strongly pro-Western for both political 
and economic reasons, and the former President Heydar Aliyev was absolutely 
determined to have an energy outlet to the West. Realizing that the oil volumes 
discovered in the state would not justify more than one pipeline, the Azerbaijani 
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government decided to develop the BTC, which was powerfully supported by the U.S. 
government. In addition to such geopolitical calculations, the revitalization of 
Azerbaijan’s economy through foreign investment from Western oil companies and the 
stabilization of its internal order (threatened by the post-Soviet transition as well as the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict) became urgent priorities for Azerbaijan.  
Certainly, the BTC pipeline allowed Azerbaijan to monetize its energy resources: 
SOCAR owns a 10 percent share of AIOC, a 20 percent share of the ACG upstream 
equity, and a 25 percent share of the BTC pipeline JV. The BTC pipeline also enabled the 
development of the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) (or the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum (BTE) 
gas pipeline) at reduced cost, with the massive gas discovery in the Shah Deniz field. In 
2004, BP estimated that Azerbaijan would receive more than $100 billion in revenue 
from operations of the ACG, BTC, Shah Deniz, and SCP projects. Azerbaijan created the 
State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ) to use its energy revenues, but also enjoyed job 
creation from the BTC and SCP pipeline projects.  
Turkey strongly supported the BTC pipeline project for geopolitical, security, and 
domestic political reasons. Turkey aimed to enhance its geopolitical influence over the 
region as it believed that Turkey, as NATO ally, could play a key role in granting 
Azerbaijan and Georgia the opportunities to orient themselves toward the Euro-Atlantic 
security frameworks. The BTC pipeline route provided an alternative to transporting 
large amounts of crude oil through the Bosporus, which was creating major security and 
environmental problems for Turkey. Each political party in Turkey also supported the 





The BTC pipeline addressed geopolitical and strategic concerns in Georgia as well. 
Georgia’s geographical proximity to the Black Sea, Caspian, and Central Asia regions 
has made this transit country an important player in terms of energy exports after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Since Georgia became the site of the first major open 
confrontation between Russia and the United States in the region with the Rose 
Revolution in 2003420, the United States and the European Union have considered 
Georgia to be one of the main building blocks in the formation of alternative energy 
export routes that bypass the territory of Russia. Therefore, the successful launch of the 
BTC oil pipeline and its parallel BTE gas pipeline enabled Georgia to emerge as a major 
transit country in the region. Georgia also viewed the BTC pipeline project as an 
opportunity for foreign investment as the country was trying to shake off its reputation 
for endemic corruption and a poor investment climate. Combined, the BTC and BTE 
projects represent one of the largest forms of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Georgia, 
which contributed to the country’s socioeconomic development. Georgia is also enjoying 
economic benefits of transit tariffs and employment benefits from the pipeline 
projects.421  
                                                        
420 The Rose Revolution was a change of power in Georgia in November 2003, which took place after 
widespread protests over the country’s disputed parliamentary elections. As a result, President Eduard 
Shevardnadze was forced to resign on November 23, 2003. The Rose Revolution marked the end of 
Shevardnadze's reign in Georgia, along with the end of a Soviet era of leadership. Consisting of twenty 
days of protests, it ended with new presidential and parliamentary elections and Shevardnadze stepping 
down from power. Many countries watched Georgia’s transition from an autocracy to a democracy, but the 
key international players were primarily Russia and the United States. Russia was suspected of being 
involved in Georgia’s affairs from the beginning. Georgia was previously under Soviet influence, became 
independent in the 1990s, but saw much disarray in the form of separatist groups, particularly those that 
were Russian-backed. The United States viewed the revolution as an opportunity to make a serious attempt 
at establishing   democracy not only in Georgia, but also in the region. The U.S. Agency for International 
Development was reported to have spent $1.5 million on modernizing Georgia’s voting system. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rose_Revolution  




Since the early 1990s, the U.S. government made continuous political and diplomatic 
efforts to promote the export of Azerbaijan’s hydrocarbons to international markets 
through an east-west corridor. Notwithstanding the modest volume of oil, Washington 
viewed the BTC pipeline transit route as tool to foster security and political ties with the 
Caspian states, as well as to begin to end dependence on Russian and Iranian oil 
transportation networks from the Caspian region. While the United States successfully 
excluded the Iranian route by supporting the BTC and other Caspian infrastructure 
projects, it did not seem to push hard to exclude Russia. As in the “early oil” debate 
during the early 1990s, the United States seemed to be satisfied with the two-track 
solution of dual pipeline strategy (one led by the U.S. and Western oil companies, and the 
other led by Russia) in exporting Caspian energy to international markets, as evidenced in 
the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC)422 to carry Kazakhstan’s oil in the Tengiz field 
to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk.  
However, the geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the West certainly played a key 
role in planning and developing the BTC oil project. Moscow refused to support the 
project and Lukoil and other Russian state-oil companies declined to join it, whereas U.S. 
oil companies participated in the Russian-driven CPC pipeline project. It is worth noting 
that despite Washington’s strong political support for the BTC project, most of the major 
investment in the project came from non-U.S.-based oil companies. U.S. oil companies 
initially opposed the U.S. government’s political involvement in the decision-making and 
negotiation process of the BTC pipeline project, but this political decision certainly 
                                                        
422 The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) is a consortium and a pipeline to transport Caspian oil from 
Tengiz field to the Novorossiysk terminal on Russia's Black Sea coast. It is also a major export route for oil 
from the Kashagan and Karachaganak fields. The CPC was established in 1992 with shareholders including 




contributed to the creation of commercially effective solutions, along with BP’s 










CASPIAN GAS TO EUROPE: 







This chapter examines the development of natural gas pipelines in the Southern Gas 
Corridor (SGC).423 As a chief component of the EU’s strategy in energy diversification, 
the SGC has been at the center of an intricate geostrategic game for many years. 
Geopolitical, geo-economic, and commercial interests intersect in the decision-making of 
the various pipeline proposals: Nabucco, South Stream, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline 
(TAP), the Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), and Turkish Stream. With the recent 
results of the pipeline competition from which TAP and TANAP were chosen, I 
investigate the region’s gas pipeline dynamics and political-economic interests of key and 
relevant actors. How states, the EU, and firms have defined their interests and how those 
interests diverge or converge are scrutinized through analysis of the four proposed 
pipelines.  
The case of the SGC pipeline project fits with the overall architecture of my dissertation 
in the following respects. First, I explained earlier that I chose four pipeline cases that 
show variations in terms of the relationship between economic and political incentives in 
order to explain the underlying mechanism of political and economic factors that lead 
states to agree binding cross-border pipeline deals. The SGC pipeline project is a case 
where the deals proceeded with a high-to-medium level of political alignment and 
economic incentives among host countries. The degree of political alignment (i.e., 
                                                        
423 The southern corridor refers to the area south of the Black Sea and into southern Europe. The term 
“Southern Gas Corridor” was mentioned in: “An EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan (Second 
Strategic Energy Review),”   Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and 





political trust) among host countries for the SGC pipeline project is not resolved, 
however, given that dynamics in the region are changing quickly due to the Ukraine crisis, 
resulting Western sanctions, low oil prices, Russia’s subsequent cancellation of the South 
Stream pipeline, and Moscow’s strategic moves toward the Turkish Stream pipeline, all 
of which happened after TAP and TANAP were chosen. The degree of political 
alignment among host countries seems to keep declining and is difficult to estimate 
because participating countries with different policy goals are taking diverging 
approaches to energy resources. Compared to the other three cases in my dissertation, 
however, the SGC pipeline project is a case where there are substantial political and 
economic incentives, rather than a case where political and economic incentives are 
inversely related. 
Second, the SGC pipeline project involves combined pipeline ownership between 
national oil companies (NOCs) and international oil companies (IOCs), with a joint 
venture (JV) consortium for the financing, construction, and operation of pipelines, as 
well as for the development of the upstream sector (where states receive natural gas via 
pipeline). The SGC pipeline project is also a case that shows why the Caspian multi-state 
export pipelines materialized more quickly than the Sino-Russian direct-link pipelines, 
even though the multi-state export pipelines involve more parties (including transit states 
without overarching jurisdiction) than direct-link pipelines.  
As mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 6, I explain the similarities and differences 
between the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the SGC gas pipeline 
development throughout Chapters 6 and 7 based on the logic for case selection described 




countries into the SGC’s binding gas pipeline deals: (1) the geopolitical rivalry between 
the European Union (EU) and Russia (i.e., the EU’s quest for natural gas supply 
diversification to reduce its dependence on Russia, which has disrupted supply in the past 
in its efforts to punish uncooperative countries and maintain its control over the European 
market); (2) the relatively high degree of political alignment among host countries; and 
(3) the NOC-IOC combined ownership structure of pipeline and upstream financing.  
Key players’ geopolitical and economic interests intersected in the decision-making 
regarding various pipeline proposals in the SGC project network (namely, Nabucco, TAP, 
TANAP, and South Stream). Similarities between BTC and SGC include the U.S. and 
EU efforts to link the Caspian region with Europe for supply diversification purposes and 
to secure transit routes away from Russia, as well as a pipeline and upstream sector 
ownership structure that is shared between IOCs and NOCs. To explain differences 
between BTC and SGC, this chapter focuses on the changing landscape of energy 
markets and geopolitics in the region. A complex set of commercial interests, political 
interests, and geopolitics in the Caspian region came into play among the key state and 
non-state actors, including the EU, Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and the oil companies 
participating in the Shah Deniz (SD) consortium and the TAP and TANAP joint ventures 
(e.g., British Petroleum (BP) and Azerbaijan’s national oil company, SOCAR).  
The SD consortium’s choice of TAP and TANAP over the Nabucco proposal for SGC, as 
well as Russia’s cancellation of South Stream pipeline and its strategic move toward the 
Turkish Stream pipeline in the midst of the Ukraine crisis, illustrates how regional power 
politics have changed in the last decade. Changes in the energy development policies of 




pragmatic relations with Russia in ways that did not concern them much in the 1990s—
explains why the SD consortium chose TAP and TANAP over the EU-backed Nabucco 
Pipeline. In particular, Azerbaijan’s national oil company SOCAR is playing a larger role 
in the SGC project than it played in the BTC project (it is the largest shareholder in the 
SGC’s TAP and TANAP pipeline JVs, while it held the second-largest share in the BTC 
pipeline JV, after British Petroleum). Turkey is also strategically moving toward 
developing new forms of bilateral energy partnerships with Russia, particularly with the 
emergence of energy policy fragmentation between Turkey and the EU. Chapter 7 
explains how different countries with different policy goals are taking diverging 
approaches to developing natural gas outlets from the Caspian region to Europe given the 
changing landscape of geopolitics and energy markets.  
BACKGROUND 
Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply Diversification in Europe 
Before I delve into the SGC development, it is worth discussing the particularities of 
natural gas as a traded good. Natural gas is gaining more significance worldwide as it is 
cleaner than other fossil fuels in terms of greenhouse gas emissions. However, natural gas 
displays a number of unique traits, which set its market apart from other energy markets 
such as oil. While oil is a global commodity, gas is a regional commodity with regional 
buyers and sellers exerting more influence. As natural gas is produced, transported, and 
traded through regional, fragmented markets, its pricing mechanism displays regional 
differentiation. Outside of North America, where deregulated hub pricing reigns, the 




prices. With its relatively low energy density, and hence its high cost of transportation 
and storage, natural gas until recently has lent itself to the business model of long-term 
contracts, destination clauses, and “captive” end-use consumers.424 Under long-term and 
oil-indexed contracts, the buyer takes the “market risk” and the seller takes the “price risk” 
through the price linkage to oil and the take-or-pay mechanism.425 This business model is 
well suited to Russia and Gazprom, where one-third of the EU’s natural gas originates.426 
Throughout the 1960s to the mid-2000s, the long-standing EU-Russian gas relationship 
that was rooted in standard long-term contracts was relatively stable. Especially when 
European gas demand growth seemed assured and oil prices were expected to remain 
robust, the risk incurred by both parties seemed low. Since the mid-2000s, however, the 
EU has become increasingly concerned about its rising dependence on Russian gas 
imports owing to Russia’s cutoffs of natural gas supplies to Europe. Many European 
countries have suffered several unexpected energy cutoffs due to confrontations between 
Russia and the key pipeline transit states of Ukraine and Belarus over natural gas supply 
and transit issues. Gazprom halted all natural gas supplies transiting Ukraine for three 
days in January 2006 and for nearly three weeks in 2009 after the two sides failed to 
reach agreement on several issues, including a debt allegedly owed by Ukrainian oil and 
gas company Naftohaz Ukrayiny to Gazprom and the price that Ukraine would pay for 
natural gas supplies. Given that about 80 percent of Europe’s natural gas imports from 
                                                        
424 James and Pirani Henderson, Simon, ed. The Russian Gas Matrix: How Markets Are Driving Change 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). Jonathan Stern, The Pricing of Internationally Traded Gas 
(Oxford University Press, 2012). Market risk is the risk that an investment will decrease due to moves in 
market factors. Price risk is the risk of a decline in the value of a security or a portfolio. 
425 Take-or-pay clauses specify a minimum, pre-set volume of gas per year that the buyer will pay for at the 
contract price, regardless of whether the volume is taken or not. 




Russia passed through Ukraine at that time427, the 2009 Russian-Ukraine gas dispute 
resulted in supply disruptions in many European nations, with eighteen European 
countries reporting major drops or complete cutoffs of their gas supplies transported 
through Ukraine from Russia.428 In 2010 and 2011, disputes between Russia and Belarus 
over a variety of issues, including energy prices, debt owed by Belarus, and transit fees 
paid by Russia for the use of Belarusian pipelines, led to temporary reductions of oil and 
natural gas supplies to Belarus and neighboring countries.429 These incidents of gas 
disputes demonstrate how Russia has openly exploited its energy strength to manipulate 
domestic and international policies in Belarus and Ukraine, thus enabling Russia to exert 
influence over certain European countries. As the current Ukraine crisis shows, moreover, 
the EU’s interdependent hydrocarbon relations with gas giant Russia have grown ever 
more tense since the mid-2000s, remaining paramount in almost all of the foreign policy 
dealings between Brussels and Moscow.430  
In response to past supply disruptions and the potential for future energy supply 
curtailments, European leaders, sometimes with the support of the United States, have 
sought to increase their energy security by exploring supply diversification options both 
                                                        
427 Prior to the opening of the Nord Stream pipeline, about 80% of Europe’s natural gas imports from 
Russia transited Ukraine pipelines. The Nord Stream, which transports natural gas from Russia to Germany 
via a pipeline under the Black Sea, has a planned capacity of almost 2 trillion cubic meters (tcf) per year, as 
compared to the Ukraine pipeline system’s 4.0-4.5 tcf per year. The first supplies from the Nord Stream 
were delivered in late November 2011 and the pipeline is operating at about 80% of its maximum capacity.  
428 "Factbox - 18 Countries Affected by Russia-Ukraine Gas Row," Reuters, Jan 7, 2009. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/01/07/uk-russia-ukraine-gas-factbox-
idUKTRE5062Q520090107?sp=true  
429 Paul Belkin, Jim Nichol, and Steven Woehrel, "Europe’s Energy Security: Options and Challenges to 
Natural Gas Supply Diversification," Congressional Research Service  (2013). 
430 Angel Saz-Carranza and Marie Vandendriessche, "Routes to Energy Security: The Geopolitics of Gas 
Pipelines between the EU and Its Southeastern Neighbors," in The New Politics of Strategic Resources: 
Energy and Food Security Challenges in the 21st Century, ed. David Steven, Emily O'Brien, and Bruce 




in terms of sources and transit routes. One such response has been the decision by some 
EU members to support alternative transit routes for Russian gas. Examples include the 
opening of the Nord Stream pipeline, which directly connects Russia and Germany, and 
Russia’s proposal of the South Stream pipeline, which would connect Russia, Bulgaria, 
and Hungary across the Black Sea, bypassing Ukraine. While the European Commission 
energy commissioner office maintained that projects such as the Nord Stream enhance 
European security by providing alternative routes for Russian supplies, a number of EU 
member states opposed Nord Stream, questioning Russia’s reliability as an energy 
supplier.431 In particular, the Russian-backed projects such as the South Stream are 
widely seen as rivals to other pipelines supported by the EU such as Nabucco and 
criticized for potentially giving Moscow additional political and economic leverage in 
Russia’s dealing with countries that the pipeline is going to bypass.432 The South Stream 
project, which Russia announced its intention to scrap during the Ukraine crisis, will be 
examined in detail later in this chapter.  
Another response to enhancing the EU’s energy security, in this respect, has been the 
Southern Corridor to transport natural gas from the Caspian region and Central Asia. The 
SGC is regarded as a key component of the EU’s strategy for supply diversification, 
given that the Caspian region holds the greatest potential for new natural gas supplies for 
Europe and that the EU’s reliance on Russian gas can be reduced. However, the delays in 
expanding and fully developing Southern Corridor natural gas pipelines to Europe, 
                                                        
431 Roger Boyes, “Gazprom is not a market player, it’s political weapon,” The Times, January 7, 2009.  
432 Michael Ratner, Paul Belkin, Jim Nichol, and Steven Woehrel, "Europe’s Energy Security: Options and 





including the Trans-Caspian Pipeline, have thus far led Central Asian countries to look 
east rather than west to bypass Russia and open new markets.433 Intricate geostrategic 
dynamics lie at the heart of the various pipeline proposals for the SGC, thus resulting in 
the replacement of Nabucco (or Nabucco West), which is no longer considered a 
commercially viable project, by the planned small-scale TAP and TANAP projects. On 
June 28, 2013, the Shah Deniz II consortium that controls the Azerbaijani natural gas 
chose the TAP projects instead of Nabucco to connect to TANAP.434  
Although natural gas is decreasing its share in the EU energy mix,435 it forms the 
centerpiece of a complex geopolitical competition to the union’s east.436 As Europe’s 
natural gas production has declined in recent years, its dependence on imported natural 
gas has increased.437 This has left it more dependent on its primary supplier, Russia, 
                                                        
433 Ibid.  
434 BP press release, http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/press/press-releases/shah-deniz-targets-italian-
and-southeastern-european-gas-markets.html. 
435 Gas consumption decreased both in absolute and relative terms against feeble economic performance, 
weak electricity demand and growing role of solid fuels and renewables in the power sector. The quantity 
of gas consumed went down by 11%, reaching 393 Mtoe in 2012 and the share of gas declined from 25.1% 
in 2010 to 23.4%. “EU Energy Markets in 2014,” European Commission.  
According to Eurostat, the EU-27’s energy mix in 2011 was split as follows: petroleum products and 
natural gas made up over half of the whole (providing 35 percent and 23 percent of needs, respectively), 
with solid fuels (17 percent), nuclear heat (14 percent), and renewables (10 percent) delivering the rest. In 
2011, the then 27 member states (Croatia became the 28th member of the EU on July 1, 2013) imported 
more than half of their energy (54 percent), with Russia and Norway as their main petroleum and gas 
suppliers. This dependence continues to rise steadily, especially for natural gas, where imports are 154 
percent greater that their 1995 levels. See European Commission’s Eurostat data for 2011, published in 
April 2013.  
436 Angel Saz-Carranza, and Marie Vandendriessche. "Routes to Energy Security: The Geopolitics of Gas 
Pipelines between the EU and Its Southeastern Neighbors." In The New Politics of Strategic Resources: 
Energy and Food Security Challenges in the 21st Century, edited by David Steven, Emily O'Brien and 
Bruce Jones (Washington, D.C.: the Brookings Institution, 2015). 
437 Europe and Eurasia together produce 31 percent of the world’s natural gas. However, the EU countries’ 
share in that percentage is low and decreasing. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom are the EU’s main 
indigenous producers: the latter, in particular, has seen its production drop over the last decade – from 




which has shown some inclination to use its resources for political ends.438 As natural 
gas comprised 23 percent of the EU’s primary energy consumption in 2011 and the EU 
gas production is declining, the EU import dependence is expected to grow to 71-73 
percent by 2030.439 Russia accounted for 32 percent of European natural gas imports in 
2012 and 39 percent in 2013440, surpassed only by Norway as the lead supplier441. In the 
face of rising concern about Europe’s reliance on Russian energy and growing public 
pressure to address global climate change, EU member states have begun to increase 
cooperation toward an “Energy Policy for Europe.”442 The European Commission 
adopted the Third Energy Package in 2009 to complete the integration and liberalization 
of the internal European energy market, promote the interconnection of electricity grids 
and natural gas pipelines, boost energy efficiency, and better coordinate external energy 
policies. Moreover, Europe is now stressing its desire to lessen its dependence on Russian 
energy supplies (European Commission, 2014), as a result of geopolitical tensions 
between Russia and the West arising from the Ukraine crisis.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and Vandendriessche, "Routes to Energy Security: The Geopolitics of Gas Pipelines between the EU and 
Its Southeastern Neighbors." 
438 The George W. Bush Administration sharply criticized Russia for using energy supplies as a means to 
gain political influence over other countries and urged European countries to diversify supply sources. See: 
Richard Cheney, "Vice President's Remarks at the 2006 Vilnius Conference," Reval Hotel Lietuva, Vilnius 
(2006). May 4, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov  
The Obama Administration has also called for diversification, but has refrained from openly expressing 
concerns about Russia’s energy policy in the region, perhaps in order to avoid jeopardizing relations with 
Moscow. See: Belkin, Nichol, and Woehrel, "Europe’s Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural 
Gas Supply Diversification." 
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Figure 6. Sources of EU Gas (2013) Figure 7. Share of Russian Gas in 
European Demand 
 
(Source: Eurogas)       (Source: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies) 
Many question how far EU member states will go to push Russia (and Gazprom) to adopt 
the EU’s principles of competition and open its energy sector to outside investment. 
Some analysts argue that an EU commitment to further liberalize Europe’s energy 
market—which includes changing to a gas pricing mechanism with a much higher share 
of spot indexation443, European anti-trust investigations against Gazprom occurring since 
September 2012, and third party access requirements for the North European (NEL) and 
the South Stream pipelines—could signal the beginning of a more unified approach 
                                                        
443 Given that the U.S. natural gas market is not priced against oil, the EU’s changing gas pricing 
mechanism (which is to increase share of spot indexation) may pose an opportunity to enhance the EU’s 
energy security with the prospect of significant U.S. LNG exports to Europe since the advent of shale gas 




toward Russia.444 Other observers contend that regardless of the aforementioned efforts, 
Russia will continue to exercise significant influence over Europe’s energy security. 
Indeed, several member states such as Germany and Italy, the largest importers of 
Russian natural gas, have pursued long-term bilateral energy deals with Russia, which 
will likely increase their dependence on Russia for years to come. Although they are not 
the major energy consumers, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Greece have also entered 
into long-term energy agreements with Russia.445  
Key Gas Infrastructure in Europe 
In 2011, Europe and Eurasia accounted for the trade of 469.7 bcm of the world’s 694.6 
bcm of international pipeline–supplied natural gas. In terms of infrastructure, two-thirds 
of the world’s cross-border natural gas pipelines operate in Europe. The EU already holds 
some €500 billion of sunk costs in natural gas infrastructure; the European Commission 
estimates some €70 billion more will be necessary in the period up to 2020.446 The EC 
published its strategy for long-term energy infrastructure in Europe in 2013, defining the 
following priorities for gas: first, diversify the continent’s gas infrastructure; second, 
expand the Southern Gas Corridor in order to import about 10 percent of European 
demand from the Caspian region and the Middle East; third, increase flexibility by 
developing more liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals and storage facilities; and finally, 
                                                        
444 Jonathan Stern, Simon Pirani, and Katja Yafimava, "Does the Cancellation of South Stream Signal a 
Fundamental Re-Orientation of Russian Gas Export Policy," Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (2015). 
445 Belkin, Nichol, and Woehrel, "Europe’s Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas 
Supply Diversification." 
446 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Guidelines for Trans-European Energy Infrastructure and Repealing Decision, No 1364/2006/EC. 




increase indigenous production from the eastern Mediterranean of biogas or other 
unconventional sources.  
Caspian Gas to Europe 
Supply diversification and secure transit routes are key ingredients for the EU’s quest for 
energy security. In order to seek alternative supplies of natural gas outside of Russia, as 
well as more secure supply routes that avoid unstable transit countries such as Ukraine, 
the EU has aimed to construct an energy corridor, the so-called Southern Gas Corridor 
(SGC). This corridor—a network of gas pipelines transporting natural gas from the 
Caspian, Central Asia, and even potentially the Middle East to Europe—has no pre-
established route. Over the last decade, a number of competing pipelines have been 
proposed to form the corridor: Nabucco, South Stream, TAP, and TANAP. The original 
Nabucco project, once heralded as the centerpiece for European energy diversification, 
has stalled and been replaced by the TAP project, which has significantly less capacity. 
The TAP project is currently in its implementation phase and is preparing for 
construction  beginning in 2016.447 Connecting with TANAP at the Greek-Turkish 
border, TAP will cross Greece, Albania, and the Adriatic Sea before coming ashore in 
southern Italy and connecting to the Italian natural gas network. A final investment 
decision for TANAP has not yet been made. 
The geopolitical competition over the SGC began with the original Nabucco project 
proposal in 2002, and its counter-proposal, Russia’s South Stream pipeline project, 
launched in 2007. After much speculation and fierce competition with other pipeline 
                                                        




projects, TANAP in particular, the Nabucco consortium submitted a new pipeline 
proposal called Nabucco West. Therefore, the competition essentially played out between 
two EU-sponsored pipelines – Nabucco West and TAP – and intensified with the addition 
of a Russian counterpart, South Stream. While the Shah Deniz Consortium chose the 
TAP over Nabucco West in June 2013, Moscow continued to push forward with its South 
Stream pipeline.448 Russia finalized arrangements with transit states for the construction 
of South Stream and began construction of the onshore portion in Russia in December 
2012. During Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Turkey on December 1, 2014, 
however, Russia scrapped the $40 billion South Stream pipeline project to Europe, in 
favor of another project, Turkish Stream, designed to ship gas exports to Turkey. While 
Russia was struggling to avoid recession amid plunging oil prices and lingering sanctions 
arising from the Ukraine crisis, Russia signed a preliminary deal with the Turkish 
company Botas Petroleum Pipeline to build Turkish Stream, a pipeline of the same size 
as the South Stream, under the Black Sea to Turkey.449  
 
SOUTHERN GAS CORRIDOR (SGC)  
Tracing the Competition 
                                                        
448 Although Russia has long been viewed as an opponent of Nabucco or any other project associated with 
the Southern Corridor strategy, it has not been as vocal in its opposition to smaller-scale projects such as 
TAP. Belkin, Nichol, and Woehrel, "Europe’s Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas 
Supply Diversification." 
449 Stephen Bierman, Ilya Arkhipov, and Elena Mazneva, "Putin Scraps South Stream Gas Pipeline after Eu 




In this section, I trace the competition over the SGC, beginning with the original Nabucco 
project through to the counter-proposal of South Stream and rival TANAP, and on to the 
final struggle between TAP and Nabucco West.   
Nabucco, the Original 
The vision of Nabucco, one of the first SGC proposals, was first translated into an 
infrastructure project in 2002, and comprised a five-company consortium including OMV 
of Austria, MOL Group of Hungary, Bulgaraz of Bulgaria, Transgaz of Romania, and 
BOTAS of Turkey. The project would invove a 3,800 kilometer–long pipeline with a 
capacity of 31 bcm per year, designed to carry natural gas extracted in Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, Iraq, Iran, and Egypt to southeast and central Europe via Turkey.450 In 
June 2005, the five Nabucco partners signed a joint venture agreement and later the 
consortium was extended to RWE AG, German electric utilities company, in 2008.451 
The intergovernmental agreement (IGA) between Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
and Austria was signed by five prime ministers in July 2009 in Ankara.452 All the 
participating countries ratified the agreement by March 2010.453 
 
 
                                                        
450 Natural gas flows from these producing countries would have reached the Turkish border as follows: via 
the South Caucasus Pipeline in the case of Azerbaijan; via Iran or the planned Trans-Caspian Pipeline in 
the case of Turkmenistan; via the planned extension of the Arab Gas Pipeline in the case of Iraq; via the 
Arab Gas Pipeline in the case of Egypt.  
451 Each partner held one-sixth of the venture.  
452 "Europe Gas Pipeline Deal Agreed," BBC News, July 13, 2009. 
453 Badalova A., "Rwe: Ratifying Nabucco Agreement by Turkey Gives Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan 




Map 7. The Nabucco Pipeline 
 
(Source: Wikipedia) 
The project immediately got unprecedented support from the EU, the United States, and 
Turkey. For the EU, it represented a major opportunity to diversify its natural gas away 
from Russia. In particular, southeast Europe is heavily dependent on Russian gas imports 
compared to other European countries. According to Simon Pirani, senior research fellow 
at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, the price for Russian gas varies in different 
European countries. For instance, eastern European countries pay more than $500 per 
trillion cubic meters, while the United Kingdom pays $300 and Germany $370 or 
more.454 For this reason, Nabucco not only got financial support from the EU455 but also 
became the flagship project of the SGC. The European Commission in 2008 launched an 
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initiative for transporting the natural gas supply from Caspian and Middle Eastern regions 
to Europe as a response to the energy security concerns that emerged in the EU after the 
first European gas crisis occurred between Russia and Ukraine in January 2006.456 
For the United States, the project represented an important geopolitical asset in reducing 
the EU’s natural gas dependency on Russia, exactly as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) 
pipeline served in the 1990s to reduce the EU’s oil dependency on Russia and Iran. 
Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy Richard Morningstar and Ranking Member of the 
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Senator Richard Lugar represented 
the United States at the signing of the intergovernmental agreement among the five states 
in 2009.457 The sheer length of the pipeline and its route – through Turkey, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Hungary, and Austria – would enable some EU states to have direct access to 
gas sources from the Caspian and beyond. In Erzurum, Turkey, Nabucco would connect 
to the South Caucasus Pipeline. For Turkey, the project offered an opportunity to realize 
its long-term strategic goal of becoming a key energy hub in the region.  
Despite the strong political commitment of the five transit countries and the political 
support of the EU and the United States, the Nabucco project ultimately failed mainly 
due to commercial and financial reasons: it was a very large scale pipeline project with a 
hugely uncertain demand outlook and faced a potential competitor in the South Stream 
pipeline. Moreover, the project promoters were mainly mid-size companies who had to 
rely on project finance and bank loans, and the banks demanded guarantees and long-
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term take or pay contracts that the market could not deliver.458 Another major element of 
uncertainty for the Nabucco project was that, with the exception of Azerbaijan, all the 
potential suppliers were facing major difficulties realizing their desire to ship natural gas 
to Europe via Turkey.459  
From the very beginning, obtaining firm commitments from suppliers in order to ensure 
diversified sourcing (one of the main goals in the project) was problematic.460 The 
Middle East proved unworkable as a source of gas through Nabucco. Northern Iraq’s gas 
fields were not yet ripe for the picking, due to uncertainty regarding their governance. In 
addition, accessing Iraq’s gas would require construction of an extra connector to hook 
up to existing pipelines heading toward Europe. Iran, bordering the Caspian, still had its 
resources locked away because of sanctions related to its nuclear program.461 Complex 
situations in Caspian countries other than Azerbaijan have prevented any true progress 
from transporting their resources northwest to Europe. While Turkmenistan holds largest 
reserves of natural gas in the region and is investing in a number of recently assessed 
fields such as the South Yolotan-Osman field, it already exports to Russia and China. 
China has been offering investment and loans for Turkmen gas field development and 
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pipeline construction. Plans for the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline have been discussed 
since the early 1990s, but they did not make any real progress due to political and legal 
disputes between the Caspian littoral states.462 In this sense, Azerbaijan seemed the most 
realistic source of supply, and both the European Commission and the United States 
pushed hard to secure Azeri gas supplies for Nabucco. However, the Nabucco consortium 
found it difficult to secure supplies because banks and customers were unwilling to 
commit to the project before supplies were guaranteed.463 At the same time, Azerbaijan 
refused to sign any delivery contract before being certain of the pipeline’s viability. 
Whereas Azeri gas was the only realistic source of supply to the Nabucco consortium, to 
Azerbaijan Nabucco was only one of several options to export its gas to Europe. 
South Stream 
While the Nabucco partners were developing detailed plans and attempting to secure 
diversified supply for the pipeline, Russia launched its own pipeline project, South 
Stream, in 2007. Although Russia said that it designed the South Stream pipeline to 
bypass troublesome transit states along its transport route, such as Ukraine or Belarus, it 
has been considered as a rival to Nabucco in order to thwart the EU’s attempts to 
diversify its gas imports away from Russian dominance.  
                                                        
462 As of 2000, negotiations related to the demarcation of the Caspian Sea had been going on for nearly a 
decade among the states bordering the Caspian – Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran. 
The status of the Caspian Sea is the key problem. Access to mineral resources (oil and natural gas), access 
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The plan for the pipeline was for it to run under the Black Sea and connect Russia with 
Bulgaria, and then for the onshore section to travel over land from Bulgaria to Serbia, 
Hungary, and Slovenia, finally connecting with Italy. Starting with the signing of an 
agreement between Gazprom and the Italian energy company Eni on establishing a joint 
project company for the commissioning of the marketing and technical feasibility studies 
of the project in November 2007464, Russia signed agreements with all European transit 
countries, committing them to South Stream from 2008 to 2010. Russian officials 
estimated the first line of South Stream, a span of 2,380 kilometers, would be operational 
by 2015 and have a capacity of 63 bcm per year by 2018, which would account for 
around 12 percent of Europe’s gas consumption.465 The joint venture South Stream AG, 
equally owned by Gazprom and Eni, was registered in 2008 for the pipeline’s onshore 
section.466 A new project company, South Stream Transport AG, was established for the 
offshore Black Sea section of the pipeline in 2011, with shareholders comprising 
Gazprom (50 percent), Eni (20 percent, Italy), Électricité de France (EdF) (15 percent, 
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France), and Wintershall (15 percent, Germany).467 The total cost for pipeline 
construction was estimated as €16 billion.  
Map 8. The South Stream Pipeline 
 
(Source: Gazprom) 
Construction of the Russian onshore facilities for the pipeline started in Bulgaria in 
October 2013. However, the project was dropped by the Russian side in December 
2014—following numerous obstacles caused by Bulgaria and the EU, the 2014 Crimean 
crisis, and the imposition of European sanctions on Russia.468 On April 17, 2014, amid 
the Russian conflict in Ukraine, the European Parliament adopted a non-binding 
resolution opposing the South Stream gas pipeline and recommended a search for 
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alternative sources of gas supplies for the European Union.469 According to the 
Parliament, the pipeline does not comply with the EU legislation under the Third Energy 
Package, which stipulates the separation of companies' generation and sale operations 
from their transmission networks.470 In June 2014, Bulgaria suspended construction of 
the pipeline due to the European Commission's infringement procedure against Bulgaria 
for non-compliance with European rules on energy competition public procurements.471 
On December 1, 2014, during a state visit to Turkey, President Putin announced that 
Russia was withdrawing from the project, blaming Western sanctions and lack of 
construction permits in the territory of the European Union.472 Russia instead announced 
it intends to build a pipeline through Turkey known as Turkish Stream, although 
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The Southern Gas Corridor beyond Nabucco: Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and 
Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) 
Map 9. The Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) Pipeline Project 
 
(Source: BP) 
Azerbaijan completely reshaped the South Gas Corridor game in 2011 by rapidly 
conceptualizing its own infrastructure project to carry future natural gas flows from Shah 
Deniz Phase II to Turkey: the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP). The TANAP project 




in Istanbul474, and Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a memorandum of understanding 
establishing a consortium to build and operate the pipeline in December 2011. On June 
26, 2012, President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and then Prime Minister of Turkey Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan signed a binding intergovernmental agreement on the pipeline.475  
Under the agreement, SOCAR (Azerbaijan’s state oil company) initially held 80 percent 
of TANAP’s share as well as operating rights, whereas Turkey’s state pipeline company 
BOTAŞ held 15 percent and Turkish Petroleum held five percent. However, Baku later 
invited BP, Norway’s Statoil, and Total of France – the shareholders of the Shah Deniz 
gas production consortium – to acquire minority stakes in TANAP.476 Only BP exercised 
this option in 2013,477 and TANAP will be operated by SOCAR, which currently holds a 
58 percent stake in the project, BOTAŞ (30 percent), and BP (12 percent).478 
Approximately 2,000 kilometers in length, TANAP is planned to run from the Georgia-
Turkey border to the Turkey-Greece border (although the exact route of the pipeline is 
not yet determined) and is expected to be completed in 2018.479 The initial capacity of 
TANAP is expected to be 16 bcm gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz II field in the 
Caspian Sea, of which 6 bcm of gas will be delivered annually to Turkey (by 2018) and 
10 bcm to Europe (by 2019). The pipeline is expected to cost $10 to $11 billion and will 
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receive its gas from the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), a pipeline already carrying gas 
from the Azerbaijani Shah Deniz field to Turkey, which will be expanded in order to 
accommodate the new volumes of gas coming from Shah Deniz Phase II and going to 
TANAP. 
As the Turkish and Azeri governments committed their support to TANAP, the Nabucco 
project started to unravel. TANAP took over the first two-thirds of Nabucco’s planned 
route, as well as its direct feed-in from the Shah Deniz field.480 The entrance of TANAP 
into the Southern Gas Corridor race in December 2011 gave the “coup de grace” to the 
already moribund Nabucco project by replacing Nabucco on Turkey’s territory up to the 
EU border.481 For this reason, the Nabucco consortium tried to reinvent itself in 2012, by 
proposing a new and smaller version of the project: Nabucco West. This pipeline was 
designed to carry 10 bcm gas per year to Europe—from the Turkish-European border 
(from TANAP’s end at Turkey) to Austria via Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary, with a 
distance of 1,300 kilometers.482 As a continuation pipeline from TANAP into central 
Europe, Nabucco West inherits the “old” Nabucco’s legal framework on EU territory.483  
Initially, SOCAR had received final proposals for pipelines to export natural gas from the 
second phase development of the Shah Deniz offshore fields. By October 2011, proposals 
were received from consortia backing the Nabucco, the Interconnector Turkey–Greece–
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Italy (ITGI)484, and TAP, as well as from BP, which proposed the South East Europe 
Pipeline (SEEP) from western Turkey through Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary to 
Austria. As the Azerbaijani and Turkish governments signed a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) to construct TANAP in December 2011, however, the Nabucco 
consortium submitted new pipeline proposals to the Shah Deniz consortium, including 
the original route as well as the short Nabucco West route in May 2012. The Shah Deniz 
Export Negotiating Team indicated in February 2012 that it preferred the TAP proposal 
over the ITGI proposal. In mid-2012, it rejected SEEP, leaving TAP and Nabucco West 
as the final remaining choices.485 In June 2013, the Shah Deniz consortium announced 
that it had chosen TAP over Nabucco West to provide a missing link between TANAP 
and the European market.486  
TAP is planned to run 870 kilometers across Greece, Albania, and on the seabed of the 
Adriatic Sea, terminating in southern Italy. As the SGC’s segment on EU territory, TAP 
will connect with TANAP at the Turkey-Greece border. TAP is designed to carry 10 bcm 
annually of TANAP natural gas to Europe from the Turkey-Greece border.487 TAP’s 
shareholding is comprised of BP (20%), SOCAR (20%), Norway’s Statoil (20%), 
Belgium’s Fluxys (16%), France’s Total (10%), German’s E.ON (9%), and Switzerland’s 
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Axpo (5%). TAP plans to commence pipeline operations in 2020, in time for first gas 
exports from Shah Deniz II.488 
The TAP project was envisioned in 2003 by the Swiss energy company EGL Group. The 
feasibility study was conducted in March 2006, investigating two options – a northern 
and a southern route. The southern route through Greece and Albania was considered to 
be more feasible. Trans Adriatic Pipeline AG, a joint venture for the pipeline, was 
registered in 2007 by the EGL Group and the Norwegian energy company Statoil.489 
Since then, Statoil has been the driving force for the TAP project.490 In September 2012, 
Albania, Greece, and Italy confirmed their political support for the pipeline by signing a 
memorandum of understanding.491 In February 2013, the countries signed an 
intergovernmental agreement.492 The TAP consortium approved the Resolution to 
Construct on December 17, 2013, the same day when the Shah Deniz consortium 
approved its final investment decision.493 
The decision of the Shah Deniz consortium to choose TAP makes it possible for pipeline 
construction to proceed along the 3,500-kilometer Southern Gas Corridor, from 
Azerbaijan to European Union territory in Italy. The cumulative investments are 
estimated at $25 billion in the offshore gas projects and $20 billion in the construction of 
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transit pipelines. This is one of the largest energy projects in the global energy business in 
terms of investment costs, technical complexity, territory covered, and multinational 
participation. Three pipeline projects – the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) expansion494, 
TAP, and TANAP – along the route from Shah Deniz and Baku to Italy, comprise the 
Southern Gas Corridor (See the SGC map above). 
The Current Shape of the Southern Gas Corridor: Why TANAP and TAP were chosen  
TANAP and Azerbaijan  
In this section, I outline a set of reasons to explain both how TANAP completely killed 
the original Nabucco project and why TAP was chosen over Nabucco West.  
Azerbaijan completely reshaped the SGC game in 2011 by conceptualizing its own 
infrastructure project (TANAP) to transport its future natural gas flows from Shah Deniz 
Phase II to Turkey. One of the chief reasons for TANAP’s victory over Nabucco was its 
ownership structure. Azerbaijan and its state oil company SOCAR initiated the TANAP 
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project and, as the largest shareholder, will undertake most of the cost. The eastern 
section of the original Nabucco design would have been predominantly owned by 
international companies from downstream and consuming countries. Moreover, the 
Nabucco project promoters were mid-size companies that have to rely on project finance 
and bank loans. TANAP, on the other hand, was not born as a multilateral project, but 
rather as a producer-driven bilateral project between Azerbaijan and Turkey.495 Although 
BP later joined the pipeline consortium (with a 12 percent share), the initial composition 
of the ownership was not based on symmetric bilateral relations, but rather unbalanced in 
favor of Azerbaijan. SOCAR was initially expected to hold an 80 percent stake in the 
project, leaving only the remaining 20 percent to the Turkish partners. Notwithstanding 
the recent changes to a more balanced ownership structure for the pipeline (entailing a 
share of 58 percent for SOCAR, 25 percent for BOTAŞ, 5 percent for TPAO, and 12 
percent for BP), SOCAR still retains a controlling share of TANAP and will operate the 
line in the future.496 TANAP is crucially important for SOCAR, as it will have a key role 
in the delivery of gas from its Shah Deniz field further down the supply chain to Europe, 
rather than selling the gas at Azerbaijan’s border (which would have been the case with 
Nabucco).497 It seems plausible that Azerbaijan prefers TANAP to Nabucco’s eastern 
tract given that TANAP enables the pipeline owners to control both intake and offtake of 
the gas flows and to ensure that contractual commitments are met. Moreover, Azerbaijan 
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is able to ensure the financing of the infrastructure directly, which is totally different 
from Nabucco’s case where the shareholder companies would have relied on project 
finance and bank loans. Given that Azerbaijan accumulated considerable oil revenues 
from the exports through the BTC pipeline, the cost of TANAP, estimated at 
approximately $10 to $11 billion, is an amount that Azerbaijan can easily finance by 
making use of its sovereign wealth fund, the State Oil Fund, which currently contains 
about $34 billion in assets under management.498 
In sum, Azerbaijan and SOCAR strategically planned the TANAP project in order to 
provide a bridge through Turkey. The Shah Deniz Consortium partners were unable or 
unwilling to build a dedicated pipeline across Turkey for Shah Deniz gas and, beyond 
Shah Deniz, other Caspian gas.499 The consortium partners were unable or unwilling to 
finance the pipeline because there was simply never going to be enough gas at that time 
to provide 31 bcm, as Nabucco planned, to Europe. Retaining a controlling stake has 
enabled SOCAR to finance the TANAP project, which effectively replaced the Turkish 
section of the original Nabucco project. The Nabucco West pipeline project that came to 
surface after TANAP killed the original Nabucco was only one third of the length of the 
original project. 
Why TAP and Not Nabucco?—The Shah Deniz Consortium’s Perspective 
The Shah Deniz consortium selected the TAP project to provide a missing link between 
TANAP and the European market. Why was TAP chosen over Nabucco West? From the 
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consortium’s point of view, TAP is more economically viable than Nabucco West in 
terms of cost and supply-demand structure. BP-Azerbaijan executive vice president Al 
Cook, who is responsible for developing the Shah Deniz Phase II field, described TAP as 
significantly more efficient than Nabucco West from a gas price and tariff point of view. 
Moreover, uncertainty over the volume of gas supplies from the Caspian region 
exacerbated doubts over Nabucco West’s viability. Other than the Azerbaijan’s Shah 
Deniz fields, no alternative source of gas was available for Nabucco West in the short- 
and medium-term. A fundamental drawback of the Nabucco project (both the original 
and the revised version) was that its joint venture consortium does not include any single 
supplier country, while TANAP was founded and owned by members of the Shah Deniz 
consortium, which will provide the initial gas supplies. Although disconnected second-
order suppliers – such as Turkmenistan, Iran, and Iraq – favored Nabucco due to its larger 
capacity in the Balkans and southeast Europe, these countries had little influence on the 
decision. The European Commission did not seem to understand that any pipeline project 
to bring natural gas to Europe needs to include gas suppliers. The idea that a pipeline 
owned solely by buyers of gas could be bankable was unrealistic from the start.500 In 
contrast, the three largest TAP stakeholders are all gas producers (SOCAR, BP, and 




                                                        





Why TAP and Not Nabucco?—Azerbaijan’s Perspective 
As a gas exporter, Azerbaijan preferred TAP over Nabucco because it allowed buyers to 
locate as close as possible to the production side in the Caspian Sea to limit transportation 
costs.501 From a commercial point of view, Azerbaijan refused to sign any delivery 
contract with the Nabucco consortium before being certain of the pipeline’s viability, 
while banks and customers were unwilling to commit to the project before supplies were 
guaranteed.502 From a geopolitical and strategic point of view, Azerbaijan desired to 
avoid any direct competition with Gazprom, and thus was trying to find limited market 
niches in as many countries as possible to have a diversity of buyers for Azerbaijani gas, 
given the limited volume of available gas from the Shah Deniz project.503  
The Azerbaijan government under the leadership of President Ilhan Aliyev has developed 
a strategic vision for oil- and gas-related projects. Admitting that oil production in 
Azerbaijan will be declining significantly starting in 2015-2016504, the current 
government has been working on strategies for investment in non-oil sectors such as 
natural gas. Moreover, given that the country’s gas revenues are much lower than its oil 
revenues, Azerbaijan has developed a strategic long-term view to be not only an exporter 
of gas but also a transit country for major volumes of gas.505 This partially explains 
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Azerbaijan’s purchase of two thirds of the Greek Natural Gas System Operator (DESFA). 
With its purchase of DESFA, SOCAR will, for the first time, be able to enter the 
European downstream gas business, by connecting TAP with DESFA’s network in 
Greece.506 The acquisition of DESFA will provide Azerbaijani gas access to the Greece-
Bulgaria Gas Interconnector (IGB), the domestic LNG terminal in Revythousa, Greece, 
and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP).507 SOCAR will also be able to obtain a minority 
stake in IGB, as DESFA itself used to be a 50 percent partner with Italian Edison in that 
interconnector on Greek territory. The interconnector opens the way for Azerbaijan to 
export 1.5 bcm of gas per year to Bulgaria. 
Why TAP and Not Nabucco? – The Russian Factor 
While Nabucco West competed directly with South Stream in terms of transit routes, 
TAP has been considered less of a competitor. Nabucco’s transit route would run toward 
central and east European (CEE) countries that are strongly dependent on Russian gas 
supplies. Austria depends on Russia gas for 52 percent of its national energy needs, 
Hungary for almost 50 percent, Romania for 24 percent, and Bulgaria for 100 percent. 
Russia has been able to use its dominant role in the energy sectors of the central 
European countries to expert influence over domestic politics and business. If Nabucco 
were selected instead of TAP, it could help reduce Russian influence on the CEE region’s 
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energy markets, as Nabucco was planned to help gas supply diversification in the areas 
that are heavily dependent on Russia. In this respect, it seems reasonable to speculate that 
both Azerbaijan and Turkey opted for TAP to avoid direct confrontation with Russia.  
The selection of TAP over Nabucco West was not only a commercial decision, but also a 
political one, as Russia put Azerbaijan under immense pressure to withdraw from 
Nabucco in order to allow its competitor South Stream pipeline to be built. Some 
observers speculate that Russia may have attempted to influence Azerbaijan and the Shah 
Deniz consortium’s selection of TAP over the competing Nabucco West (although Russia 
would likely have preferred neither project to be built).508 From Russia’s perspective, 
TAP was less of a rival than Nabucco because Azerbaijani gas will be pumped by TAP to 
Greece, Albania, and Italy, and onto western and northern Europe from Italy, whose 
markets are already diversified from Russian gas owing to alternative supplies from 
Algeria, Norway, Egypt, and Qatar.  
The Russian Factor on Azerbaijan 
From Azerbaijan’s perspective, there were not only commercial and financial difficulties 
with the proposed Nabucco pipeline, but also a clear lack of strategic focus and political 
leadership in both Washington and Brussels.509 While the European Commission 
endorsed Nabucco over rival projects including TAP in previous years, the EC and 
                                                        
508 Belkin, Nichol, and Woehrel, "Europe’s Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas 
Supply Diversification." 
509 "Azerbaijan and the Southern Gas Corridor to Europe: Implications for U.S. And European Energy 




United States changed their positions to balance between Nabucco West and TAP.510 
Both kept expressing equal support for Nabucco West and TAP since the 2010s, which 
was not what Baku expected.511 This neutrality drove Azerbaijan to be more cautious in 
dealing with EU-supported energy infrastructure projects. Meanwhile, as the likelihood 
of abandoning the southern branch of the South Stream pipeline became possible with 
Gazprom’s removal of its bid for Greece’s state-owned natural gas supplier DEPA in 
June 2013, Azerbaijan learned that Gazprom would not interfere in the gas markets of the 
TAP project if the Greece-Italy route was selected instead of Nabucco West.512 There 
was speculation that Moscow’s decision to pull out from the bidding for DEPA could 
have been the result of geopolitical pressure from the EU and United States, as Gazprom 
had made a preliminary bid of €900 million ($1.17 billion) for the acquisition of 
DEPA.513 By insisting that the market liberalization directives of its Third Energy 
Package would be applied, however, the European Commission blocked Gazprom from 
controlling a monopoly in the operation of Greece’s national gas grid. Thanks to 
Gazprom’s dropping out, Azerbaijan was able to avoid direct competition with Russia, 
but also to achieve its goal of diversifying gas customers through the TAP, a goal which 
Azerbaijan had initially desired through the Nabucco project. After Gazprom withdrew, 
Azerbaijan’s SOCAR stepped in to acquire Greece’s natural gas distributor DESFA, 
which will connect TAP to the Balkan market.  
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The Russian Factor on Turkey 
While Turkey’s preference among competing gas pipeline projects to build the Southern 
Gas Corridor remained unclear, Turkey (like Azerbaijan) did not want to take the risk of 
opposing Russia. Turkey’s strategy is to support multiple pipeline options simultaneously, 
rather than fully committing to a single project. Besides its share in the Nabucco pipeline 
consortium, Turkey also supported TANAP with Azerbaijan granting a permit in 2011 
for the construction of South Stream via Turkey’s exclusive economic zone. Such a 
strategy seems to be clear in what Turkey’s Minister of Energy and Natural Resources 
Taner Yildiz said, “Turkey has seen it can develop an energy project with one of its 
neighbors without disturbing the others.”514 While Turkey has often been a U.S. ally, 
such as in the case of the Syrian crisis, Russia is not only Turkey’s main energy supplier, 
but also a partner for its first nuclear power plant. Turkey currently imports more than 
half of its natural gas (about 55 to 60 percent) and around 30 percent of its coal from 
Russia. The Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR)’s 2010-2014 
Strategic Plan recommended that by 2015, Turkey should not depend on any country’s 
gas imports for more than 50 percent of its energy requirements. Turkey has concluded 
contracts with other energy producers such as Iran, Azerbaijan, and Algeria in order to 
reduce its gas dependence on Moscow. Notwithstanding such attempts, however, Turkey 
has not been able to curb natural gas deliveries from Russia.515 Moreover, the Nabucco 
project experience certainly left a negative legacy in Turkey as far as the energy 
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cooperation with the EU is concerned. After years of cooperation with the EU on 
Nabucco, in 2011 Turkey rapidly decided to change its approach and turned to 
Azerbaijan to speed up the development of the SGC. This choice reflected the fact that 
Turkey’s primary aim is to realize its own energy security, but also reflected Turkey’s 
genuine discontent towards the EU due to its continuous procrastination on the country’s 
accession negotiations in general and to the EU’s vagueness about the opening of the 
accession process of energy chapter in particular.516 After Russia cancelled the South 
Stream project in December 2014, Turkey agreed to buy an additional 3 billion cubic 
meters of natural gas from Russia, and started negotiating on the construction of a new 
pipeline transiting Turkey – the so-called Turkish Stream pipeline project. In April 2015, 
Turkey’s energy minister Taner Yıldız said Turkey no longer demands the European 
Union to open the energy chapter.517  
The 2014 Ukraine Crisis and the Geopolitical Rivalry between Russia and the EU 
The South Stream pipeline was Putin’s most important European project, a critical 
economic and geopolitical tool for achieving twin goals: keeping Europe hooked on 
Russian gas, and further entrenching Russian influence in fragile former Soviet satellite 
states as part of a broader effort to undermine European unity.518 Although Russia said 
that South Stream was designed to eliminate its transit dependence on Ukraine, it has 
been mostly considered as means to prevent the Nabucco pipeline from progressing and 
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partially as a strategy to exert political pressure on Ukraine by using gas supplies and 
prices.519  
EU’s Third Party Access Exemption before and after the Ukraine Crisis 
Ever since the EU’s Third Energy Package (TEP) came into force in March 2011, 
Russian gas exports to EU countries have started to encounter major problems in terms of 
compliance with the changing regulatory environment, with respect to both existing and 
new pipeline capacity. One of the TEP’s core provisions prohibits a single company from 
both owning and operating a gas pipeline (i.e., unbundling) and contains rules on third-
party access that prohibit a single company from owning more than 50 percent of assets 
in the upstream, midstream, and downstream projects, unless an exemption under the 
TEP rules is granted by an National Regulatory Authority (NRA) and approved by the 
European Commission.  
In September 2011, TAP requested a “Third Party Access exemption” from the European 
Commission, which proposed that the pipeline would only be used by Azerbaijan and not 
by other suppliers, in spite of the EU Third Energy Package rules. The EC approved the 
exemption in May 2013, which means that TAP can offer capacity for the export of gas 
volumes from Azerbaijan to Europe for a period of 25 years.520 On the other hand, 
Nabucco West acquired a partial (50%) exemption from the European Commission, 
which the original Nabucco project was granted in 2008-2009.521522 Namely, Nabucco 
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West is a project completely under EU law and the pipeline was to be regulated by rules 
such as third-party access and unbundling throughout its entire length. The 
intergovernmental agreement on Nabucco signed by the five transit countries in 2009 
provided a legal framework for 50 years, confirming that 50 percent of the pipeline’s 
capacity was to be reserved for the shareholders of the project and the remaining 50 
percent was to be offered to third-party shippers on the basis of a regulatory transit 
regime under the EU law.523 The situation of TANAP is clearly different. Given that 
Turkey has not yet adopted the EU energy acquis on its legislation, Azerbaijan, with a 58 
percent stake in the project, will practically have the ownership and operatorship of the 
pipeline. Considering Turkey’s reluctance to enter the Energy Community524 and the 
difficulties related to the opening of the energy chapter of Turkey’s EU accession process, 
this situation will be unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.525 
Gazprom did not apply to the European Commission for the third-party access exemption 
for South Stream, given its negative experience with the OPAL pipeline – the onshore 
extension of the Nord Stream pipeline. In that case, Gazprom and the European 
Commission negotiated over the third-party access exemption of OPAL, and the 
Commission was expected to approve the exemption by March 2014. However, with the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
522 A difference between TAP and Nabucco West appears to be that Nabucco West would offer third party 
access to other suppliers who could book capacities when the ‘open season’ would begin.  
523 Christian Dolezal, "Nabucco: Delivering Diversification to the European Gas Market," Natural Gas 
Europe, May 23, 2013. 
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its Energy Union package of proposals designed to continue developing the bloc’s energy market and 
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worsening of the EU-Russia relationship over Ukraine, the EC repeatedly postponed the 
decision and terminated its OPAL exemption review procedure in December 2014.526  
Before the Ukraine crisis, Russia appeared to believe that a legal and regulatory 
compromise between the EC and the Russian government was possible.527 In fact, the 
TEP’s argument that a set of intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) Russia signed with 
host countries for the construction of South Stream are in breach of the TEP regulations 
is somewhat flawed; the TEP in its current form does not contain any rules for 
construction and utilization of new pipeline capacity, and only has rules for existing 
pipeline capacity.528 However, following the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea, relations between the EU and Russia have worsened and all natural gas projects 
have been frozen.529 After Crimea was annexed by the Russian Federation on March 18, 
2014, the European Parliament adopted a non-binding resolution opposing South Stream 
on April 17, 2014. The EU demanded Bulgaria suspend construction work on Russia's 
South Stream natural-gas pipeline project and started infringement procedures against 
Bulgaria in June, 2014, which led to suspension of pipeline construction in Bulgaria in 
August 2014.530  
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Relations between Russia and the EU have been badly hit by the crisis in Ukraine. The 
EU and the United States have imposed sanctions on a number of Russian individuals and 
companies following Russia's intervention in Ukraine, but Gazprom has not been 
targeted.531 Putin seems to have underestimated the West’s response to his aggression in 
Ukraine; for instance, Russia has filed a lawsuit with the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) over the EU’s TEP after the EU’s adoption of a non-binding resolution opposing 
South Stream. Faced with punishing sanctions from the West, however, Russia’s petro 
economy was pushed to the brink by plunging oil prices and currency values.532  
The story of South Stream shows how Putin has operated in Europe and will probably 
continue to do so, as well as how geopolitical concerns can limit his ability to use his 
energy leverage as a foreign policy tool. For instance, Bulgarian leaders initially 
supported South Stream, declaring that the pipeline would provide not just transit fees but 
also energy security. Russia has been directly involved with powerful politicians and 
businessmen in Bulgaria and had much control over the country: Bulgaria receives 90 
percent of its gas from Russia, along a route through Ukraine that has been left vulnerable 
to periodic pricing disputes between Moscow and Kiev. Pipeline contracts for the 
construction of the Bulgarian section of South Stream were given to a company 
controlled by a member of Putin’s inner circle and politically connected Bulgarian 
companies. The Bulgarian elections that led to a transition from the previous center-right 
                                                        
531 Gazprom supplies 30% of Europe's gas and some 15% of it via Ukraine. 
532 Oil has long been the Russian government’s main export earner, but its value has halved since June 
2014 after the country was thrown into a recession following fighting in Ukraine. In December, the ruble 
had its steepest drop in a single day since the 1998 Russian financial crisis, plummeting more than 11 
percent versus the dollar. Financial experts wondered if the country was headed for another currency 
collapse similar to the one 16 years ago that saw Russians’ wages dip to their lowest level since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Alexander Winning and Valdimir Abramov, "Russian Ruble Suffers Steepest 




government under Boyko Borisow to the socialist-led government under Plamen 
Oresharski worked to Putin’s advantage.533 Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller promised to 
finance the €3.1 billion construction of the Bulgarian leg of the pipeline. Soon after 
Russia annexed Crimea, Bulgaria’s parliament gave initial passage to a bill that 
effectively exempted South Stream from a number of EU regulations that would have 
forced Gazprom to allow non-Russian gas to flow through the pipeline. In early June, 
2014, the EC told Bulgaria to stop work on South Stream, saying that it was investigating 
whether the pipeline construction violated the TEP rules. When the Bulgarian 
government refused, the EU cut off tens of millions of euros in regional development 
funds to the country. In desperate need of the European funds, the Bulgarian prime 
minister announced the next day that South Stream would be halted until it had full 
European Union approval.534  
Geopolitical Rivalry after the Ukraine Crisis: Turkish Stream? 
The South Stream pipeline project failed due to the geopolitical rivalry between Russia 
and the West that was exacerbated with Russia’s annexation of Crimea. However, Russia 
does not seem willing to end this geopolitical game and is now focusing its energy 
resources into other directions by proposing to build the Turkish Stream pipeline.  
When South Stream was proposed by Russia in 2007, it seemed to have been designed to 
discourage the Nabucco project. However, as time goes by, South Stream’s objective 
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seems to have evolved to enlist transit countries, such as Bulgaria, to undermine the EU’s 
legislation, because Gazprom desires to extend co-ownership of the pipeline into 
countries on EU territory, contrary to the specifications of the Third Energy Package. 
Gazprom wants to pursue this strategy in order to create a precedent in the South Stream 
transit countries and then use it to protect Gazprom’s existing holdings in Germany and 
the Baltic states.535 Moscow fears that it is gradually losing its ability to set gas prices 
using oil indexation and monopoly pressures. In this sense, Russia fought hard to block 
the EU-led Southern Gas Corridor and to maintain its European market, whether through 
plans to build a competing gas pipeline, disinformation campaigns, or attempts to 
purchase the Greek natural gas distributor DEPA. However, the EU successfully put 
pressure on Bulgaria – where South Stream would first enter the EU after crossing the 
Black Sea – to block South Stream, preventing Gazprom from controlling a monopoly in 
the operation of Greece’s national gas grid. 
When Putin surprised the world in December 2014 by announcing Russia would abandon 
its South Stream project and named Turkey as its preferred partner to build an alternative 
pipeline, the so-called Turkish Stream, many in the West thought it might be merely a 
bluff to make the EU reconsider its opposition to South Stream. As I mentioned in 
Chapter 5, the cancellation of South Stream and the proposal of Turkish Stream tend to 
show Russia’s routinized patterns of strategic behavior in dealing with geopolitical 
turmoil. In these cases, Russia appears to send political messages to the rest of the world 
that it always has other options during a crisis. Regardless of whether the Turkish Stream 
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proposal is just a bluff or a face-saving measure, Russia had to admit that the realization 
of South Stream was impossible given current geopolitical and financial realities.  
First, the EU’s opposition to South Stream stiffened after Russia’s intervention in 
Ukraine, which created great difficulty for the two sides to discuss a compromise solution 
in terms of the EU’s Third Energy Package. Second, subsequent Western sanctions 
arising from Russia’s annexation of Crimea created financial uncertainties for the South 
Stream project as companies involved in it, such as Stroytransgaz and Gazprombank, 
have been targeted. Third, Russia had to recognize that the South Stream project was no 
longer affordable due to the economic problems not only stemming from sanctions but 
also from falling oil prices and the plummeting ruble. Building a new pipeline estimated 
to cost as much as $40 billion to deliver gas mainly to small European countries such as 
Hungary and Serbia made little sense to Russia.  
Turkish Stream is a proposed pipeline that would run under the Black Sea to the Turkey-
Greece border with a capacity of 63 bcm of natural gas per year. Before discussing the 
Turkish Stream project in detail, it is first worth noting the timing of the decision to 
substitute South Stream with Turkish Stream. By the time that South Stream was 
scrapped, Gazprom had already spent $4.7 billion on the Black Sea project. The pipe for 
the first offshore line was already on the dock of Varna, the largest city on the Bulgarian 
Black Sea coast, and the barges for laying the first two lines had been chartered.536 But 
since the construction of the offshore section had not yet started, Russia could recoup 
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much of the capital it had already spent if pipelines to Turkey could be substituted for 
South Stream.537 Given the estimate that Turkish Stream would cost Gazprom about $10 
billion, a route to Turkey seems to make more economic sense than the $40 billion South 
Stream project, whose rationale had always been questionable. 
Map 10. The Turkish Stream Gas Pipeline
 
(Source: The Reuters) 
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More importantly, Turkish Stream makes more strategic sense from Russia’s point of 
view. First, Turkey has a strategic importance to Russia, as Turkey is the only major 
expansion market for Russian gas in the 2020s and is already Gazprom’s second-largest 
gas customer in the European region after Germany, having imported 26.7 bcm in 
2013.538 Second, the pipeline to Turkey would also partly reduce Gazprom’s dependence 
on Ukraine as a transit route. About half of the gas Turkey imports from Russia now 
comes through Ukraine, and some of it would be replaced by Turkish Stream.539 Third, 
Turkish Stream would also place Russia in a powerful position to compete with gas from 
Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraqi Kurdistan, and any other potential sources passing through Turkey 
en route to Europe.540 Last, the fact that Turkey is not an EU member would make the 
construction of Turkish Stream easier, as it is not bound by the EU Third Energy Package.  
From Turkey’s perspective, the new pipeline would ensure direct delivery of Russian gas 
rather than Turkey remaining the last country in the geographical chain of the existing 
trans-Balkan pipeline route. While the Turkish government is not necessarily eager to 
increase its dependence on Russian gas, it needs to take into account the history of transit 
problems through Ukraine, which has impacted flows through the trans-Balkan pipeline. 
With the cancellation of South Stream, Turkey presumably has leverage vis-à-vis Russia 
because Turkey knows that if Gazprom cannot proceed quickly with the Turkish route, a 
lot of the potential cost savings may be lost. Russia already publicly offered a 6 percent 
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discount on Russian natural gas prices to Turkey, whereas Turkey, which pays 
substantially more for Russian gas than Germany does, is pressing for a better deal.541 
According to a Turkish official, Turkey appears to be trying to use Gazprom’s need for a 
face-saving alternative to South Stream as leverage to negotiate a lower price for Russian 
gas. Therefore, talks between Russian and Turkish officials on matters such as the precise 
routes and financial terms of a deal are said to be proceeding slowly.542 
Table 7. Prospective Southern Gas Corridor Pipelines 
 Nabucco Nabucco 
West 
TANAP TAP South Stream 
Length (km) 3,900 1,315 2,000 870 2,380 
Capacity 
(bcm/year) 
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Announced  2002  2011 2003 2007 
Construction    2014 2015 2012 started 
2014 
suspended 
Operational    2018 2018  
* Originally the project was planned to be two lines with a capacity of 31 bcm/year but, 
following the January 2009 Russia-Ukraine crisis, this was then expanded to four lines 
and 63 bcm/year.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The Caspian region is geographically landlocked, but at the crossroads between Western 
Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. Since the breakdown of the former Soviet Union 
(FSU) opened up enormous potential reserves of oil and gas in Central Asia, the main 
issue has been where, not whether, to develop transnational pipelines to bring Eurasia’s 
oil and gas to market. The emerging trend of transnational oil and gas pipelines in Eurasia 
has immense geopolitical and energy market implications. Transnational pipelines create 
long-term links between producer states, consumer states, and transit states. In particular, 
the choice of certain pipeline routes over others reflects political and energy priorities 
among participating countries.  
Cross-border pipelines that were built in the early 2000s to transport Caspian oil to the 
West are quite different from the pipeline projects that are currently being discussed or 
planned. When the idea of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan BTC pipeline was introduced soon 
after the breakup of Soviet Union, there was a great degree of cooperation between 
Russia and the West, which enabled the Caspian Pipeline Consoritum (CPC) pipeline and 




Such a degree of cooperation between Russia and the West is no longer possible, and 
decisions to choose certain pipeline routes and to develop trans-regional pipelines are 
now much more complicated. In the Caspian Sea region, different countries have 
different policy goals and are taking diverging approaches to developing energy 
resources. Moreover, things have been changing quickly in the region due to the Ukraine 
crisis, low international oil prices, the Eurasian Union, China’s moves into Central Asia 
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), as well as changes with regard to the 
Shah Deniz (SD) consortium. The SD consortium’s choice of the TAP and the TANAP 
pipelines over the Nabucco proposal for the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), as well as 
Russia’s cancellation of South Stream pipeline and its strategic move toward the Turkish 
Stream pipeline in the midst of the Ukraine crisis, for instance, illustrate regional power 
politics at work.  
After examining the changing geopolitical landscape and energy markets in the region, I 
found the following differences between BTC and SGC. First, given that BTC was an oil 
project where American companies (Chevron, Hess, and ConocoPhillips) were directly 
involved, the U.S. government was more committed to BTC than to SGC. In a similar 
fashion, Europe, with its quest for supply diversification of natural gas both in terms of 
sources and transit routes in order to reduce dependence on Russia, has been directly 
involved with the SD gas project (e.g., BP is the largest shareholder) and consequently 
with the Nabucco pipeline project. Second, Russia is currently playing a stronger role in 
the region than when BTC was built, as it attempts to maintain its control over the 
regional energy market. Third, the relationship between Azerbaijan and Russia is 




strongly pro-Western for both political and economic reasons, and the former Azerbaijani 
President Heydar Aliyev was absolutely determined to have an energy outlet to the West. 
However, current Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev is moving toward a policy of non-
alignment with the West (e.g., refusing to liberalize the country’s political system, 
becoming increasingly authoritarian, clamping down on pro-democracy activists, and 
freezing NGO accounts), while also trying to maintain pragmatic relations with Russia, 
although he is believed to be committed to the West regarding Ukraine. Fourth, there was 
a high degree of unity among the countries involved with BTC, which has not been the 
case with SGC. With the BTC, the political leaders of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey 
were all fully committed to the project and to each other. Now, the role of Turkey in 
particular has become much more complicated than before, with the emergence of energy 
policy fragmentation between Turkey and the EU, as well as Turkey’s strategic moves 
into developing new forms of bilateral energy diplomacy with natural gas producing 
countries such as Russia (e.g., the Turkish Stream pipeline project). 
However, BTC and SGC are similar in that changes in the geopolitical environment 
profoundly shape energy relations and affect the successful development of pipeline deals. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the geopolitical goal of enhancing Western 
involvement in the energy and security sectors of the Caspian region was a key factor 
driving commercial decisions in the BTC pipeline development – the first oil pipeline 
transporting Caspian oil to international markets without crossing through Russia. 
Competition over the SGC pipeline project to transport Caspian gas to Europe, 
meanwhile, illustrates the geopolitical rivalry between the EU and Russia, as well as 




control over the European market against the EU’s quest for supply diversification of 
natural gas, both in terms of sources and transit routes. The EU wants to reduce its 
dependence on Russia due to Russia’s gas disputes with key transit countries, which lead 
to unpredictable and consequential supply disruptions in Europe. In addition, the 
emergence of new geopolitical dynamics—in which Azerbaijan and Turkey, U.S. allies 
that worked with Washington on the BTC pipeline, now desire to avoid direct 
competition and maintain pragmatic relations with Russia—was one of the key elements 
in promoting the success of TAP and TANAP over other pipeline routes in the SGC 
competition.  
BTC and SGC are also similar in that both represent the combined ownership structure 
where both national oil companies (NOCs) and international oil companies (IOCs) are 
shareholders in the pipeline and upstream JVs. In particular, both BTC and SGC receive 
oil and gas from the respective upstream fields whose PSA consortia are led by IOCs. BP 
is the principal shareholder and project operator both in the JV consortium of the Azeri-
Chirag-Gunashli (ACG) oil field and and SD gas field. While Azerbaijan’s state oil 
company SOCAR is playing a larger role in the SGC development, as the largest 
shareholder in the TAP and TANAP JVs, than it played in the BTC project,543 the 
combined ownership structure of the BTC and SGC pipelines is certainly different from 
the Sino-Russian pipelines that are owned only by their NOCs. In contrast to NOC-
owned pipelines, pipelines with combined ownership involve multiple state and non-state 
actors. The BTC pipeline JV consortium consists of seven countries and eleven 
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companies, and the TAP and TANAP pipeline JVs combined comprise eight countries 
and eight companies. As I argued, the IOC-NOC combined ownership structure does 
more than the NOC–only ownership structure to facilitate the successful materialization 
of cross-border pipeline deals, even though such an ownership structure engages a larger 
number of actors, including companies from non-host countries.    
Finally, the Caspian pipeline cases confirmed that gas pipeline projects tend to take 
longer to materialize than oil pipelines. Beyond the clear market reasons that building 
natural gas pipelines are more technologically difficult and consequently more expensive 
than developing oil pipelines, natural gas trade tends to be more vulnerable to political 
influence than oil trade due to the fuels’ inherently different characteristics. I found that 
political-economic arrangements in host countries have a greater impact on the speed and 
success of cross-border pipeline projects for natural gas than for oil. Changing 
geopolitical dynamics concerning the SGC shows that gas pipelines are more vulnerable 
in geopolitical and external crises than oil pipelines such as the BTC, and are thus more 















This dissertation project has examined what brings countries into binding cross-border oil 
and gas pipeline deals and why some proposed pipeline projects materialize quickly 
while others do not. The purpose of the dissertation is to provide a more systematic 
explanation of how politics and energy markets are interconnected in the choice of supply 
routes and of how political and economic factors play out interactively in decisions 
regarding cross-border pipeline projects. The key findings are the following: (1) 
Geopolitical factors profoundly shape energy relations and affect the likelihood of 
successful pipeline deals and their speed regardless of the degree of economic incentive; 
(2) The degree of political alignment (i.e., political trust) between host countries and the 
ownership structure of pipelines likely determine the success and speed of cross-border 
pipeline deals; and (3) The political-economic arrangements of host countries affect the 
likelihood of successful pipeline deals and their speed more significantly in the field of 
natural gas than in oil.  
This chapter is organized as follows. The first section summarizes the entire dissertation, 
because it includes a thick and complicated description of case studies and statistical 
analysis. This summary helps readers see how four cases fit into my hypotheses and what 
the key findings of each case study contribute to my dissertation. The chapter then 
discusses the dissertation’s policy implications for the United States. 
SUMMARY 
The emerging trend of cross-border oil and gas pipelines in Eurasia has immense 
geopolitical and energy market implications. Since the breakdown of the former Soviet 




and the Russian Far East, the main issue has been where, not whether, to develop cross-
border pipelines to bring Eurasia’s oil and gas to international markets. With the 
changing landscape of global energy markets, access to and control over future oil and 
gas supplies, as well as control of oil and gas transportation links and transit 
infrastructure, has become a priority in both key consuming and producing states in 
Eurasia. They have strategic reasons to forge new transit routes and to diversify supply 
lines with new overland (or undersea) pipelines.  
Cross-border pipelines link states in long-term relationships between producer states, 
consumer states, and transit states. A choice of certain pipeline route over other various 
options reflects both energy security priorities and political relations of host countries 
involved in a pipeline project. Although the market can provide energy supplies, the 
market neither creates energy security nor has much to do with diversification of energy 
supply sources and transportation routes. In addition to market considerations, there are 
strategic reasons for developing cross-border pipelines between key producing and 
consuming states. It is frequently observed that some cross-border pipeline projects that 
are seemingly less economically justifiable become implemented because of strong 
political motivations. Conversely, some commercially viable pipeline projects are 
delayed for decades or never materialized due to lack of political motivations.  
In cases where clear economic incentives do not align with strong political motivations, 
what political-economic dynamics bring countries into binding cross-border oil and gas 
pipeline deals? How do political and economic factors play out interactively in decisions 
regarding cross-border pipeline projects, and to what extent do political factors affect the 




some proposed pipeline projects materialize quickly while others do not?  My dissertation 
examined these puzzles in order to provide a more systematic explanation of how energy 
infrastructure projects link states with energy markets, particularly in choices about 
supply routes.  
Looking at both the domestic and international levels, I explored political and economic 
factors and their underlying interconnected mechanisms that lead states to reach 
cooperative trans-border pipeline arrangements. I employed combined methods of 
statistical analysis and case studies to test my four working hypotheses: (H1) Geopolitical 
factors are likely to have an effect on the likelihood of a successful pipeline deal and its 
speed; (H2) When the level of political trust (i.e., political alignment) between host 
countries on a cross-border pipeline project is higher, it is more likely to increase the 
likelihood of a deal’s success and speed; (H3) When pipeline ownership is shared 
between host-country firms (either state-owned enterprises or multi-national 
corporations whose national origins belong to one of the host countries) and non-host 
country firms (either state-owned enterprises or multi-national corporations whose 
national origins do not belong to any of host countries), it is more likely to increase the 
likelihood of a deal’s success and speed; and (H4) The effect of political trust, 
geopolitical factors, and pipeline ownership structure on the pipeline deal’s success and 
speed is more pronounced in cases involving natural gas pipelines than oil pipelines.  
The purpose of the statistical analysis is to enable a structural understanding on the 
international political economy of cross-border oil pipelines, which is neglected in 
existing studies. I have constructed my own dataset on all pipelines in the world that are 




resources that are open to public (e.g., the LexisNexis database) to keep the track of 
industry sources and major newspapers. Constructing my own dataset was a very 
challenging task due to the limited accessibility to industry data (requiring very expensive 
subscriptions), thus resulting in many missing values in dependent variables (deal speed 
of a cross-border pipeline project) and independent variables (geopolitical and external 
crisis factors, political trust, and pipeline ownership structure). However, the statistical 
results reinforce my hypotheses in the following respects. First, they lend strong evidence 
that geopolitical and external crisis factors are likely to delay the speed of cross-border 
pipeline deals. Second, a higher level of political trust (i.e., higher level of political 
alignment between host countries) and a combined pipeline ownership structure 
consisting of both national oil companies (NOCs) and international oil companies (IOCs) 
are likely to expedite the speed of a successful cross-border pipeline deal. Third, cross-
border natural gas pipelines are more susceptible to external geopolitical factors and 
crisis situations than oil pipelines. Notwithstanding the constraints in my current dataset, 
this dissertation is among the first to quantitatively identify the key political and 
economic factors involved in successful cross-border pipeline projects and to provide a 
brief overview of all cross-border oil and gas pipelines in the world. 
In addition to the quantitative analysis, I conducted four case studies that focused on two 
regions (China-Russia and the Caspian region): (1) the completed oil pipeline of the 
Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean (ESPO) from Russia to China; (2) the planned gas 
pipeline projects of the Altai Pipeline and the Power of Siberia (POS) Pipeline from 
Russia to China; (3) the completed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline that has brought 




planned gas pipeline project of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) development544 to bring 
Caspian gas to Europe from Azerbaijan, via Georgia, Turkey, Greece, Albania, and Italy. 
While constructing a dataset, I learned that each pipeline has a different and complex 
story depending on domestic political and economic considerations, including countries’ 
energy bureaucracy and industry structures, their national and foreign policies, and their 
interactions with their geopolitical environments and international political-economic 
factors. Domestic arrangements in producer-, consumer-, and key transit states help 
determine a pipeline project’s commercial viability, security of supply, and the choice 
over various supply routes. Through case studies, my dissertation explained these 
domestic factors that are not assessed in the statistical analysis, as well as international 
factors that influence domestic political economies of host countries.    
It is worth noting why I chose my four cases and how each of them contributes to my 
hypotheses. First, I chose four cases that show variations in terms of relationship between 
economic and political incentives (see Figure 1 in Chapter 1). In planning and developing 
cross-border pipeline projects in Eurasia, it is frequently observed that strong political 
motivations do not necessarily align with clear economic incentives. Major energy deals 
in Eurasia often reveal that energy cooperation between states cannot be justified through 
purely economic considerations. Neither economic nor political incentives alone explain 
why these pipelines move forward. Emerging types of strategic energy cooperation in 
Eurasia are much more complex than energy partnerships in other regions, because states 
                                                        
544 The Southern Gas Corridor includes the expansion of the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline to Turkey from 
Azerbaijan, the construction of the Trans Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) across Turkey, and the 
construction of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) across Greece, Albania, and into Italy. The Southern Gas 
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with different cultures, economies, and political regimes are developing energy ties 
where they find complementarity.  
By paying close attention to the cross-border pipeline projects where economic and 
political incentives moved in opposite directions, my dissertation explored the underlying 
mechanisms of political-economic dynamics that led states to agree binding cross-border 
pipeline deals. Sino-Russian oil and gas pipelines are cases where the deals were delayed 
for decades due to lack of political willingness among the parties despite clear economic 
incentives (as these neighboring states could enjoy supply-demand complementarity – 
with one as a major energy importer, and the other as a major energy exporter). The BTC 
oil pipeline is a case where strong political alignment between states drove the deal 
despite a lack of economic incentives for international oil companies, particularly until 
the late stage of pipeline planning (e.g., a relatively small volume of oil). The SGC 
pipeline project is a case where the deals proceeded with a high-to-medium level of 
political alignment and economic incentives among host countries. The degree of 
political alignment among host countries for the SGC pipeline project is not resolved, 
given that dynamics are changing quickly in the region due to the Ukraine crisis, Russia’s 
subsequent cancellation of the South Stream pipeline, and Moscow’s strategic moves 
toward the Turkish Stream pipeline. The degree of political alignment among host 
countries seems to keep declining and is difficult to estimate because participating 
countries with different policy goals are taking diverging approaches to energy resources. 
Compared to the other three cases, however, the SGC pipeline project is a case where 
there are substantial political and economic incentives, rather than a case where political 




cross-border pipelines in Eurasia proceed differently from pipelines in North America or 
Europe, where clear and strong political and economic incentives exist within a solidified 
institutional basis for multilateral cooperation. My dissertation does not include any cases 
involving a pipeline project that has low economic and political incentives, because it is 
self-evident that such a project is unlikely to materialize.    
Second, I chose four cases that show variations in terms of pipeline type (i.e., direct link 
pipeline vs. multi-state export pipeline), the number of host countries, and the speed of 
pipeline deals (i.e., the number of years to finalize the deals). I selected four cases that 
went against the prevailing assumption that the more parties involved in a cross-border 
pipeline project, the harder it is to negotiate, reach investment decisions, and finalize 
intergovernmental agreements. Intuitively, multi-state export pipelines incur more risks 
than direct link pipelines because multi-state export pipelines involve multiple parties 
including transit state(s) without overarching jurisdiction. Although Sino-Russian oil and 
gas pipeline deals involved fewer number of actors than the oil and gas pipeline projects 
to bring Caspian hydrocarbons to Europe, Sino-Russian direct-link pipeline deals took 
much longer to finalize than those of the multi-state export pipelines carrying Caspian oil 
and gas. Through the four selected cases, my dissertation examined why some bilateral 
deals of direct-link pipelines face or have faced many more obstacles than multi-state 
export pipelines in Eurasia, how the nature of energy relations in Eurasia is different from 
other parts of the world, and how political and economic factors play out interactively in 
driving the successful launch of each cross-border pipeline project.  
Third, I chose four cases that are representative of other cross-border pipeline projects in 




structure and fuel type. Sino-Russian pipelines represent the pipeline ownership and 
financing structure driven exclusively by NOCs, whereas the pipelines from the Caspian 
region represent combined pipeline ownership between NOCs and IOCs, and a joint 
venture (JV) consortium for the financing, construction, and operation of pipelines. The 
ESPO pipeline from Russia to China and the BTC pipeline from the Caspian to the West 
represent cross-border oil pipelines, while the POS and Altai pipelines from Russia to 
China and the SGC pipeline network from the Caspian to Europe represent natural gas 
pipelines.    
The key finding of Sino-Russian pipeline cases is that geopolitical changes due to crisis 
situations have profoundly shaped bilateral energy relations in both oil and gas deals. 
Notably, the two countries’ binding agreements for cross-border oil and gas pipelines 
were signed when 1) Russian-Western relations were at odds – with Russia’s invasion of 
Georgia in 2008 and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 – and/or 2) unexpected 
external factors such as the Global Financial Crisis and collapsing oil prices compelled 
Russia to rely on Chinese capital. Although I examined the differences between oil and 
gas deals (i.e., why Sino-Russian cooperation in the oil sector was easier and materialized 
earlier than in the natural gas sector), I also paid close attention to their similarities in 
order to explain why Sino-Russian bilateral deals for direct-link pipelines took much 
longer to finalize than the deals for multi-state export pipelines carrying Caspian 
hydrocarbons to European markets.   
I argue that the fundamental similarity between Sino-Russian oil and gas deals is that 
changes in the geopolitical environment have caused both Russia and China to alter their 




became willing to compromise on the fundamental disagreements over price and equity, 
only as part of efforts to preserve its geopolitical leverage with major powers such as the 
United States and Europe at critical historical points. Without a doubt, the inflow of 
Chinese capital (e.g., three major “loans for oil” to Russian companies from the Chinese 
Development Bank) has served as a key driver to the finalization of cross-border 
agreements between the two countries. On China’s end, there are strong market and 
strategic incentives to diversify its energy import portfolio with Russian oil and gas. 
China’s decision to import and invest in Russian oil and gas captures how government 
concerns about security of supply and domestic political agendas (e.g., Beijing’s air-
pollution issues and President Xi’s anti-corruption campaign) are interlinked with 
national oil companies’ commercial interests. 
I also argue that lack of political alignment between China and Russia due to mutual 
mistrust was one of the key elements delaying the finalization of both oil and gas deals. 
Sino-Russian pipeline deals took a much longer time to finalize due to low political trust 
between the two countries and despite substantial economic incentives both countries 
would enjoy from energy cooperation (e.g., supply-demand complementarity and 
economic development in the Russian Far East), whereas relatively high levels of 
political trust (i.e., political alignment) among host countries enabled Caspian pipelines to 
be realized sooner despite less substantial economic incentives (e.g., relatively small 
volumes of oil and gas). Moscow fears that with the widening gap between a rising China 
and a declining Russia, increasing dependence on China as an energy export destination 
will eventually constitute a threat to national security. Beijing, meanwhile, is suspicious 




countries—which is driven by lingering historic distrust, Russia’s perception of the 
Chinese demographic threat in the Russian Far East, and strategic competition over 
shared regions such as Central Asia—has hindered their energy ties from evolving into an 
enduring and comprehensive partnership.  
The transactional nature of Sino-Russian energy relations has prevented the two countries 
from successful engagement and materialization of any major joint venture participation 
in the Russian upstream development so far. Although Russia has invited Chinese 
participation in less significant oil upstream projects and Rosneft, in particular, has 
consistently tried to open the Russian upstream sector to Chinese NOCs, there have been 
no major Chinese equity acquisitions in Russia’s oil and natural gas sector. This is not 
only because Russia allowed only limited foreign participation in the development of the 
country’s strategic oil and gas assets, but also because the two countries are still 
suspicious of each other on other dimensions such as politics. In addition, China and 
Russia have not formed any JVs in the development of oil and gas pipelines. The ESPO 
oil pipeline is owned and operated by Transneft, Russia’s state-owned pipeline monopoly, 
except for the Chinese section of the spur line from Russia. As Russia did not allow 
Chinese NOCs to take equity positions in Russia’s upstream, China instead financed the 
target supply source through loans to make sure of long-term energy security. Although 
the arrangements in terms of financing for the construction and gas supply of the POS gas 
pipeline have not been disclosed, they are likely to be in a similar format with those of 
ESPO.    
In contrast to the similarities between oil and gas deals, Sino-Russian gas deals took 




gas as commodities and (2) the contrast between Rosneft’s proactive approach in oil 
cooperation with China and Gazprom’s rigid stance toward China. First, while oil is an 
international commodity, natural gas is a regional commodity. While the price of oil 
generally refers to the spot price545 of a barrel of benchmark of crude oil,546 the pricing 
mechanism for natural gas displays regional differentiation. Outside of North America 
(where a deregulated Henry Hub pricing mechanism of spot indexation reigns), countries 
typically sign a contract for natural gas trade that is linked to oil prices and has a long-
term (usually thirty-year) “take-or-pay” clause.547  In this respect, the gas pricing 
mechanism requires direct and long-term relationships between supplier and consumer 
states. Consequently, I argue that the gas trade is more vulnerable to the political 
orientation of the involved governments than oil trade because natural gas is produced, 
transported, and traded through regional and fragmented markets.  
Second, the difference between Sino-Russian oil sector and gas sector cooperation in 
terms of progress lies in Rosneft and Gazprom’s differing approaches toward China and 
Asia-Pacific. Rosneft took the lead in developing the Russian Far East through oil deals 
with China (via inland pipeline and shipping by sea) as the company views the Asia-
Pacific market as the baseline for its future business. Consequently, Rosneft has 
obviously been the primary driving force of Sino-Russian oil cooperation. In contrast, 
                                                        
545 A spot contract is a transaction for the buying and selling a commodity, security, or currency for 
settlement (payment and delivery) on the spot date, which is normally two business days after the trade date. 
The settlement price is called spot price.  
546 A benchmark crude or market crude is a crude oil that serves as a reference price for buyers and sellers 
of crude oil. There are three primary benchmarks, West Texas Intermediate (WTI), Brent Blend, and Dubai 
Crude. Other well-known blends include the OPEC Reference Basket used by OPEC, Tapis Crude (which 
is traded in Singapore), Bonny Light used in Nigeria, Urals oil used in Russia, and Mexico’s Isthmus. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benchmark_(crude_oil)  
547 “Take-or-pay” clauses require the buyer to take an annual minimum volume of natural gas or to pay for 




Gazprom retained a rigid stance toward China not only because the company enjoys its 
monopoly over Russian gas in the European market, but also because it does not 
understand the Chinese business culture (such as Chinese approach to negotiations) as 
well as Rosneft does. Gazprom’s European-oriented business strategy caused it to delay 
in reaching a gas price compromise with China, which motivated China to prioritize its 
supply options from Central Asia, particularly from Turkmenistan. Until Gazprom was 
pushed to participate in the gas deal with China by Russian President Vladimir Putin 
given the geopolitical turmoil of the Ukraine crisis and resulting Western sanctions, 
Gazprom continuously delayed signing the deal because of its low profit margins. This 
move was driven by Gazprom’s strategic decision not to lose its window of opportunity 
in the Asia-Pacific market, whereas Rosneft has already moved into China on account of 
commercial considerations. 
The POS and Altai gas pipeline projects are both considered to be Putin’s signature 
projects for finding new markets for Russia’s energy resources in Asia, in response to 
Europe’s determination to cut back its reliance on Russian energy. The geopolitical 
turmoil of the Ukraine crisis and resulting Western sanctions occurred right around the 
time China and Russia signed a final agreement on the POS gas pipeline following 
China’s preferred eastern gas supply route. After the deal, however, Russia prioritized the 
Altai project through the western gas supply route that Russia prefers, given that the 
prolonged Western sanctions and the collapse of the Russian ruble following the steep 
drop in global oil prices made the POS project unprofitable for Gazprom. On China’s end, 
however, any progress for the Altai pipeline project seems to be stalled because China’s 




Given that China is reviewing its energy needs and its access to LNG is increasing due to 
the fall in oil prices, it is not likely that China is willing to change its priority from 
eastern to western gas pipeline route. Low international oil prices, if sustained for a 
prolonged period, may add even more complications to the second China-Russia gas deal 
negotiations.  
After considering Russia-China oil and gas pipelines, my dissertation moved on to the 
cases of oil and gas pipelines carrying Caspian hydrocarbons to European markets. The 
key finding regarding the Caspian oil and gas pipelines is that changes in the geopolitical 
environment profoundly shaped energy relations and affected the successful development 
of pipeline deals. Both the BTC oil pipeline and the SGC pipeline network have similar 
motivations, in that the United States and Europe have strategic reasons to develop 
pipeline routes bypassing Russia and Iran. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
geopolitical goal of enhancing Western involvement in the energy and security sectors of 
the Caspian region was a key factor driving commercial decisions in the development of 
the BTC oil pipeline. Indeed, BTC is the first pipeline transporting Caspian oil to 
international markets without crossing through Russia. In a similar respect, competition 
over the SGC pipeline projects to transport Caspian natural gas to Europe illustrates the 
geopolitical rivalry between the EU and Russia, as well as changing dynamics in regional 
power politics. While Russia is trying hard to maintain its control over the European gas 
market, the EU wants to reduce its dependence on Russia mainly due to Russia’s gas 
disputes with key transit countries, which have led to unpredictable and consequential 




involving Azerbaijan and Turkey was one of the key elements in promoting the success 
of TAP and TANAP over other pipeline routes in the SGC competition.  
The BTC oil pipeline and the SGC gas pipeline network are also similar in that both 
reflect a combined ownership structure where both NOCs and IOCs are shareholders in 
the pipeline and upstream JVs. BTC and SGC both receive energy resources from 
upstream fields whose production-sharing agreement (PSA) consortia are led by IOCs. 
BP is the principal shareholder and project operator both in the JV consortium of the 
Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (ACG) oil field (which contributes to the BTC) and the Shah 
Deniz (SD) gas field (which contributes to the SGC). While Azerbaijan’s state oil 
company SOCAR is playing a larger role in the development of SGC— as the largest 
shareholder in the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and the Trans Anatolian Pipeline 
(TANAP) JVs—than it played in the BTC project,548 the combined ownership structure 
of both the BTC and SGC pipelines is certainly different from the Sino-Russian pipelines 
that are owned only by their NOCs. As I argued, the combined IOC-NOC ownership 
structure does more than the NOC–only ownership structure to facilitate the successful 
materialization of cross-border pipeline deals, even though such an ownership structure 
engages a larger number of actors, including companies from non-host countries. 
Moreover, BTC and SGC are similar in that they both have relatively stronger political 
alignment (i.e., higher levels of political trust) amongst host countries than the degree of 
political alignment in the case of Sino-Russian oil and gas pipeline development, which 
                                                        
548 SOCAR held the second-largest shares in the BTC pipeline JV, while it is the largest shareholder in the 
TAP and TANAP JVs. In the TANAP pipeline consortium, SOCAR holds the same number of shares as 




enabled Caspian oil and gas pipelines to be realized sooner than Sino-Russian oil and gas 
pipelines. 
However, my dissertation also found significant differences between BTC and SGC. First, 
the BTC oil pipeline is a case where direct, consistent U.S. involvement and strong 
political alignment between host countries and the West drove the successful 
materialization of a cross-border oil pipeline bypassing the Russian territory, despite low 
economic incentives for IOCs. The SGC gas pipeline project, meanwhile, is a case where 
there are relatively high degrees of economic incentives and political trust among host 
countries. Facing a direct rivalry between EU and Russia, the TAP and TANAP pipelines 
were finally chosen over the EU-backed Nabucco pipeline and the Russia-backed South 
Stream pipeline. While SOCAR held the second-largest number of shares in the BTC 
pipeline JV after BP, SOCAR is playing a larger role as the largest shareholder in both 
the TAP and TANAP pipeline JVs.  
Second, Russia is currently playing a stronger role in the Caspian region than when BTC 
was built, which is changing the regional power dynamics. Azerbaijan and Turkey, U.S. 
allies that worked with Washington on the BTC pipeline, now desire to avoid direct 
competition and maintain pragmatic relations with Russia. Azerbaijan and Turkey’s 
changing approaches toward the West and Russia explain why the SD consortium chose 
TAP and TANAP over the Nabucco pipeline (that was proposed by EU) for the SGC 
development. Even after the deals for TAP and TANAP were finalized, things have been 
changing quickly in the region due to the crises in Ukraine and Syria, as well as low oil 
prices. Russia’s cancellation of the South Stream pipeline and its strategic move toward 




politics at work. The degree of commitment that host countries made to the BTC project 
does not seem to exist with the SGC project, as different countries have different policy 
goals and are taking diverging approaches to developing energy resources, given the 
changing geopolitical landscape and energy markets in the region.  
In summary, both statistical results and case studies generally support the hypotheses of 
my dissertation. First of all, the key empirical finding from quantitative and qualitative 
analyses is that geopolitical and external crisis factors affect the likelihood of successful 
oil and gas pipeline deals and their speed regardless of political and commercial 
alignment between host countries. However, the effect of geopolitical factors can be 
interpreted differently in statistical analysis and case studies. While statistical findings 
lend strong evidence that geopolitical factors are likely to delay the speed of cross-border 
pipeline deals, the cases of Sino-Russian oil and gas pipelines show geopolitical factors 
motivated the countries to make a strategic decision to finalize long-delayed bilateral oil 
and gas deals at critical historical points.  
The reason why the effect of geopolitical factors is likely to be interpreted in the opposite 
direction in statistical analysis and case studies is mainly because of the difference in 
methodological approaches. While statistical analysis identifies the generalized effect of 
geopolitical factors on the speed of cross-border oil and gas pipeline deals in the world, 
case studies examine complex causal mechanisms involved in individual pipelines. In 
addition to geopolitical factors, other international political-economic factors such as 
political alignment and pipeline ownership structure, as well as domestic political-
economic factors such as energy bureaucracy and oil and gas industry structure, are all 




geopolitical factors in the Sino-Russian cases is embedded in the complex mechanisms of 
political and economic factors at both the domestic and international level. In this respect, 
the case study offers more nuanced and sophisticated explanations than statistical 
analysis as to why Sino-Russian cases of bilateral direct-link pipelines have faced many 
more obstacles than multi-state export pipelines in bringing Caspian oil and gas to market, 
and how geopolitical factors play a role in the Sino-Russian pipeline development.  
Overall, notwithstanding the limitations of the quantitative aspects of my dissertation 
(e.g., small final sample size), these quantitative calculations form the basis for the 
dissertation’s more in-depth qualitative case discussions: namely, that geopolitical factors 
are likely to affect the likelihood of successful pipeline deals and to delay their speed, 
whereas a higher level of political alignment and a combined NOC-IOC pipeline 
ownership structure are likely to expedite the deal speed. Case studies offer detailed 
subnational analysis of changing internal political-economic dynamics that lead countries 
to reach cooperative trans-border arrangements of pipeline development, in addition to 
detailed analysis of relevant external political-economic factors. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
Geopolitics has been changing rapidly even after the cross-border gas pipeline deals – 
both the Sino-Russian deal and the Southern Gas Corridor – were signed. Russia is 
struggling with the Ukraine crisis and resulting Western sanctions, as well as low 
international oil prices and collapse of the ruble. In particular, Gazprom’s contract with 
China to develop the POS gas pipeline offers no protection against low oil prices (which 




prices. There has been speculation, therefore, that Russia is prioritizing the development 
of the Altai gas pipeline, which is a cheaper option for Russia but more expensive for 
China, while postponing the POS gas pipeline project. However, any progress for the 
Altai pipeline project seems to have stalled at this point, given that China’s demand 
growth for natural gas is slowing due to the country’s economic slowdown. Growth in oil 
demand is also slowing as the Chinese economy decelerates, and the increases in demand 
growth for both oil and natural gas will likely halve by the end of the decade.549 China is 
reviewing its energy needs with its economic slowdown, which may add even more 
complications to the agreed-upon Sino-Russian gas deals.  
On the other hand, Russia announced to abandon the South Stream gas pipeline due to 
strong opposition from the EU, which was stiffened after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. 
The South Stream project was no longer affordable due to the economic problems not 
only stemming from Western sanctions, but also from falling oil prices and the 
plummeting ruble. Instead, Russia named Turkey as its preferred partner to build an 
alternative pipeline, the so-called Turkish Stream. Many in the West thought it might be 
merely a bluff to make the EU reconsider its opposition to South Stream or a face-saving 
measure to send political messages to the rest of the world that Russia always has other 
options during a crisis. Regardless of whether the Turkish Stream proposal is just a bluff 
or a face-saving measure, what are policy implications to U.S.?   
Russia tends to pursue partnerships with countries such as China and Turkey to keep its 
geopolitical leverage with major powers such as the United States and the EU. Some 
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Chinese scholars argue it is an open secret that the Chinese policy elites are sympathetic 
to Russia, partly due to their belief that the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), and other Western countries are primarily responsible for 
destabilizing Ukraine in the first place, although Beijing remains neutral in the Russian-
Ukrainian confrontation.550 Under pressure from Western sanctions over the Ukrainian 
crisis, Putin signed the energy deals with China, confronting with the West and 
demonstrating that Russia cannot be isolated economically and politically.  
Similarly, Russia is strengthening its ties with Turkey which has had complicated 
relationships with the EU recently, mainly due to the EU’s delay in Turkey’s accession 
negotiations regarding EU membership and the EU energy chapter. While Turkey has 
been considered a U.S. ally on issues such as the Syrian crisis, Russia plays a major role 
in Turkey. Moscow is not only Turkey’s main energy supplier,551 but also a partner for its 
first nuclear power plant. At the same time, Turkey holds strategic importance for Russia. 
First, the Turkish Stream pipeline to Turkey would partly reduce Gazprom’s dependence 
on Ukraine as a transit route. Second, the pipeline would also place Russia in a powerful 
position to compete with gas from Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraqi Kurdistan, and any other 
potential sources passing through Turkey en route to Europe. Third, the fact that Turkey 
is not a EU member would make the construction of the Turkish Stream pipeline easier, 
as the country is not bounded by the EU Third Energy Package. Meanwhile, after Russia 
failed to have much control over Bulgaria regarding the South Stream pipeline due to 
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551 Turkey currently imports more than half of its natural gas (about 55 to 60 percent) and around 30 




strong opposition from the European Commission, Russia is moving to focus on another 
weak state, Greece, by developing new forms of bilateral energy diplomacy.  
How should the United States deal with Russia in its strategic moves into developing new 
forms of bilateral energy diplomacy? How should Washington view new Eurasian 
pipeline networks and deal with the weakening U.S. positions in the region? The United 
States has significant energy security and strategic interests at stake in the geography of 
pipeline development in Eurasia. The current trend of cross-border pipeline network 
across Eurasia, however, is reshaping how Washington pursues its energy security goals. 
The changing landscape of geopolitics and energy markets are different from the late 
1990s and the early and mid-2000s when the United States had more actively sought to 
influence the geography of pipeline routes from the Caspian region in order to limit 
Russia’s control over European oil and gas markets as well as over the scale and direction 
of oil and gas supplies to Europe and Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
First, Russia and the Central Asian states have become more capable and active in 
pursuing their national energy interests. Russia tried hard to maintain as much control as 
possible over the transport of Caspian oil and gas to Western markets. Such efforts 
helped reassert broader Russian geopolitical and economic influence in the region, while 
at the same time protecting Gazprom’s dominant gas market position in Europe from 
competition with Caspian gas. Regional powers such as Azerbaijan and Turkey, whose 
policies in the 1990s and early 2000s were strongly pro-Western for both political and 
economic reasons, now desire to avoid direct competition and maintain pragmatic 
relations with Russia. Second, China’s rising political and economic power in the 




direction of the pipeline transportation grid toward the east, which will likely weaken the 
U.S. position in the region. Third, low oil prices and China’s economic slowdown will 
likely decrease the prospects for the U.S. shale oil and gas imports. Given that the crude 
imports from major consuming countries are not growing as fast as they were in the past, 
the United States will have to compete with key producing countries including Russia for 
global market share. All these factors suggest that looming competition to determine in 
which direction Russia’s hydrocarbon will flow (west to Europe, or south to China) and 
Caspian oil and gas will flow (west to Europe, east to China, or south through Iran) will 
be far more difficult for the United States to influence than has been the case during the 







Table 8. Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min 
Deal Speed 11.58537 9.055318 2 
Geopolitics 0.3835616 0.4896182 0 
PoliticalTrust 0.8803512 0.0863885 0.55556 
Ownership 0.5384615 0.5023981 0 
PipeLength 1529.167 1415.331 140 




Table 9. Correlation Matrix 
        
 Deal Speed Geopolitics PoliticalTrust Ownership PipeLength CountryNumbers  
Deal Speed 1       
Geopolitics 0.4035 1      
PoliticalTrust -0.1432 -0.0517 1     
Ownership -0.0585 0.3669 0.2312 1    
PipeLength 0.2363 -0.0811 -0.1468 -0.3911 1   
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